JESIP RESOURCE MANUAL

FEBRUARY 2018

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Working Together – Saving Lives

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JOINT DOCTRINE:

THE INTEROPERABILITY FRAMEWORK

EDITION 2 JULY 2016

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1. FOREWORD

Welcome to the second edition of the *"Joint Doctrine: the interoperability framework"*.

Whilst joint working between agencies is a daily occurrence, whenever we work together and especially at major incidents, we need to ensure that we have the most coherent and effective joint response possible - the public will expect no less.

This guidance has been recognised as significantly improving the interoperability of emergency services since its publication in 2013. This revised edition continues to provide a framework to support and enhance interoperability between emergency response organisations when responding to multi-agency incidents.

The review of this guidance has been coordinated by the JESIP team along with the emergency services, other responder agencies and the central government departments including the Cabinet Office, Home Office, Department for Communities and Local Government and the Department of Health.

The content, whilst largely similar to the first edition, has been enhanced to provide more clarity in certain aspects and incorporates lessons from training, exercises and incidents which have been identified through the Joint Organisational Learning process.

This guidance remains essential to the effective interoperability of emergency services and other responder agencies and will be subject to future changes and improvements as it is tested and incorporated into business as usual. We need to make sure that the ethos of 'working together' becomes embedded, not only within our own organisations at every level, but within that of the other responder agencies.

The 'Joint Doctrine' is an essential element in the hierarchy of guidance. It provides commanders, at the scene and elsewhere, with generic guidance on the actions they should take when responding to multi-agency incidents of any scale. It is built on common principles for consistent terminology and ways of working. It does not constitute a set of rules to be applied without thought, but rather seeks to inform, explain and guide.

It should be embedded in individual organisation policies and procedures and in their training and exercise programmes, for all levels of response staff.

We are extremely grateful to those individuals and their supporting organisations who have contributed up to this point. If you have any comments about the document, or any questions as to how you might act upon this doctrine, please email them to contact@jesip.org.uk

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CFOA Chief Fire Officers Association	Association of Ambulance Chief Executives	NPCC National Police Chiefs' Council

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2. STATUS OF THE DOCTRINE

The structure for managing the local multi-agency response to emergencies is based on the Civil Contingencies Act (2004). The act is supported by two sets of guidance: Emergency Preparedness and Emergency Response and Recovery (ERR). Emergency Preparedness deals with the pre-emergency (planning) phase. Emergency Response and Recovery (ERR) describes the multi-agency framework for responding to, and recovering from, emergencies in the UK.

Details of the operation and co-ordination of emergency response can be found in the Cabinet Office Concept of Operations and the relevant chapters of Emergency Response and Recovery.

This publication complements Emergency Response and Recovery (ERR) by focusing on the interoperability of the emergency services and other responder agencies in the response to an incident.

Separate publications set out specialist ways of working that will apply in specific circumstances, such as chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRNe) incidents or marauding terrorist firearms attacks (MTFA). These specialist response documents reflect the generic guidance found in this publication.



Figure 1- Emergency response documentation hierarchy

3. PRINCIPLES FOR JOINT WORKING

The need for a joint response is not new. The findings and lessons identified by public inquiries and inquests have highlighted cases where the emergency services could have worked better together and shown much greater levels of communication, co-operation and co-ordination.

As well as improving joint working between the emergency services, this document emphasises the need for all responding organisations to work in a joint and co-ordinated approach.

Policies and procedures that promote joint working form the basis of the doctrine for responding services. Applying simple principles for joint working are particularly important in the early stages of an incident, when clear, robust decisions and actions need to be taken with minimum delay, in an often rapidly changing environment.

Those principles are illustrated in the diagram below. They will often, but not always, be followed in the order in which they are presented.

In the early stages of an incident, employees of one service may arrive before the employees of another, and as a result they may carry out tasks that are not normally their responsibility. If this happens, command and control arrangements for the relevant service should start as soon as the right personnel are in place in sufficient numbers.

Co-locate
Co-locate with commanders as soon as practicably possible at a single, safe and easily identified location near to the scene.

Communicate
Communicate clearly using plain English.

Co-ordinate
Co-ordinate by agreeing the lead service. Identify priorities, resources and capabilities for an effective response, including the timing of further meetings.

Jointly understand risk
Jointly understand risk by sharing information about the likelihood and potential impact of threats and hazards to agree potential control measures.

Shared situational awareness
Shared Situational Awareness established by using METHANE and the Joint Decision Model.

Figure 2 - Principles for joint working

3.1. CO-LOCATION

When commanders are co-located, they can perform the functions of command, control and co-ordination face-to-face. They should meet as early as possible, at a jointly agreed location at the scene that is known as the Forward Command Post (FCP). This allows them to establish jointly agreed objectives and a co-ordinated plan, resulting in more effective incident resolution.
The benefits of co-location apply equally at all levels of command.

If there is any delay in commanders co-locating, interoperable communications should be used to begin establishing shared situational awareness.

The operational and tactical commanders of each service should be easily identifiable at an incident. This is usually achieved by wearing role specific tabards. There are exceptions, such as at public order and other specialist incidents where coloured epaulettes and helmet markings are used.
See JESIP: incident commander tabards for more information.

Although not all responders will have role specific tabards they should wear appropriate personal protective equipment (PPE) and have identification as a minimum.

3.2. COMMUNICATION

Meaningful and effective communication between responders and responder agencies underpins effective joint working.

Sharing and understanding information aids the development of shared situational awareness, which underpins the best possible outcomes of an incident.

The following supports successful communication between responders and responder agencies:

- Exchanging reliable and accurate information, such as critical information about hazards, risks and threats
- Ensuring the information shared is free from acronyms and other potential sources of confusion
- Understanding the responsibilities and capabilities of each of the responder agencies involved
- Clarifying that information shared, including terminology and symbols, is understood and agreed by all involved in the response

3.2.1. COMMON TERMINOLOGY

Using terminology that either means different things to different people, or is simply not understood across different services is a potential barrier to interoperability.

The Lexicon of UK civil protection terminology sets out definitions for common terminology in emergency management, including important terms in interoperability. There is also a set of common map symbols for civil protection.

Emergency services and responder agencies should cross-reference definitions in their own organisation's documents and adopt the common definitions contained from the Lexicon. Agreeing and using common terminology is a building block for interoperability. If there is any doubt about what is meant by a specific term, individuals should check and confirm whether a common understanding has been established.

Some of the terms used in this document are key to successful joint working and responders should understand them. Definitions and a short explanation can be found here.

3.3. CO-ORDINATION

Co-ordination involves commanders discussing resources and the activities of each responder agency, agreeing priorities and making joint decisions throughout the incident. Co-ordination underpins joint working by avoiding potential conflicts, preventing duplication of effort and minimising risk

For effective co-ordination, one agency generally needs to take a lead role. To decide who the lead agency should be, factors such as the phase of the incident, the need for specialist capabilities and investigation, during both the response and recovery phases should be considered. There is specific guidance for some types of incidents, highlighting which agency should take the lead role. The decision on who takes the lead role should be documented – the lead agency may change as the incident develops.

The lead agency should chair co-ordinating meetings and make sure they take place regularly.

3.4. JOINT UNDERSTANDING OF RISK

Different responder agencies may see, understand and treat risks differently.

Each agency should carry out their own 'dynamic risk assessments' but then share the results so that they can plan control measures and contingencies together more effectively.

By jointly understanding risks and the associated mitigating actions, organisations can promote the safety of responders and reduce the impact that risks may have on members of the public, infrastructure and the environment.

3.5. SHARED SITUATIONAL AWARENESS

'Shared situational awareness' is a common understanding of the circumstances, immediate consequences and implications of the emergency, along with an appreciation of the available capabilities and the priorities of the emergency services and responder agencies.

Achieving shared situational awareness is essential for effective interoperability. Establishing shared situational awareness is important for a common understanding at all levels of command, between incident commanders and between control rooms.

4. THE EARLY STAGES OF A MULTI-AGENCY OR MAJOR INCIDENT

Recognising that an incident will involve working with other emergency services and/or other responder agencies is very important. The earlier other responder agencies are notified of the incident, the sooner joint working arrangements can be agreed and put into place.

For incidents with multiple sites, or an incident that initially appears to be a number of separate incidents, emergency service control rooms are best placed to recognise that a 'multi-agency' incident or 'major incident' may be in progress.

In other cases, first responders may recognise the nature of an incident and the need for a multi-agency response.

During the early stages of an incident it takes time for operational structures, resources and protocols to be put in place. This is likely to put initial responders and control rooms under considerable pressure. All the required information may not be available and commanders may have insufficient resources to deal with the incident.

In order to help all agencies gather initial information about an incident in a consistent manner, a common approach is recommended. The 'METHANE' model brings structure and clarity to the initial stages of managing any multi-agency or major incident.

A major incident is defined as[1]:

> ***An event or situation with a range of serious consequences which requires special arrangements to be implemented by one or more emergency responder agency.***

Declaring a 'major incident' triggers a predetermined strategic and tactical response from each emergency service and other responder agencies. It takes time for operational structures, resources and protocols to be put in place. Declaring that a major incident is in progress as soon as possible means these arrangements can be put in place as quickly as possible.

[1] See Cabinet Office Lexicon of civil protection terminology

5. M/ETHANE

The METHANE model is an established reporting framework which provides a common structure for responders and their control rooms to share major incident information. It is recommended that M/ETHANE be used for all incidents.

For incidents falling below the major incident threshold 'METHANE' becomes an 'ETHANE' message. During the decision making process using the joint decision model, there should be period consideration of the 'M' (representing 'major incident') by responders to establish whether a developing incident goes above the major incident threshold.

Each responder agency should send a M/ETHANE message to their control room as soon as possible. The first resources to arrive on scene should send the M/ETHANE message so that situational awareness can be established quickly. The information received through multiple M/ETHANE messages will gradually build to support shared situational awareness in those responding to the incident and between control rooms.

M	**M**AJOR INCIDENT	Has a major incident or standby been declared? (Yes / No - if no, then complete ETHANE message)	*Include the date and time of any declaration.*
E	**E**XACT LOCATION	What is the exact location or geographical area of the incident?	*Be as precise as possible, using a system that will be understood by all responders.*
T	**T**YPE OF INCIDENT	What kind of incident is it?	*For example, flooding, fire, utility failure or disease outbreak.*
H	**H**AZARDS	What hazards or potential hazards can be identified?	*Consider the likelihood of a hazard and the potential severity of any impact.*
A	**A**CCESS	What are the best routes for access and egress?	*Include information on inaccessible routes and rendezvous points (RVPs). Remember that services need to be able to leave the scene as well as access it.*
N	**N**UMBER OF CASUALTIES	How many casualties are there, and what condition are they in?	*Use an agreed classification system such as 'P1', 'P2', 'P3' and 'dead'.*
E	**E**MERGENCY SERVICES	Which, and how many, emergency responder assets and personnel are required or are already on-scene?	*Consider whether the assets of wider emergency responders, such as local authorities or the voluntary sector, may be required.*

6. CONTROL ROOMS

Control rooms play a vital role in managing the early stages of a multi-agency incident. There cannot be a co-ordinated multi-agency response or effective communication if control rooms do not deliver a swift and joint approach to handling them.

Specific control room guidance in the interoperability framework builds consistency into the procedures and working practices of emergency service control rooms.

This guidance sets out how control rooms, working together, start the principles for joint working. It also sets out what responders can expect from their respective control rooms when attending a multi-agency incident.

The control room guidance is divided into three sections, which align to the principles for joint working:

- Communication
- Shared situational awareness and joint understanding of risk
- Co-ordination and co-location

As with the five principles for joint working, they do not have to be followed in the order in which they are presented.

Control rooms generally operate from separate fixed locations and therefore cannot feasibly co-locate. They can, however, help in co-locating responders and commanders by jointly agreeing the initial multi-agency rendezvous points.

6.1. COMMUNICATION

6.1.1. SUPPORTING PRINCIPLE 1

A dialogue between control room supervisors should be established as soon as possible.

A multi-agency discussion between control room supervisors in the affected control rooms at the earliest opportunity starts the process of sharing information about the incident. The ‘talk not tell’ procedure involves control room personnel passing information and asking other responders what their response to the incident will be.

This is done by:

a) Sharing information from all available sources along with immediate resource availability and decisions taken in accordance with each organisation’s policies and procedures.

Because of the unverified nature and range of information sources at this early stage, situational awareness may be unclear until information can be verified by the first responders at the scene.

b) Nominating a single point of contact (SPoC) in each control room and establishing a method of communication between all of them. This could involve creating a telecommunications link or a multi-agency interoperable talkgroup.

   Information and intelligence can then be shared in a timely way and inform deployment decisions. It also allows a co-ordinated response to be managed efficiently when key decision-making personnel (operational commanders, for example) are deployed to rendezvous with their emergency service counterparts.

   To maximise shared situational awareness, responding commanders should be invited to join shared talkgroups between the control room single points of contact before they arrive at the scene or other location such as the tactical co-ordinating group.

c) Co-ordinating the setting up of multi-agency interoperable voice communications for commanders and operational working if necessary. See Supporting principle 4 for further guidance.

6.1.2. SUPPORTING PRINCIPLE 2

Plain English should be used in all discussions between control rooms.

Emergency services and responder agencies may not fully understand each other's call sign structures and single-service terminology, such as colloquial references to assets. Control rooms should therefore use plain English and avoid using acronyms and single-service jargon whenever they communicate with one another.

Control room staff should ensure that shared information, including terminology and symbols, is understood and agreed by everybody involved.

6.2. SHARED SITUATIONAL AWARENESS AND JOINT UNDERSTANDING OF RISK

6.2.1. SUPPORTING PRINCIPLE 3

Talking to commanders, both before the first commander arrives at the scene and to commanders throughout the incident will contribute to shared situational awareness. The process should include identifying risks and hazards to all responders.

Discussion between control rooms should be frequent and cover the following key points:

- Is it clear who the lead agency is at this point? If so, who is it?
- What information and intelligence does each agency hold at this point?
- What hazards and risks are known by each agency at this point?
- What assets have been – or are being – deployed at this point and why?
- How will the required agencies continue communicating with each other?
- At what point will multi-agency interoperable voice communications be required, and how will it be achieved?

Whenever possible, control rooms should use electronic data transfer to share information. This can reduce congestion on voice channels, prevent misunderstandings and eliminate 'double-keying' information.

Direct data transfer does not, however, remove the need to establish early dialogue between control room supervisors to achieve shared situational awareness.

6.3. CO-ORDINATION AND CO-LOCATION

6.3.1. SUPPORTING PRINCIPLE 4

Control room supervisors should engage in multi-agency communications and carry out the initial actions required to management the incident.

Control room supervisors should co-ordinate communication between the single points of contact in each control room by a method agreed during early multi-agency discussions (see Supporting principle 1). When identified, the lead agency should agree the timing of subsequent conversations between control room supervisors to ensure that shared situational awareness is maintained.

Control room supervisors should be ready to set up multi-agency interoperable voice communications for commanders if and when required. Requests to use multi-agency interoperable talkgroups should always be made to the police control room for authorisation. After identifying the talkgroups to be used, the police control room will communicate this to the appropriate responder control rooms so that the relevant commanders can be informed.

Multi-agency interoperable talkgroups are not necessary for every multi-agency incident. But when each service has allocated a commander to an incident, the value of making interoperable voice communications available should be considered.

Co-locating commanders and face-to-face exchanges will always be the preferred option. But when this is not possible or practical, interoperable voice communications can allow decision-makers to keep each other informed, contribute to shared situational awareness and enhance joint decision-making.

Control room supervisors and dispatch personnel should familiarise themselves with the policies, procedures and any other arrangements for using interoperable voice communications. A specialist operational communications adviser from each organisation should be identified to support the incident.

6.3.2. SUPPORTING PRINCIPLE 5

The lead responder will suggest a location for commanders to co-locate in the early stages of a multi-agency incident when operational commanders may be travelling to the scene.

When early location information is unverified and the suitability of potential rendezvous points is unclear, the lead responder and other control room supervisors should jointly agree an initial rendezvous point and communicate it to commanders as soon as possible.

Commanders may wish to revise the location of the rendezvous point and/or the forward command post in the light of further information at the scene.

Further information on the role and responsibilities of control room managers / supervisors can be found here.

7. ESTABLISHING A COMMON OPERATING PICTURE

A common operating picture (COP) has been defined as: *"A common overview of an incident that is created by assessing and fusing information from multiple sources, and is shared between appropriate command, control and co-ordinating groups to support joint decision-making"*.

A common operating picture is a single point of reference for those involved, and supports joint decision-making. Answering the questions below helps develop a common operating picture and helps establish shared situational awareness:

- What? - What has happened, what is happening now and what is being done about it?
- So what? - What might the implications and wider impacts be?
- What might happen in the future?

The form of the common operating picture depends on local requirements and practices. It would be updated as events and inputs change and also as the results of further work become available, such as analysis which answers the 'so what?' or 'what might?' questions.

The common operating picture should have a clear relationship with established command, control and co-ordination groups (including the Scientific and Technical Advice Cell) and should be accessed through a suitably resilient and secure common information sharing platform.

This completed Strategic Co-ordinating Group situation report is an example of a common operating picture. In other contexts, the common operating picture may be a dynamic dashboard that provides an overview of the incident, using maps and graphics as well as text.

8. ARRANGEMENTS FOR JOINT WORKING

Decision making in incident management follows a general pattern of:

a) Working out what's going on (situation),

b) Establishing what you need to achieve (direction)

c) Deciding what to do about it (action), all informed by a statement and understanding of overarching values and purpose.

8.1. JOINT DECISION MODEL (JDM)

One of the difficulties facing commanders from different responder agencies is how to bring together the available information, reconcile potentially differing priorities and then make effective decisions together.

The Joint Decision Model (JDM), shown below, was developed to resolve this issue.



Figure 3 - Joint Decision Model (JDM)

Responder agencies may use various supporting processes and sources to provide commanders with information, including information on any planned intentions, to commanders. This supports joint decision making.

All joint decisions, and the rationale behind them, should be recorded in a 'joint decision log'.

When using the joint decision model, the first priority is to gather and assess information and intelligence. Responders should work together to build shared situational awareness, recognising that this requires continuous effort as the situation, and responders' understanding, will change over time.

Understanding the risks is vital in establishing shared situational awareness, as it enables responders to answer the three fundamental questions of ‘what, so what and what might?’

Once shared situation awareness is established, the preferred ‘end state’ should be agreed as the central part of a joint working strategy. A working strategy should set out what a team is trying to achieve, and how they are going to achieve it.

If a strategic co-ordinating group is convened, they will agree and share the joint strategy for the multi-agency response. The strategic command teams from each agency should then review and amend their single-agency strategy to be consistent with the joint strategy and support them in achieving the jointly defined end state, or overarching aim.

Deciding how all agencies will work towards the preferred end state reflects the available capabilities, powers, policies and procedures (means) and the arising options, constraints and contingencies (ways). Ways and means are intimately related – some options will not be viable because they can’t be implemented, or they may be technically and logistically feasible, but illegal or ethically indefensible.

The joint decision model helps commanders explore these considerations and sets out the various stages of reaching joint decisions. One of the guiding principles of the joint decision model is that decision makers use their professional judgement and experience in deciding any additional questions to ask and considerations to take into account, so that they can reach a jointly agreed decision.

Commanders should be free to interpret the joint decision model for themselves, reasonably and according to the circumstances they face at any given time. Achieving desired outcomes should always come before strict adherence to the stepped process outlined in the joint decision model, particularly in time sensitive situations.

A detailed and well-practised understanding of the joint decision model will help commanders to think clearly and in an ordered way when under stress. The joint decision model can be used for both ‘rapid onset’ and ‘rising tide’ emergencies.

The following sections summarise the questions and considerations that commanders should think about when they use the joint decision model.

8.1.1. WORKING TOGETHER – SAVING LIVES, REDUCING HARM

The pentagon at the centre of the joint decision model reminds commanders that all joint decisions should be made with reference to the overarching or primary aim of any response to an emergency – to save lives and reduce harm.

This should be the most important consideration, throughout the decision making process.

8.1.2. GATHER INFORMATION AND INTELLIGENCE

This stage involves gathering and sharing information and intelligence to establish shared situational awareness.

At any incident, no single responder agency can appreciate all the relevant dimensions of an emergency straight away.

A deeper and wider understanding will only come from meaningful communication between the emergency services and other responder agencies. Commanders cannot assume others will see things, or say things, in the same way.

There may need to be a sustained effort to reach a common view and understanding of events, risks and their implications,

Decision making in the context of an emergency, including decisions on sharing information, does not remove the statutory obligations of agencies or individuals, but it is recognised that such decisions are made with an overriding priority of saving lives and reducing harm.

Personal data, including sensitive personal data (such as police intelligence), must be carefully considered before it is shared across agencies. The joint decision model can be used as a tool to guide decision making on what information to release, and who can receive it.

M/ETHANE is a structured and consistent method for responder agencies to collate and pass on information about an incident.

8.1.3. ASSESS RISKS, DEVELOP A WORKING STRATEGY

Commanders jointly assess risk to achieve a common understanding of threats and hazards, and the likelihood of them being realised. This informs decisions on deployments and the required risk control measures.

A key task for commanders is to build and maintain a common understanding of the full range of risks. They should consider how risks may increase, reduce or be controlled by any decisions made and subsequent actions taken. At any incident, each responder agency will have a unique insight into those risks.

By sharing what they know commanders can establish a common understanding. Commanders can then make informed decisions on deployments and the risk control measures required. Time critical tasks should not be delayed by this process.

The risk control measures to be employed by individual services must also be understood by other responder agencies, to ensure any potential unintended consequences are identified before activity commences. This increases the operational effectiveness and efficiency of the response as well as the probability of a successful incident resolution.

WORKING STRATEGY

The working strategy should not be confused with the strategy for the incident provided by the strategic commanders or strategic co-ordinating group. This strategy will generally be issued some time into the incident response and almost certainly after the operational or tactical levels of command have been established.

The working strategy is the action plan that commanders develop and agree together. They put the action plan in place to address the immediate situation and the risks that they are faced with to save lives and reduce harm.

It is rare for a complete or perfect picture to exist for a rapid onset incident. The working strategy should therefore be based on the information available at the time.

When developing a working strategy, consider:

- Sharing single service risk assessments
- Recording and agreeing the joint assessment of risk, in an agreed format

When developing a working strategy, commanders should consider these questions:

- **What**: Are the aims and objectives?
- **Who by**: Police, fire and rescue services, the ambulance service and other organisations?
- **When**: Timescales, deadlines and milestones?
- **Where**: What locations?
- **Why**: What is the rationale? Is it consistent with the overall strategic aims and objectives?
- **How**: Will these tasks be achieved?

For an effective integrated multi-agency operational response plan, objectives and priorities must be agreed jointly. Each agency will then prioritise their plans and activity.

The following key steps should be undertaken:

IDENTIFY HAZARDS	This begins with the initial call to a control room and continues as first responders arrive on scene. Information gathered by individual agencies should be disseminated to all first responders, control rooms and partner agencies effectively.
CARRY OUT A DYNAMIC RISK ASSESSMENT (DRA)	Individual agencies carry out dynamic risk assessments, reflecting the tasks/objectives to be achieved, the hazards identified and the likelihood of harm from those hazards. The results should then be shared with any other agencies involved.
IDENTIFY TASKS	Each individual agency should identify and consider their specific tasks, according to their role and responsibilities. These tasks should then be assessed in the context of the incident.
APPLY RISK CONTROL MEASURES	Each agency should consider and apply appropriate control measures to ensure any risk is as low as reasonably practicable. The 'ERICPD' mnemonic may help in agreeing a co-ordinated approach with a hierarchy of risk control measures: **E**liminate, **R**educe, **I**solate, **C**ontrol, **P**ersonal Protective Equipment, **D**iscipline
HAVE AN INTEGRATED MULTI-AGENCY OPERATIONAL RESPONSE PLAN	The outcomes of the hazard assessments and risk assessments should be considered when developing this plan, within the context of the agreed priorities for the incident. If the activity of one agency creates hazards for a partner agency, a solution must be implemented to reduce the risk to as low as reasonably practicable.
RECORD DECISIONS	The outcomes of the joint assessment of risk should be recorded, together with the jointly agreed priorities and the agreed multi-agency response plan, when resources permit. This may not be possible in the early stages of the incident, but post-incident scrutiny focuses on the earliest decision making.

8.1.4. CONSIDER POWERS, POLICIES AND PROCEDURES

This stage relates to any relevant laws, procedures or policies that may impact on the response plan and the capabilities available to be deployed.

Decision making in an emergency will focus on achieving the desired end state. Various constraints and considerations will shape how this is achieved.

Power, policies and procedures may affect how individual agencies operate and co-operate to achieve the agreed aims and objectives.

In a joint response, a common understanding of any relevant powers, policies, capabilities and procedures is essential so that the activities of one responder agency complement rather than compromise the approach of other responder agencies.

8.1.5. IDENTIFY OPTIONS AND CONTINGENCIES

There will almost always be more than one way to achieve the desired end state. Commanders should work together to evaluate the range of options and contingencies rigorously.

Potential options or courses of action should be evaluated, considering:

- Suitability Does it fit with the strategic direction?
- Feasibility Can it be done with the available resources?
- Acceptability Is it legal, morally defensible and justifiable?

Whichever options are chosen, it is essential that commanders are clear on what they need to carry out. Procedures for communicating any decision to defer, abort or initiate a specific tactic should also be clearly agreed.

Contingencies relate to events that may occur and the arrangements that will be put in place if they do occur. For example, strong evidence may suggest that an emergency is being successfully managed and the impacts safely controlled, but there remains a likelihood that the situation could deteriorate and have a significant impact. It is not good enough to ‘hope for the best’ and a contingency may include defining the measures to be taken if the situation deteriorates.

8.1.6. DECISION CONTROLS

As part of the decision making process, decision makers should use ***decision controls*** to ensure that the proposed action is the most appropriate.

Decision controls support and validate the decision making process. They encourage reflection and set out a series of points to consider before making a decision:

Note that points (a) to (d) are intended to structure a joint consideration of the issues, with (e) suggesting some considerations for individual reflection.

A) WHY ARE WE DOING THIS?	• What goals are linked to this decision? • What is the rationale, and is that jointly agreed? • Does it support working together, saving lives and reducing harm?
B) WHAT DO WE THINK WILL HAPPEN?	• What is the likely outcome of the action; in particular what is the impact on the objective and other activities? • How will the incident change as a result of these actions, what outcomes do we expect?
C) IN LIGHT OF THESE CONSIDERATIONS, IS THE BENEFIT PROPORTIONAL TO THE RISK?	• Do the benefits of proposed actions justify the risks that would be accepted?
D) DO WE HAVE A COMMON UNDERSTANDING AND POSITION ON:	• The situation, its likely consequences and potential outcomes? • The available information, critical uncertainties and key assumptions? • Terminology and measures being used by all those involved in the response? • Individual agency working practices related to a joint response? • Conclusions drawn and communications made?
E) AS AN INDIVIDUAL:	• Is the collective decision in line with my professional judgement and experience? • Have we (as individuals and as a team) reviewed the decision with critical rigour? • Are we (as individuals and as a team) content that this decision is the best practicable solution?

Once the decision makers are satisfied, collectively and individually, that the decision controls validate the proposed actions, then these actions should be implemented.

As the joint decision model is a continuous loop, it is essential that the results of these actions are fed back into the first box – *'Gather and share information and intelligence'* – which sets out the need to establish and sustain shared situational awareness. This will, in turn, shape any change in direction or risk assessment as the cycle continues.

8.1.7. BRIEFING

Once commanders have made decisions and decided on actions, information must be relayed in a structured way that can be easily understood by those who will carry out actions or support activities. This is commonly known as briefing.

In the initial phases of an incident, the joint decision model may be used to structure a briefing. As incidents develop past the initial phases or if they are protracted and require a hand over between commanders and responders, then a more detailed briefing tool should be used. The mnemonic 'IIMARCH' is a commonly used briefing tool.

Using the IIMARCH headings shown below as a guide, information can be briefed in appropriate detail:

- **I** INFORMATION
- **I** INTENT
- **M** METHOD
- **A** ADMINISTRATION
- **R** RISK ASSESSMENT
- **C** COMMUNICATIONS
- **H** HUMANITARIAN ISSUES

Information on IIMARCH and its use as a briefing tool can be found here.

8.1.8. TAKE ACTION AND REVIEW WHAT HAPPENED

Building shared situational awareness, setting direction, evaluating options and making decisions all lead to taking the actions that are judged to be the most effective and efficient in resolving an emergency and returning to a new normality.

Actions must be reviewed. As information changes during the response, commanders should use the joint decision model to inform their decision making until the incident is resolved.

9. SUPPORTING JOINT DECISION MAKING

The joint decision model is designed to help commanders make effective decisions together. As they establish shared situational awareness, they can develop a common operating picture.

As part of this process, commanders and decision makers may need further support, skills and resources so they can assess and interpret the information they receive appropriately, before it influences the decisions they make.

The following section provides background information and some suggested methods to support decision making.

In many incidents there won't be a need, or any time, for formal arrangements to be set up to support decision makers. But some incidents will be highly complex and strategically significant, involve considerable levels of uncertainty, have hard-to-predict consequences and unclear choices.

In these circumstances, it will be necessary to implement pre-established arrangements to manage information and support multi-agency decision-making at tactical and strategic levels.

9.1. ASSESSING AND MANAGING INFORMATION

This section outlines the capabilities that responder agencies should establish to inform and support joint decision making. It covers the need to:

- Assess information
- Have common processes to report, assess and manage information consistently
- Have a common information sharing platform, so that information can be shared and applied

9.2. INFORMATION ASSESSMENT

Assessing the information received, using proven criteria, will establish its quality and suitability for the task in hand. This is critical to ensure that decision-making is based on the best possible information and to identify where critical uncertainties lie.

In an emergency or crisis, much of the information decision makers receive will be unreliable or of uncertain quality.

For that reason a framework is needed, to distinguish between:

- Information that can be relied on with confidence
- Information that is unreliable in some way
- Information of unknown quality

There are many ways in which responder agencies can assess information. If agencies use the same information assessment framework, interoperability will be enhanced.

As a minimum, information should be assessed for:

- **Relevance** – in the current situation, how well does the information meet the needs of the end user?
- **Accuracy** – how well does the information reflect the underlying reality?
- **Timeliness** – how current is the information?
- **Source reliability** – does previous experience of this source indicate the likely quality of the information?
- **Credibility** – is the information supported or contradicted by other information?

As they develop a common operating picture, decision makers need to work together, using their joint experience and judgement, when using an information assessment framework. This will ensure the information they are using is both suitable and adequate.

If decision makers are concerned or dissatisfied with the information assessment, they should issue clear direction and take steps to update, reconcile and check the information, or to seek further information, potentially drawing on other channels and sources.

The behaviour of individuals and teams, and the effectiveness of interaction, will either enable or impede them in developing shared situational awareness. Achieving shared situational awareness is more likely if people:

- Share what they know freely
- Make uncertainties and assumptions absolutely clear
- Challenge their own understanding of what they are being told, and challenge the understanding of others
- Are critical and rigorous

9.3. COMMON PROCESSES

An organisation responding to a crisis or incident must:

a) Gather relevant information about the incident

b) Evaluate that information in terms of quality and relevance

c) Filter, analyse and make sense of that information

d) Communicate the information inside their organisation, and outside if required

e) Present the information to decision makers in an appropriate form

Interoperability will be enhanced if emergency responders use consistent ways of working to carry out these tasks.

9.4. COMMON INFORMATION SHARING PLATFORM

A common information sharing platform is the means to share and manage information collaboratively to support joint decision-making. Any commonly understood, effective system can be described as a common information sharing platform.

There are considerable advantages to using an electronic system. For example, automating aspects of sourcing, combining, analysing and displaying data will be much more useful and efficient for those using the data collected.

The precise form of a common information sharing platform will reflect local requirements and existing capabilities, but responder organisations should consider ResilienceDirect, a widely-used and secure platform with a range of functions to support joint working. ResilienceDirect is provided to all responder agencies by the government.

10. TIERS OF COMMAND

Emergency responders adopt levels of command when responding to incidents. The level does not convey seniority or rank but the level of command an individual has at the incident. The figure below shows the generic tiers of command and basic responsibilities.



Figure 4 - Response structure

This document refers only to the generic tiers of command and not the specific functional activities of individual organisations.

There should be a clear and identifiable commander or representative who is responsible for co-ordinating the activity of their agency at each level of command.

10.1. FIRST RESPONDER STAFF

It is important that all individuals who could be first on scene for their respective responder agency are able to declare a major incident, and that they understand the implications of declaring one. They must also be able convey incident information using the M/ETHANE model. Declaring a major incident begins the process of activating relevant plans.

10.2. OPERATIONAL

Operational commanders will be working with colleagues from other responder agencies. This will most likely be at, or close to, the scene of the incident.

They will control and deploy the resources of their respective service within a functional or geographical area, and will implement the tactical plan as directed by the tactical commander.

Clear communications should be established and maintained so that individuals can work together in a co-ordinated way.

The roles and responsibilities of operational commanders can be found here.

10.3. TACTICAL

In the initial stages of an incident, first responders are responsible for tactics. Once the scale and nature of the incident is known, emergency services will appoint officers to act as tactical commanders for their organisation. Other responder agencies may also appoint individuals to act as tactical commanders or co-ordinators on behalf of their organisations where relevant.

Communication and co-ordination between commanders is critical. Tactical commanders should be located at a mutually agreed location where they can maintain effective joint command of the operation. This includes effective joint working with other services, and other factors such as access to communications systems. The fire and rescue service tactical commander will be located where they can maintain effective tactical command of the operation, invariably they will be in attendance at the scene. Once the tactical co-ordinating group is formed, they will either attend in person or nominate a liaison officer to attend.

Where circumstances hinder co-location of commanders (of any level) then robust communications arrangements must be implemented, through the use of interoperability communications and where appropriate National Inter-agency Liaison Officers (NILO) to ensure a co-ordinated response and safe systems of work are maintained.

The tactical commander is likely to be in place before the strategic commander and is also likely to be the first senior officer taking command of the incident. In the early stages of an incident, the tactical commander is likely to set priorities before the strategic commander has set a strategy.

The roles and responsibilities of tactical commanders can be found here.

10.4. STRATEGIC

The strategic commander from each agency has overall authority on behalf of their agency. They are responsible for the resources of their own agency and for formulating their single agency strategy for the incident.

Each strategic commander may delegate implementation decisions to their respective tactical level commanders.

At the earliest opportunity, a strategic co-ordinating group (SCG) will determine or confirm a specific response strategy and record a strategy statement. The roles and responsibilities of strategic commanders can be found here. The role and responsibilities of the strategic co-ordinating group can be found here.

To minimise the consequences of the developing incident as far as is reasonably practicable, the structures and responsibilities detailed above must be activated and put into place as quickly as possible. It is acknowledged this is likely to take some time and therefore the first responders and commanders at a scene must identify and implement the initial tactics, whilst also communicating the need for support.

10.5. INTER-AGENCY RESOURCES

Any service may request temporary assistance from the personnel and equipment of another organisation. In these circumstances, while the supporting service will relinquish the immediate control of those resources to the requesting service for the duration of the task, the supporting service will keep overall command of its personnel and equipment at all times.

Personnel from one service who help another in this way should only be given tasks they are trained and equipped for, and they should not supplement the other service in a way that is potentially dangerous.

National inter-agency liaison officers (from the fire and rescue service or ambulance service) and tactical advisers are part of a network of specially trained officers who are qualified to provide commanders with advice on operational capabilities, limitations and capacity.

10.6. MULTI-AGENCY INFORMATION CELL

Emergency services and local resilience forums (LRFs) should be able to support tactical and strategic co-ordinating groups, when they are activated, by managing information and forming a common operating picture. This capability should be formalised as a multi-agency information cell (MAIC). The effectiveness of the multi-agency information cell (MAIC) depends on established and rehearsed capabilities.

A multi-agency information cell (MAIC) will not need to be established at the start of every incident involving a tactical and strategic co-ordinating group, but the multi-agency response to complex and/or protracted incidents should be supported with a multi-agency information cell (MAIC).

The multi-agency information cell (MAIC) may come together in either a physical, co-located form, or in a virtual form. It should be able to source, access, analyse, display and disseminate situational information, drawing on information and expertise from many sources rather than a single organisation. Both co-located and virtual arrangements for a multi-agency information cell (MAIC) should make use of a wide range of information systems to support shared situational awareness, such as ResilienceDirect, other open data sources or social media.

A core function of the multi-agency information cell (MAIC) is to produce the common operating picture that will inform and support the tactical and strategic co-ordinating groups and other responders.

11. JOINT ORGANISATIONAL LEARNING (JOL)

The lessons identified from de-briefing activities are now at the forefront of many key changes in emergency services policy and practices.

Issues have frequently been identified but not successfully acted upon to improve effective joint working. It is essential that joint organisational learning is accepted as the standard for multi-agency learning and is adopted by all response agencies to ensure interoperability is continually improved.

Joint Organisational Learning (JOL) provides emergency services and other responder agencies with a consistent and accountable mechanism to ensure lessons identified are acted on and to ensure they become lessons learned.

11.1. JOINT ORGANISATIONAL LEARNING ARRANGEMENTS

A robust governance structure and process addresses joint organisational learning issues.

The Interoperability Board provides governance for the joint organisational learning arrangements. This ensures that any issues regarding interoperability are considered and acted upon by appropriate representatives from the emergency services, their respective Government departments and other key stakeholders.

The process includes a method to capture, analyse, implement and share learning from incidents, training, testing and exercises, and from other external sources. All responder agencies (some via their local resilience forum or LRF) have access to the joint organisational learning (JOL) application which is hosted on ResilienceDirect and can submit interoperability issues and share notable practice.

The majority of lessons to be learned are identified during de-brief procedures. It is essential that responder agencies have robust de-brief procedures at a local level, which include ways to identify any interoperability lessons and raise them to the national level via the joint organisational learning (JOL) application.

11.1.1. DE-BRIEFING AND LESSONS IDENTIFIED

It is important to capture lessons while events are fresh in the minds of those involved. For this reason, a joint ‘hot de-brief’ should be held by commanders as soon as practicable after an incident.

Formal de-briefs, which may be held later, will take into account lessons identified and captured from hot de-briefs or equivalent post-incident reviews. All de-briefs should involve the full range of responders and control room staff to ensure the lessons identified are captured from every aspect of the response.

To support emergency services in capturing interoperability lessons, a de-brief template can be found in the JESIP Interoperability de-brief template. This template is designed to be integrated into, or used alongside, existing de-brief procedures.

11.1.2. NOTABLE PRACTICE

Joint organisational learning (JOL) can also be used to share notable practice. This is where services have found a solution to an interoperability issue, which works well and that they wish to share so that others can benefit from their learning.

11.2. EXPECTATIONS OF RESPONDER AGENCIES

To continually improve emergency response interoperability, all responder agencies must capture lessons identified from incidents, exercises and training and have the opportunity to submit them for consideration by the Interoperability Board.

Where lessons identified meet the criteria for adding to the joint organisational learning application, then a local process should be adopted to ensure all responder agencies and where it is deemed appropriate, the respective local resilience forums, agree what will be submitted and who will submit them on behalf of their agency or area.

Following any incident, exercise or training, those involved should ensure appropriate de-briefs are scheduled and that all those involved in the response are represented.

- The lead agency for the response and/or local resilience forum (LRF) should co-ordinate de-briefing after a multi-agency incident or exercise
- There should be a common understanding among attendees of any issues raised during the de-brief process
- Issues should be captured using local multi-agency de-brief procedures alongside the JESIP interoperability de-brief template

11.2.1. CRITERIA FOR SUBMISSION TO JOINT ORGANISATIONAL LEARNING (JOL)

Issues that meet any of the following criteria should be submitted onto JOL:

- Relate to interoperability – primarily using M/ETHANE, the JESIP principles for joint working and the joint decision model
- Had an impact on the effectiveness of at least two of the response organisations
- Impeded successful interoperability
- Are known to be recurring issues
- If resolved, could benefit other organisations and so may have a national impact

Any disclosure requests for information related to the de-brief or incident should be managed appropriately.

Supporting information, guidance and templates to help with using joint organisational learning (JOL) are available in the JESIP - Joint Organisational Learning, Learning Interoperability Lessons, Guidance Document 2015

12. DISCLOSURE AND FREEDOM OF INFORMATION

Disclosing unused material in criminal cases is an essential part of any police investigation. Unused material is material that the police service has gathered during the course of an investigation that is not used evidentially for the case when it gets to court. Even though it has not been used, the material is expected to be kept as it could become relevant at a later date. Lord Justice Gross has described this as still ‘one of the most important – as well as one of the most misunderstood and abused – of the procedures relating to criminal trials’ (2011).

The police investigation team is likely to appoint a disclosure officer, who will be able to advise commanders on relevant material and disclosure procedures. Decision logs and de-brief information could be subject to disclosure rules, and form part of the unused material.

In an investigation, police investigators, via nominated disclosure officers, compile a list of all unused material that will be disclosed to the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) and the defence. Examples of material falling under the definition are:

- 999 voice tapes
- Incident logs and pocket books
- Operational briefing/de-briefing sheets
- Policy files/decision books
- Material in police possession from third parties and records held by other agencies

In deciding whether the material satisfies the disclosure test the investigator must pay particular attention to material that could potentially undermine the prosecution case or assist the defence. Material should be made available to the officer in charge and the disclosure officer so they can make an informed decision. De-brief material includes not only the de-brief report but also individual feedback and notes made by any party at the de-brief.

13. INFORMATION FOR MILITARY RESPONDERS ATTENDING CIVIL EMERGENCIES

This guidance is provided for the use of military responders. It clarifies and explains the ways of working used by civil responder agencies when they respond to incidents.

13.1. INTRODUCTION

Emergency responders need to be able to work with other agencies, including the armed forces. Military responders contribute in a supporting role, with civil responders having primacy throughout.

Military responders should be aware of the JESIP principles for joint working and will be expected to adhere to them wherever possible. The principles for joint working are **co-location**, **communication**, **co-ordination**, **a joint understanding of risk** and **shared situational awareness**.

13.2. COMMAND AND CONTROL

Civil organisations use the terms ‘strategic’, ‘tactical’ and ‘operational’ to identify individual roles in the command and control structure. This differs from the strategic – operational – tactical structure found in UK and NATO military doctrine. The strategic commander has overall command of the incident and is part of the strategic co-ordinating group (SCG). Below this is the tactical command level, which functions through a tactical co-ordinating group (TCG). The operational commander will work at or very near the scene.

13.2.1. CO-LOCATION

Co-locating commanders is essential. When commanders are co-located, they can perform the functions of command, control and co-ordination face-to-face. They should work from a single jointly agreed location known as the Forward Command Post (FCP). They use the JESIP joint decision model along with joint decision logs to record their actions and decisions. Military log keepers must be aware of this, so that they can ensure any military logs and records are consistent.

13.2.2. COMMUNICATION

At multi-agency incidents, civil commanders use interoperability ‘talk groups’, which are held by the emergency services to ensure all responders have a shared understanding. Military responders should be included if possible.

Civil responders report and share information about the incident over their communications networks using the mnemonic M/ETHANE, which stands for:

M	**M**ajor incident declared?
E	**E**xact location
T	**T**ype of incident
H	**H**azards present or suspected
A	**A**ccess – routes that are safe to use
N	**N**umber of casualties
E	**E**mergency services present and those required

Military units will also be expected to use M/ETHANE to convey information about the incident in the situation reports they give to civil agencies. Information shared should be free of acronyms and terms used by only one agency. This ensures that the information shared is clear and unambiguous.

13.2.3. CO-ORDINATION

Depending on the nature of the incident, one of the civil emergency services (or an appropriate responder) generally takes the lead role at an incident to ensure an effective response, with military contribution in a supporting role. Military unit commanders are responsible for identifying themselves at the forward command post, or any other location that they have been asked to attend. They should establish effective co-ordination with the lead civilian responder to ensure tasks are allocated appropriately.

13.2.4. JOINT UNDERSTANDING OF RISK

Commanders of civilian responder agencies will share their respective risk assessments and establish a joint understanding of risks to ensure the safety of responders. This will include any military assets where they are under the control of civilian agencies. However, this does not absolve military commanders from their own assessment of the risks and, where necessary, military commanders must decide for themselves whether the risks their personnel are exposed to are tolerable and as low as reasonably practicable. If there is disagreement between the military and the civilian commander, the military commander must inform the military chain of command as soon as possible.

13.2.5. SHARED SITUATIONAL AWARENESS

A common understanding of the circumstances and immediate consequences of an emergency, together with an appreciation of available resources and the capabilities of responder agencies, is critical to success. Using the mnemonic M/ETHANE allows incident information to be shared in a way that is easily understood. As incidents develop, the briefing tool, IIMARCH should be used by civilian agencies, with information briefed against each heading in the IIMARCH mnemonic (Information, Intent, Method, Administration, Risk assessment, Communications, Humanitarian issues). However, in the early stages, a briefing can be delivered quickly around the content of the joint decision model.

13.2.6. JOINT ORGANISATIONAL LEARNING – MILITARY CONTRIBUTIONS

Military units are encouraged to contribute to post-incident de-briefs and to ensure that interoperability lessons are captured in the joint organisational learning application on the ResilienceDirect website.

13.2.7. JOINT TRAINING AND EXERCISING

If military units and personnel are likely to assist civilian emergency services in their area, they are encouraged to take part in joint learning opportunities to enhance their awareness of the JESIP principles and ways of working.

The Army's Regional Point of Command (RPOC) brigades will co-ordinate this, usually through the network of joint regional liaison officers (JRLOs).

13.3. INFORMATION FOR CIVIL RESPONDERS WHERE MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IS LIKELY

This section gives responder agencies information on working with the military. It does not cover in depth the process for requesting assistance, or the capabilities and assets available.

13.3.1. COMMAND AUTHORITY

Military personnel deployed to assist with civilian responders remain under the military chain of command at all times. This means that they may be withdrawn at any time should the chain decide that they are required for higher priority tasks. Military commanders are also authorised to refuse tasks if they believe they are inappropriate, beyond the scope of the original request for assistance, or they put their personnel at undue risk. In these circumstances, the military commander will report the incident to a higher authority as soon as possible.

13.3.2. COMMAND AND CONTROL

Military command and control structure differs from that used by civilian agencies. The military strategic level of command is executed through the Ministry of Defence (MoD). The operational level of command will be taken by MoD Headquarters Standing Joint Commander (UK) based in Andover, whilst the tactical level of command is usually held by the Army's Regional Point of Command (RPOC) brigade commanders.

The Army's RPOC brigade commanders are usually appointed as joint military commanders for an operation to support UK civil authorities and in this capacity they may base themselves at the Strategic Co-ordinating Group. More military liaison officers will be deployed to the strategic co-ordinating group/s and tactical co-ordinating group/s (TCG/s) appropriate to the operation.

13.3.3. DEFENCE FIRE AND RESCUE MANAGEMENT ORGANISATION

The Defence Fire and Rescue Management Organisation (DFRMO) has limited numbers of personnel and equipment at a number of MoD establishments.

Should the incident escalate to involve other fire and rescue services and responders, DFRMO incident command policy presents a building block approach for a robust incident management process.

DFRMO policy is that the fire officer from the primary authority takes charge of the incident. If the incident takes place at a military establishment, this will be the DFRMO incident commander.

At incidents where there are special risks, such as those involving military aircraft or submarines, the civil fire and rescue service fire officer will assume the role of overall incident commander at the incident, but will work closely with the senior DFRMO fire officer present, who may assume the role of tactical adviser, sharing risk-critical information.

13.3.4. JOINT REGIONAL LIAISON OFFICER (JRLO)

The joint regional liaison officer (JRLO)is the MoD's primary focus for integrating regional UK military operations with civil authorities. The regions are based on the geographic boundaries of the Army's Regional Point of Command (RPOC) brigades.

During routine periods they represent the MoD at local resilience forums and attend all relevant training and exercising events. When a crisis occurs, they may represent the Regional Point of Command (RPOC) brigade commander at the strategic co-ordinating group. But if the crisis covers a number of local resilience forum areas and a representative from the Ministry of Defence (MoD) is needed in a number of areas, another military liaison officer may assume the role. They will be nominated by the MoD and will usually be drawn from military establishments or units in the region involved.

Single-service liaison officers from the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force complement the capability and capacity of the joint regional liaison officer and provide specialist, single-service advice. The joint regional liaison officer can provide advice on the military capability available in an emergency situation and how to submit a request

13.3.5. REQUESTS FOR MILITARY ASSISTANCE

If the assistance or support of the armed forces is required at an incident, a ‘military aid to the civil authority’ (MACA) request is usually made through the strategic co-ordinating group to the relevant lead government department. If the lead responder on the ground is the police or the fire and rescue service, the lead government department will be the Home Office. For the ambulance service it will be the Department of Health.

Where the local authority is the lead responder, the lead government department is the Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG). Slightly different arrangements exist in the devolved areas, although the lead government departments are still the London-based Wales Office, Northern Ireland Office and Scotland Office. In circumstances where the formal command structure for a civil emergency response has not been established, police headquarters will be able to supply the contact details for the joint regional liaison officer (JRLO) for each area.

13.3.6. EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE

If an exceptional emergency situation develops and an urgent response from military units is needed to save life, local commanders are authorised under standing arrangements to deploy without seeking approval from a higher authority.

The Defence Council approves the use of Ministry of Defence (MoD) service personnel on tasks that are assessed as:

“Being urgent work of national importance, such work as is considered by a local commander, at the time when the work needs to be performed, to be urgently necessary for the purposes of the alleviation of distress and preservation and safeguarding of lives and property in the time of disaster…”

In very exceptional circumstances, therefore, where there is a grave and sudden emergency, military commanders have a duty to act on their own responsibility without a request by the civil authority. The commander must consider that the situation demands an immediate intervention to protect life or property.

13.4. FURTHER INFORMATION

More details of the role of the armed forces in supporting the civil authorities can be found in the following documents:

Operations in the UK: The Defence Contribution to Resilience - Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 02

Operations in the UK: A Guide for Civil Responders

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London Ambulance Service NHS Trust

London Fire Brigade

Ministry of Defence

National Ambulance Resilience Unit

National Operational Guidance Programme (Fire and Rescue)

National Police Chiefs Council

Newcastle City Council

North West Ambulance Service NHS Trust

Scottish Emergency Services Interoperability Board

Yorkshire Ambulance Service NHS Trust

Notes:

Notes:

ROLES & RESPONSIBILITIES APPENDIX

JESIP
Working Together – Saving Lives

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Role

The overarching aim of the control room supervisor is to ensure that rapid and effective actions are implemented to save lives, minimise harm and lessen the effects of the incident.

Responsibilities

a) Make an initial assessment of the available information and ensure that appropriate resources are mobilised.

b) Determine whether the situation requires escalation to the respective organisations' incident command structures and take action where appropriate.
In some smaller-scale incidents, it may be appropriate for one or more services to deploy commanders to the scene while other services maintain command from their control room. When this model is adopted, it is important that control room managers acting as commanders work with commanders at the scene in line with JESIP Principles for joint working.

c) Where appropriate, declare a major incident and communicate this to others.

d) Understand the role of each agency in effective sharing and co-ordination of available information during the early stages of an incident.

e) Contribute to establishing shared situational awareness by agreeing a common view of the situation, its consequences and potential outcomes, and the actions required for its resolution.

f) Jointly agree a preliminary rendezvous point (RVP) and forward command post (FCP) if required for the initial response, and communicate this to commanders without delay.

g) Share information using the M/ETHANE model in the early stages of an incident between control rooms and all the resources involved.

h) Co-ordinate communication between control room single points of contact (SPoCs) by a method agreed during early multi-agency discussions.

i) Agree timings for further voice conversations between control room supervisors to maintain shared situational awareness.

j) Consider at an early stage whether to establish interoperable voice communications.

k) Understand how continually changing hazards and risks affect each organisation and work with multi-agency control room colleagues to address them.

l) Make and share decisions within agreed level of responsibility while remaining aware of the potential implications of any decisions made.

m) Support the response by ensuring that appropriate additional resources are mobilised, including specialist assets and command support roles.

n) Update other commanders with new information and/or intelligence as the incident progresses.

o) Ensure that statutory responsibilities for the health, safety and welfare of individuals are met during the incident.

p) Maintain accurate records of information known, decisions taken and a concise rationale for those decisions. Records should be made contemporaneously.

q) Take a full part in organisational post-incident procedures.

r) Consider any issues that have negatively affected interoperability and ensure they are noted in any debrief reports for submission to Joint Organisational Learning.

Role

The overarching aim of the operational commander is to protect life, property and the environment by ensuring that rapid and effective actions are implemented on the ground to save lives and minimise harm.

Commanders from all relevant responder organisations are responsible for working together to develop and execute the initial operational response and, where activated, the tactical plan.

Each commander is responsible for the response of their respective agency. They work with the commanders from other responder agencies to co-ordinate activities.

Responsibilities

a) Protect life, property and the environment

b) Make an initial assessment of the situation (using appropriate procedures including single service and M/ETHANE), ensuring that appropriate resources are requested and, where appropriate, declaring a major incident

c) Co-locate with representatives/commanders from other responder agencies to agree timings and a forward command post for future meetings

d) Convene joint meetings and use the joint decision model to share information, intelligence and risk information to make effective joint decisions and co-ordinate operational plans. Agree a common view of the situation, its consequences and potential outcomes and the actions required within a working strategy

e) Using the Joint Decision Model (JDM), maintain shared situational awareness through effective communication between all multi-agency organisations to assist in the implementation of the operational plan

f) Using the joint decision model, identify the challenges the organisation's operational plan may present to its multi-agency partners and take action to minimise or reduce them

g) Make and share decisions according to the agreed level of responsibility, with an awareness of consequence management. Share the decisions with multi-agency colleagues

h) Construct a working strategy and establish priorities for its execution in sufficient detail so that other agencies haves a clear understanding its actions

i) Carry out a briefing at the earliest opportunity and at regular intervals subsequently

j) Understand the role of each agency in managing and co-ordinating the care of victims, survivors and relatives

k) Consider the security of the scene and identify and agree triggers, signals and arrangements for emergency evacuation

l) Using the joint decision model conduct, record and share ongoing dynamic risk assessments, putting in place control measures with appropriate actions and review

m) Understand how continually changing hazards and risks affect each organisation and work with multi-agency colleagues to address them

n) Ensure that statutory responsibilities for the health, safety and welfare of personnel are met during the incident

o) Determine whether the situation requires activating the next level of command support (Tactical Co-ordinating Group) and make appropriate recommendations

p) Update the tactical commander on any changes, including any variation in agreed multi-agency tactics within their geographical or functional area of responsibility

q) Ensure appropriate support by the organisation at the scene in terms of communications operatives and loggists. If available, support from a National Incident Liaison Officer (or equivalent) should be provided. The amount and type of support will be determined by the incident

r) Maintain accurate records of information known, decisions taken and a concise rationale for those decisions. Records should be made contemporaneously

s) Consider organisational post-incident procedures

t) Carry out a post-incident hot debrief

u) Consider any issues that negatively affected interoperability and ensure they are noted in any debrief reports for submission to Joint Organisational Learning

Role

The role of the tactical commander is to protect life, property and the environment by ensuring that rapid and effective actions that save lives and minimise harm are implemented through a tactical co-ordinating group (TCG).

They work between the strategic and operational levels of command.

Tactical commanders are responsible for interpreting strategic direction (where strategic-level command is in use) and developing and co-ordinating the tactical plan.

The Joint Decision Model (JDM) should be used as the standing agenda for tactical co-ordinating group meetings.

Responsibilities

a) Protect life, property and the environment.

b) Be aware of and understand the multi-agency command structure, commander roles, responsibilities, requirements and capabilities (including gaps), and monitor the operational command structure, including functional roles.

c) Determine whether the situation merits the activation of the strategic level of co-ordination and recommend accordingly.

d) Establish shared situational awareness between the responder agencies.

e) Initiate, if appropriate, and identify a chair for a multi-agency tactical co-ordinating group meeting at the earliest opportunity, and convene them at regular intervals to maintain shared situational awareness.

f) Construct and agree the overall joint intent, objectives and concept of operations, and their achievement within a joint plan. Regularly assess and disseminate the information and intelligence available through appropriate communication to evaluate threats, hazards, vulnerabilities and actions. Establish and maintain multi-agency shared situational awareness and promote effective decision-making.

g) Provide accurate and timely information to inform and protect communities using the media and social media.

h) Understand how ever-changing threats and hazards affect each organisation, and work with multi-agency colleagues to conduct joint dynamic risk assessments, putting in place appropriate mitigation and management arrangements to continually monitor and respond to the changing nature of emergencies for the organisation.

i) Ensure that statutory responsibilities are met and doctrine considered for the health, safety, human rights, data protection and welfare of individuals during the incident.

j) Share and co-ordinate operational plans to ensure multi-agency compatibility and understanding of initial tactical priorities and ongoing tactics.

k) Manage and co-ordinate multi-agency resources and activities where required, providing a joined-up and directed response.

l) Liaise with relevant organisations to address the longer-term priorities of restoring essential services and the recovery of affected communities.

m) Ensure that all tactical decisions made, and the rationale behind them, are documented in a decision log, ensuring that a clear audit trail exists for all multi-agency debriefs and future multi-agency learning.

n) Make de-briefing facilities available and de-brief the operational commander.

o) Consider any issues that have negatively affected interoperability and ensure they are noted in any debrief reports for submission to Joint Organisational Learning

Tactical Co-ordinating Group

The tactical commanders of all the responder agencies should come together to form a Tactical Co-ordinating Group (TCG).

The group should meet at an appropriate and mutually agreed location as soon as practicable. The location should be capable of providing appropriate administrative support and should be suitable for holding effective meetings. For some sites, pre-existing locations may have already been identified. Tactical commanders should familiarise themselves with any existing local plans.

The group should meet as frequently as required by the circumstances of the incident. The meetings should be agreed between the tactical commanders at intervals that ensure continuity in managing the incident without disrupting the implementation of agreed plans.

The group should ensure that updates are available for the Strategic Co-ordinating Group if one is in place. Commanders attending the Tactical Co-ordinating Group should be decision-makers for their organisation and suitably trained to command. Decisions should be recorded for audit purposes and a multi-agency decision log should be used.

While it is acknowledged that local arrangements may exist, the stages of the joint decision model can be used as the standing agenda for Tactical Co-ordinating Group meetings.

Clear lines of communication between responding agencies and the TCG are required. Where agencies are responding at strategic co-ordinating group level or above, it is the role of the strategic co-ordinating group chair to ensure that Tactical Co-ordinating Group are updated with the appropriate information.

Role

The overarching aim of the strategic commander is to protect life, property and the environment by setting the policy, strategy and the overall response framework for the incident and for both the tactical and operational command levels to act on and implement.

Strategic commanders should jointly agree the response strategy with representatives from relevant responder agencies at a strategic co-ordinating group (SCG) meeting.

Responsibilities

a) Protect life, property and the environment.

b) Set, review, communicate and update the strategy, based on available intelligence on threat and risk.

c) Attend and possibly chair a Strategic Co-ordinating Group (SCG) meeting, if a group is established, or consider requesting that a SCG is set up.

d) Consult partner agencies and community groups when determining the strategy.

e) Consider setting tactical parameters within which the tactical level can work.

f) Become involved in briefings where appropriate.

g) Remain available to other agencies' strategic or tactical tiers of command, to ensure that appropriate communication mechanisms exist at a local and national level.

h) Ensure, where appropriate, that command protocols are set, agreed and understood by all relevant parties.

i) Where appropriate, secure strategic resources in order to resolve the incident and prioritise the allocation of resources.

j) Ensure that there are clear lines of communication between all responder agencies.

k) Review and ensure the resilience and effectiveness of the command team, identify requirements for assistance from the wider resilience community and manage them accordingly.

l) Plan beyond the immediate response phase for recovery from the emergency and returning to a new normality.

m) Have overall responsibility within the command structure for health and safety, diversity, environmental protection, equality and human rights compliance, and ensuring that relevant impact assessments are completed.

n) Identify the level of support needed to resolve the incident or operation and resource the agency's response.

o) The development of communication and media strategies.

p) Consider any issues that have negatively affected interoperability and ensure they are noted in any debrief reports for submission to Joint Organisational Learning.

Role

The purpose of a Strategic Co-Ordinating Group (SCG) is to take overall responsibility for the multi-agency management of an incident and establish a strategic framework within which lower levels of command and co-ordinating groups will work. Its guiding objectives are:

- Protect and preserve life
- Contain the incident: mitigate and minimise its impacts; maintain critical infrastructure and essential services
- Create conditions for recovery: promote restoration and improvement activity in the aftermath of an incident to return to the new normality

It will normally be the role of the police to co-ordinate activity with other organisations and therefore to chair the SCG. The police will usually chair the group where:

- There is an immediate threat to human life
- There is a possibility that the emergency was a result of criminal or terrorist activity
- There are significant public order implications

In other types of emergency, for example certain health or maritime scenarios, an agency other than the police may initiate and lead the group.

Responsibilities

To ensure that a co-ordinated effort is achieved a working strategy should be developed by the first responding commanders before the SCG first meets to prioritise actions. When the SCG meets and gains a full understanding of the situation, it should then review and amend the working strategy and adjust objectives and priorities as necessary.

The SCG should be based at an appropriate location away from the scene. The location where the group meets, with its supporting staff in place, is referred to as the Strategic Co-ordination Centre. This will usually, but not always, be at the headquarters of the lead service or organisation.

The SCG will:

a) Determine and share clear strategic aims and objectives and review them regularly;

b) Establish a policy framework for the overall management of the event or situation;

c) Prioritise the requirements of the tactical level and allocate personnel and resources accordingly;

d) Formulate and implement media handling and public communication plans, potentially delegating this to one responder agency; and

e) Direct planning and operations beyond the immediate response to manage the recovery process.

The SCG does not have the collective authority to issue executive orders to individual responder agencies. Each agency retains its own command authority and defined responsibilities, and exercises command of its own operations in the normal way. However, the co-ordinated direction and instructions generated by the SCG will be translated by each responder into appropriate commands, passed on through their respective command structures and transmitted directly to all subordinate tactical co-ordinating groups.

The SCG may take some time to set up and obtain a clear picture of unfolding events. As a first priority, it should formulate a strategy with key objectives that encompass and provide focus for all the activities of the responding organisations.

SCG Standing Agenda

Preliminaries: Pre-notified seating plan by organisation and name plates for attendees

Item	Item Lead
Introductions (by exception and only where deemed necessary)	Chair
Declaration of items for urgent attention	Chair
Confirmation of decisions on urgent items	Chair
Adjourn as necessary to action urgent issues	
Situational briefing (including any clarifications or recent updates from chief of staff/ information manager/attendees by exception only)	
Review and agree strategy and priorities	Chair
Review outstanding actions and their effect	Chair
Determine new strategic actions required	Chair
Allocate responsibility for agreed actions	Chair
Confirm date and time of next meeting and required attendees (alongside an established meeting rhythm)	Chair
Post Meeting: Distribute record of decisions, ensure decision log is updated and complete	Sec/Chair

Notes:

Notes:

IIMARCH TEMPLATE

JESIP

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Element	Key questions and considerations	Action
M	**Method** **How are we going to do it?** Command, control and co-ordination arrangements, tactical and operational policy and plans, contingency plans	
A	**Administration** **What is required for effective, efficient and safe implementation?** Identification of commanders, tasking, timing, decision logs, equipment, dress code, PPE, welfare, food, logistics	

Element	Key questions and considerations	Action
R	**Risk assessment** **What are the relevant risks, and what measures are required to mitigate them?** To reflect the JESIP principle of joint understanding of risk. Use the ERICPD hierarchy for risk control as appropriate. Use Decision Controls	
C	**Communications** **How are we going to initiate and maintain communications with all partners and interested parties?** Radio call signs, other means of communication, understanding of inter-agency communications, information assessment, media handling and joint media strategy	

Element	Key questions and considerations	Action
H	**Humanitarian issues** **What humanitarian assistance and human rights issues arise or may arise from this event and the response to it?** Requirement for humanitarian assistance, information sharing and disclosure, potential impacts on individuals' human rights	

Notes:

COMMAND COURSE TRAINER GUIDE

VERSION 1 (FEBRUARY 2017)

JESIP
Working Together – Saving Lives

WWW.JESIP.ORG.UK

This training product has been developed by the College of Policing in collaboration with the National Ambulance Resilience Unit and Chief Fire Officers Association on behalf of the Joint Emergency Service Interoperability Principles (JESIP) team and the national Interoperability Board.

The College acknowledges and thanks all those who contributed in the development of this training product and is committed to working collaboratively in the future to develop, deliver and maintain it.

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The College is committed to the promotion of equal opportunities. Every effort has been made throughout this text to avoid exclusionary language or stereotypical terms. Occasionally, to ensure clarity, it has been necessary to refer to an individual by gender.

Contents

Purpose of this trainer guide

This guide has been designed to assist trainers in the delivery of the Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Training – Operational and Tactical Command programme. It can be used to support the initial training of commanders and also to support the continuing professional development of commanders. As a trainer it is important that you read through this trainer guide **in full** prior to delivery of any learning associated with the programme. The guide provides you with an introduction to the overall scope and design of the programme, as well as session plans for the delivery of individual sessions and the use of accompanying learning resources. This guide should be read in conjunction with the Joint Emergency Service Interoperability Principles (JESIP) Joint Doctrine **the Interoperability Framework Edition 2. Unless otherwise stated the joint doctrine will always be the source material. The Doctrine is subject to copyright © – Crown copyright 2013 (Cabinet Office).**

Introduction to the module

The learning programme meets the requirement under the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (Contingency Planning) Regulations 2005 for the carrying out of exercises and training of appropriate Category 1 staff who have a role in dealing with major incidents at an Operational Tactical level, and includes operational and tactical coordination of activities with other organisations and initiatives.

Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Training – Operational and Tactical Commanders need to be able to understand, analyse, and respond to information in constantly changing events. Accordingly, the learning programme aims to provide delegates with the knowledge and understanding to work together effectively at the Operational and Tactical levels of command, in response to all incidents including major or complex incidents and fast moving terrorist scenarios.

Therefore, as part of the classroom-based training, learners will be required to consolidate their learning by dealing with a major incident scenario as the Operational or Tactical Commander representing their blue light service, to ensure the timely resolution of the major incident/civil emergency.

Audience

The learning programme is aimed at officers, staff and volunteers from Category 1 and Category 2 responder agencies who perform the role of operational or tactical commanders.

The Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Training Operational and Tactical Command Curriculum

The national curriculum for Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Training – Operational and Tactical Command has been commissioned by the Joint Emergency Service Interoperability Principles (JESIP) team on behalf of the national Interoperability Board and developed in partnership with the College of Policing, Chief Fire Officers Association, the National Ambulance Resilience Unit and other relevant stakeholders.

This learning programme therefore functions as the agreed national standard which meets the training needs of delegates from the police, fire and rescue and ambulance services and other responder agencies, for Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Training – Operational and Tactical Command.

The learning programme employs a variety of learning tools and approaches, including self-directed learning, classroom-based learning and scenario-based training. The programme is structured as follows:

Phase One: Prior learning

The aim of this phase is to provide an opportunity to benchmark and monitor the level of prior knowledge and experience achieved by learners before their attendance at the classroom phase. The prior learning phase is primarily knowledge-based. In this regard learners are required to:

Read the pre-read for this course.

Phase Two: Classroom-based delivery

This phase builds on the knowledge-based learning completed during Phase 1. Classroom delivery is designed to be dynamic, maximising opportunities for interaction between the learners, thereby enhancing the major incident joint learning experience. As implied previously, the principal aim of this phase of the training is to encourage the learners' thinking with regard to working together effectively, with other responders, at an incident. JESIP can be used at any incident, but the training focuses on major incidents. Accordingly, the programme is designed in the same operationally-focused manner. The learner will be taken through the role and responsibilities of their role in a major incident environment and then the operational tactical considerations of their role around the Joint Decision Model (JDM). The course closes with a developmental scenario aimed at their specific role in a major incident.

Key areas of learning

The classroom-based training as set out below is focussed around a key sequence of learning, as follows:

- Review of existing knowledge/experience

- Understanding the role of the Operational Commander
- Understanding the role of the Tactical Commander
- Explanation of the Joint Decision Model
- Shared Situational Awareness
- Interoperability communication
- Joint Emergency Service Interoperability Principles
- Consolidation of learning

These areas of learning have been translated into the learning sessions outlined in this trainer guide. You will find that each session plan below sets out aims, objectives, detailed content and the methodology for delivery. The session plans also point to the additional learning materials and resources required to support the delivery of each individual session.

No 'single-service' models, definitions or terminology should be used in the delivery of this learning, and the methodology and content of the lessons, as presented, should be followed.

Reference materials

In addition, trainers are advised to familiarise themselves with the following materials:

- Joint Doctrine: The Interoperability Framework Edition 2
- Cabinet Office Lexicon 2013 v2.1.1
- Cabinet Office (2012) Civil Protection Common Map Symbology
- Cabinet Office (2005) Civil Contingencies Act 2004: A Short Guide (revised)
- Cabinet Office (2013) Emergency Response and Recovery V5

Indicative timetable

0900hrs-0920hrs	0920hrs-1020hrs	1020hrs-1040hrs	1040hrs-1140hrs	1140hrs-1230hrs	1230hrs-1300hrs	1300hrs-1400hrs	1400hrs-1430hrs	1430hrs-14500hrs	14500hrs-1530hrs	1530hrs-1550hrs	1540hrs-1710hrs
Introduction to Course Aims and Objectives	The Role of Tactical Command	Break	Information and Intelligence	Assess Risk and Develop a Working Strategy	Lunch	Powers, Policies and Procedures	Options and Contingencies	Break	Action and Review	Airwave	Consolidation Exercise and Closure

Scheme of work

Session	Time	Objectives	Methodology	Key issues	Resources
Course Introduction	20 mins	• Recognise and be familiar with members of the training team and fellow programme delegates • Explain the aim of the Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Training – Operational and Tactical Command programme • Introduce the JESIP Joint Doctrine	Presentation Discussion	• Introduction of trainers and delegates • Aim of the programme	• PowerPoint • Course contact list
Role of Tactical Commander	60 mins	• Recognise the need for interoperability at a major incident • Explain the role of a Tactical Commander in a major incident • Explain the role of an Operational Commander in a major incident • Describe the purpose and function of the Local Resilience Forum (LRF) • Recognise the wider multi-agency response • Describe the purpose and function of the Tactical Coordination Group (TCG)	Presentation Discussion Group Work	• The need for interoperability • Understanding the roles and responsibilities as developed all blue light services and wider responders • The role of an LRF • The wider multi-agency response • Establishing what a TCG is	• PowerPoint • Task sheet • Trainers Specimen Answers task sheet • Handout

Session	Time	Objectives	Methodology	Key issues	Resources
Information and Intelligence	50 mins	• To introduce the importance of the emergency services working together and sharing intelligence • Describe the structure of the Joint Decision Model • Explain the overarching or primary aim and the five stages of the Joint Decision Model • Define M/ETHANE and recognise the importance of it for passing information • Identify the need to provide timely and accurate information to warn and inform • Recognise the importance of social media at a major incident • Recognise the advantages and disadvantages of using social media in response to a major incident	Presentation Discussion	• Understanding and using M/ETHANE • The components of the JDM including the overriding ethic • The considerations required for the Information and Intelligence stage of the JDM • The need for common terminology and the use of the Cabinet Office Lexicon • How and why social media is relevant to all commanders working in a multi-agency setting	• PowerPoint

Session	Time	Objectives	Methodology	Key issues	Resources
Assess Risk and Develop a Working Strategy	60 mins	• Identify how to jointly assess risk and develop a working strategy in regard to the Joint Decision Model • Explain the key steps to delivering an effective integrated emergency operational planned response • Explain and demonstrate the application of the joint assessment of risk within a given major incident scenario	Presentation Discussion	• The considerations required for Assess Risk and Develop a Working Strategy stage of the JDM • Key steps • The application of the joint risk assessment	• PowerPoint • Scenario task sheet
Powers, Policies and Procedures	60 mins	• Identify what generic powers, policies and procedures need to be considered in regard to the Joint Decision Model • Recognise the need for accountability and the necessity of keeping an accurate audit trail of decisions made • Recognise the generic powers, policies and procedures within a given major incident scenario	Presentation Discussion	• The considerations required for the Powers, Policies and Procedures stage of the JDM • The importance of European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) for all commanders • The importance of the audit trail	• PowerPoint • Fire and Police 'Striking the Balance' document (if required) • Scenario task sheet

Session	Time	Objectives	Methodology	Key issues	Resources
Options and Contingencies	40 mins	• Explain how to identify options and contingencies in regard to the Joint Decision Model • Identify the Principles for joint working • Describe the options for communications at a major incident	Presentation Discussion	• The considerations required for the Option and Contingencies stage of the JDM • Principles for joint working • Interoperability communication options	• PowerPoint • Social Media handout
Action and Review	40 mins	• Identify how to take action and review what happens in regard to the Joint Decision Model • Recognise the importance of a post-event debrief • Explain the need for joint learning in order to sustain interoperability	Presentation Discussion	• The considerations required for the Action and Review stage of the JDM • The need for joint learning • The importance of a debrief	• PowerPoint

Session	Time	Objectives	Methodology	Key issues	Resources
Consolidation Exercise	80 mins	• Identify the need to declare a major incident in a given scenario • Explain the role of a Tactical Commander in a given major incident scenario • Discuss the underpinning rationale in a tactical plan evidenced around the Joint Decision Model for a given scenario	Presentation Discussion Group Work	• If a major incident should be declared and by who • Evidenced answers around the JDM • Interoperability communication	• Handout • Task sheet • Consolidation Exercise task answer sheet • Trainers Specimen answers task sheet
Course Closure	10 mins	• Provide the delegates with the opportunity to ask questions, clarifying any ambiguities • Identify new learning that the delegates can apply to working effectively as a Tactical Commander at a major incident	Discussion	• Clarifying any issues and answering any outstanding questions	N/A

Sessions

Session 1.1: Programme introduction

Duration

20 minutes

Aim

To introduce delegates to the Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Services Training – Operational and Tactical Command.

Objectives

By the end of this learning programme the delegates will be able to:

- Recognise and be familiar with members of the training team and fellow programme delegates
- Explain the aim of the major incident tactical command programme
- Demonstrate awareness of the JESIP Joint Doctrine

Resources

- Programme Introduction PowerPoint
- Course contact list
- Computer
- Smart board/whiteboard
- Pens

Delivery method

The trainer should now ask the delegates to form groups so there is at least one member of each of the tri-services in each group. They should stay in their tri-service groups throughout the working day. This will assist in the joint multi-agency theme of the learning.

Ice breaker

Introductions and ice-breaking exercise – no more than 2 minutes per delegate.

All persons in the room will introduce themselves, starting with the trainer(s).

State the following:

- Name
- Current role
- Operational or Tactical Command Major Incident experience

The trainer should link these introductions back to the information the delegates have been asked to provide in the Delegate Research Portfolio, in relation to their experience and their requirements from the programme.

Programme aim

The trainer(s) will explain the purpose of the programme, which is as follows:

The programme aim is to provide delegates with the knowledge and understanding to work together effectively at the Tactical level of command, in response to major or complex incidents.

Background notes for JESIP Joint Doctrine

The Trainer should explain that the JESIP Joint Doctrine originally focused on the interoperability of the three emergency services but is now being rolled out to all Category 1 and 2 responders and partner organisations. Doctrine sets out the way responders should train and operate and is built upon a common backbone which defines terminology, principles and ways of working. Joint doctrine sets out what responders should do and how they should do it in a multi-agency working environment, in order to achieve the degree of interoperability that is essential to successful joint response. It does not constitute a set of rules to be applied without thought, but rather seeks to guide, explain and inform.

This Doctrine provides commanders, at the scene and elsewhere, with generic guidance on what actions they should undertake when responding to major and complex incidents, and the principles are equally relevant to day-to-day joint operations. The guidance contained within this publication should be reflected consistently within individual organisations' guidance, instructions to their personnel and in training. Separate publications set out specialist ways of working that will apply in specific circumstances such as Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and explosive (CBRNe) incidents or Marauding Terrorist Firearms Attacks (MTFA). These specialist response documents should also reflect the generic guidance contained within this publication.

The trainer should now briefly explain the **programme timetable**.

The trainers should then give out the **course contact list** and ask the delegates to provide their contact details for the group. Once completed the trainer should ensure that each delegate receives a copy of the contact list before the end of the day, this will assist in the interoperability communication process post course.

Closure

Trainer(s) to answer any questions and clarify any points raised by the delegates. Trainer(s) to then revisit the aims and objectives of the session, reiterating the learning points.

Session 1.2: The role of the operational and tactical commander

Duration

60 minutes

Aim

To test and develop the knowledge and understanding of the delegates in relation to roles, responsibilities and command structures when carrying out the role of the Operational or Tactical Commander during a given incident.

Objectives

- Recognise the need for interoperability at a major incident
- Explain the role of a Tactical Commander in a major incident
- Describe the purpose and function of the Local Resilience Forum (LRF)
- Recognise the wider multi-agency response
- Describe the purpose and function of the Tactical Coordination Group (TCG)

Resources

- Role of Tactical and Operational Commander PowerPoint
- Role of Tactical Operational task sheet
- Roles and Responsibilities of the Operational Commander handout
- Role of Tactical Commander task sheet
- Roles and Responsibilities of the Tactical Commander handout

Delivery method

Introduction

Give a brief overview of the session's aims and objectives.

It is important that an individual taking on the role of Operational or Tactical Commander is fully conversant with the role and responsibilities involved. This session explores how the delegates, as an Operational or Tactical Commander (for their own agencies) in a joint interoperability setting, work together in a major incident.

This session will seek to identify the level of knowledge of individual delegates from the different participating organisations, as they commence the programme. Accordingly, this initial session is designed to explore the question: 'Where are the delegates now in terms of their knowledge and experience?' This will enable the trainers to evaluate the level of the experience and knowledge in the room, and identify what areas should be focused upon, in order to maximise the learning experience for each delegate.

The trainer should display the slides and deliver the input for each individual slide based on the notes provided in this trainers guide.

Background notes for public inquiries

The trainer should explain the above was written by Lord Justice Taylor in the Inquiry he conducted into the Hillsborough Disaster April 1989.

An essential element of resilience is learning from crisis. A learning organisation will ensure that lessons learned will result in changes to the organisational culture, norms and operating practices.

The consistency with which the same or similar issues have been raised by each of the past public inquiries is a cause for concern. It suggests that lessons identified from the events are not being learned, to the extent that there is a sufficient change in both policy and practice to prevent their repetition.

Background notes for the need for interoperability

The trainer should explain that the requirement for joint response is not new to the emergency services and should already be in place for routine, day-to-day working because the Principles for joint working contained within the JESIP Joint Doctrine are already established.

However, the findings of public inquiries and inquests in recent years, and the lessons identified, have highlighted where responders could have worked better together, showing much greater levels of cooperation and coordination.

There is an inescapable requirement for better coordination and cooperation between the three emergency services, and, by extension, to the wider partnership of responder organisations, for both routine and emergency response operations. Interoperability is defined as the extent to which organisations can work together coherently as a matter of routine. To ensure interoperability exists between the emergency services in England, Wales and Scotland, which might involve cross-border mutual aid at any time, all responder organisations must make certain that their single service response arrangements, and local procedures, are in alignment with this joint doctrine, in accordance with the Civil Contingencies Act 2004.

Group work

The trainer should then hand out the **Role of Tactical Commander Task Sheet** to the delegates for completion in their multi-agency groups; each group has the same questions. They should have 15 minutes to carry out this task.

After 15 minutes, the trainer should ask each team to present their findings to the plenary group. The trainer should clear up any ambiguities which may arise throughout the presentations and answer any questions the delegates may have.

The trainer should give out the **Role of Tactical Commander Handout** and discuss the profile with the delegates.

The trainer should then hand out the **Role of an Operational Commander Task Sheet** to the delegates for completion in their multi-agency groups; each group has the same questions. They should have 15 minutes to carry out this task.

After 15 minutes, the trainer should ask each team to present their findings to the plenary group. The trainer should clear up any ambiguities which may arise throughout the presentations and answer any questions the delegates may have.

The trainer should give out the **Role of an Operational Commander Handout** and discuss the profile with the delegates.

Note: The trainer should explain to the group that the role and responsibilities have been formulated from the tri-service command and control doctrine, the relevant National Occupational Standards and wider consultation from the Cabinet Office, JESIP and the tri-services.

The trainer should ask each group in turn the answers to each question in the task sheet. A different team should present first for each question.

Background notes for major incidents

The trainer should explain that whilst JESIP should be applied at all incidents where more than one agency is involved it is particularly important at major incidents.

The trainer should explain that the Joint Doctrine: The Interoperability Framework Edition 2 provides a new definition for major incidents and all responder agencies should adopt this definition.

Background notes for the purpose of the local resilience forum (LRF)

The trainer should explain that Part 1 of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 together with supporting regulations and statutory guidance HM Government: Emergency Preparedness (2012) establish a clear set of roles and responsibilities for those involved in emergency preparation and response at the local level. The Act divides local responders into two categories, imposing a different set of duties on each.

In England and Wales there is an LRF for each Police Force area.
LRF members have a collective responsibility to plan and prepare for emergencies and communicate with their communities about the risk of emergencies. This responsibility is set out in the Civil Contingencies Act (2004) and associated Cabinet Office guidance.

LRFs exist to enable an effective and efficient multi-agency response. It is the appropriate forum to ensure that the conditions for wider emergency responder interoperability are understood, acted on and validated.

Source: Cabinet Office (2013): The Role of Local Resilience Forums: A Reference Document

Background notes for deliverables of local resilience forum

The trainers should explain that the LRF conduct a systematic, planned and coordinated approach to encourage Category 1 responders, according to their functions, to address all aspects of policy in relation to:

- risk and hazard
- planning for emergencies
- planning for business continuity management
- publishing information about risk assessments and plans
- arrangements to warn and inform the public
- training and exercises
- other aspects of the civil protection duty, including the promotion of business continuity management by local authorities

Source: Cabinet Office (2013): The Role of the Local Resilience Forums: A Reference Document

Background notes for responder agencies

The trainer should explain that interoperability between emergency responders is not limited to the emergency services, and any major incident response may require support from the wider partnership of Category one and two responders.

Non-blue light response organisations will usually take much longer to mobilise than the emergency services and therefore require the emergency services to provide:

- Notification of a major incident declaration at the earliest opportunity
- Notification should include relevant information to enable an appropriate response (shared situational awareness).

Cat 1 and Cat 2 examples

The trainer may wish to add the badges, crests or logos from local category 1 and category 2 responders to these slides.

The trainer should describe category 1 and category 2 responders. The trainer should refer to local category 1 and 2 responders such as the local ambulance trust, local police forces, fire brigades and local authorities as well as others such as local rail operation companies and other pertinent local responders. The trainer should point out that category 2 responders are not obliged to plan for incidents under the Civil Contingencies Act 2004.

The trainer should describe how UK armed forces are neither a category 1 or category 2 responder but may have a role to play in dealing with a major incident.

The trainer should describe that many voluntary agencies have roles to play in responding to major incidents but are not category 1 or 2 responders.

Background notes for tiers of command (13) from first module

The trainer should explain that the emergency services have a common three tier command structure. They should define the roles of the strategic, tactical and operational tiers of command.

The trainer should explain that historically these tiers were labelled as gold, silver and bronze and that, whilst many organisations continue to use these labels, locally students should use the national labels.

Background notes for tabards (1r) from first module

The trainer should explain how police fire and ambulance commanders at the scene should wear a tabard to assist in identification and so aid commanders in co-locating at the scene.

The trainer should explain that many other category 1 and category 2 responders may provide their commanders with tabards.

Background notes for the purpose of the tactical coordinating group (TCG)

The trainer should explain that this group should be formed as soon as is practicable in order to determine a coordinated response at the tactical level. The TCG should meet at an agreed location, either near the scene at the Forward Command Point (FCP) or another appropriate location designated as the Tactical Control.

The TCG should meet as frequently as required by the circumstances of the incident. All key decisions should be recorded in writing for audit purposes. A standard agenda can be used, focused on tactical issues.

Background notes for functions of the TCG

The trainer should explain that multi-agency commanders at the Tactical Level will have specific and differing organisational responsibilities and priorities.

However, collaboratively, they must jointly deliver the overall multi-agency management of the incident and ensure that operational commanders have the means, direction and coordination required to deliver successful outcomes in order to meet the strategic requirements as directed by the Strategic Coordinating Group (SCG).

Closure

Trainer to answer any questions and clarify any points the delegates may raise. Trainer is to then revisit the aims and objectives of the session, reiterating the learning points.

Session 1.3: Information and intelligence

Duration

50 minutes

Aim

To develop the knowledge and understanding of the delegates in relation to Information and Intelligence when carrying out the role of Operational or Tactical Commander during a major incident.

Objectives

- To introduce the importance of the emergency services working together and sharing intelligence
- Describe the structure of the Joint Decision Model
- Explain the overarching or primary aim and the five stages of the Joint Decision Model
- Define M/ETHANE and recognise the importance of it for passing information
- Identify the need to provide timely and accurate information to warn and inform
- Recognise the importance of social media at a major incident

Resources

- Intelligence and Information Tactical Commander PowerPoint
- Social Media handout

Delivery method

Introduction

Give a brief overview of the session's aims and objectives.

The trainer should display the slides and deliver the input for each individual slide based on the notes provided in this trainers guide.

Background notes for The Pitt Review

The trainer should explain that the Pitt Review states that the emergency services must be willing to work together and share information. The following quote should be shared with the group:

"We recognise there are issues of commercial confidentiality and security, but we firmly believe that the public interest is best served by closer cooperation and a presumption that information will be shared. We must be open, honest and direct about risk, including with the public. We must move from a culture of 'need to know' to one of 'need to share'."

Warnings are issued when severe weather and flooding are judged by the experts to reach certain levels of likelihood.

Ideally, warning content and methods of communication should be such that all members of the community receive the warning and understand the action they should take, informed by awareness before the emergency.

The Pitt Review would welcome "a common approach being considered further by both Local and Regional Resilience Forums. It is clear that the local authority lead role in the recovery phase should extend to an overview of communications, ensuring clear, consistent messages across all partnership organisations."

Source: Cabinet Office (2007): Learning lessons from the 2007 floods (Executive Summary) Pitt Report

The trainer should then communicate the following:

Under the Civil Contingencies Act 2004, this information sharing duty is not a statutory obligation to breach the common law duty of confidentiality – where the information is confidential the party considering making the disclosure must consider whether the interests of the individual or individuals will be better served by making the disclosure. This means it is not a 'mandatory gateway' that imposes an absolute legal obligation on public bodies to provide relevant information to one another. Rather the party should confirm that a legitimising condition of the Data Protection Act 1998 is met, and that there would not be a breach of the common law duty of confidence in sharing the data.

Source: HM Government 2007 Data Protection and Sharing – Guidance for Emergency Planners and Responders pg.17

Background notes for Joint Decision Model

The trainer should explain that a wide range of decision-making models exist, including specific models used by the individual emergency services. Such models exist to practically support decision makers working under difficult circumstances, and a guiding principle is that they should not be over-complicated. One of the difficulties facing commanders from different organisations in a joint emergency response is how to bring together the available information, reconcile objectives and then make effective decisions together. The **J**oint **D**ecision **M**odel (JDM) has been developed to enable this.

One of the guiding principles of the JDM is that decision makers will use their judgement and experience in deciding what additional questions to ask, and considerations to take into account, to reach a jointly agreed decision. They must therefore be free to interpret the JDM for themselves, reasonably and according to the circumstances facing them at any given time. Strict adherence to the stepped process outlined in the JDM should always be secondary to achieving desired outcomes, particularly in time-sensitive situations.

Background notes for decision controls

The trainer should explain how decision controls provide commanders with a structured way to consider factors that may influence their decision making.

The trainer should explain that the decision controls are not a core JESIP product, unlike the JDM, but are offered as a way of improving the robustness of decision making.

The trainer should explain that the decision controls are a series of questions commanders should ask themselves as they apply the JDM.

The trainer should explain that this is only a brief introduction into the use of decision controls.

Background notes for overarching or primary aim

The trainer should explain to the delegates joint decisions must be made with reference to the overarching or primary aims of any response to an emergency. This is to save lives and reduce harm. This is achieved through the means of a coordinated, multi-agency response. Decision makers should have this uppermost in their minds throughout the decision making process.

The JDM can be used for a **rapid onset** or a **rising tide** emergency[1] as it enables the establishment of shared situational awareness.

Background notes for stage one: information

The trainer should explain that situational awareness is having appropriate answers to the following questions: what is happening, what are the impacts, what are the risks, what might happen and what is being done about it?

In the context of the **Joint** Decision Model, **shared** situational awareness becomes critically important. Shared situational awareness is achieved by **sharing** information and understanding between the involved organisations to build a stronger, multi-dimensional understanding of events, their implications, associated risks and potential outcomes.

Commanders cannot assume other emergency service personnel see things or say things in the same way, and a sustained effort is required to reach a common view and understanding of events, risks and their implications.

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[1] The definition of rapid onset and rising tide can be found in The Lexicon and The Delegate Research Portfolio

Background notes on M/ETHANE

The trainer should explain that the following mnemonic should be used when passing information between emergency responders and control rooms to enable the establishment of shared situational awareness:

- **M**ajor incident declared?
- **E**xact location
- **T**ype of incident
- **H**azards present or suspected
- **A**ccess – routes that are safe to use
- **N**umber, type, severity of casualties
- **E**mergency services present and those required.

The trainer should describe how this message format can be used for all incidents and not just major incidents. Students should be told that at incidents that are not major incidents an ETHANE message should be sent.

Group work

M/ETHANE

Background notes for METHANE

The trainer should explain to the delegates that a plane has overshot a runway at Chesterton Airport, colliding with a goods train in the yard opposite. This has caused a derailment of the train and some chemical containers have fallen from the carriage on to the track and split open.

The plane was carrying 237 passengers and 9 crew. The yard is a goods yard and there are 3 workmen unaccounted for. The chemicals are currently unknown.

The trainer should ask the delegates to construct a M/ETHANE message in their groups in relation to the information and picture provided.

They have 10 minutes to carry out this task and at the end of this time they will be required to present it to the rest of the group. They may present it in any way they wish, within the time frame.

After the 10 minutes the trainer should ask each team to present their findings to the rest of the group. The trainer should clear up any ambiguities which may arise throughout the presentations and answer any questions the delegates may have.

The M/ETHANE message should be similar to the one below.

M/ETHANE

Major Incident declared or Standby	Major Incident Declared
Exact location	Westshire Railway Yard, at the North End of Runway 20, Chesterton Airport
Type of incident	A passenger aircraft has overshot the runway and broken up and come to rest in the Westshire freight yard. It has also collided with a freight train which has derailed losing some of its cargo which is as yet unidentified chemicals. Collision between a passenger aircraft and freight train, persons reported.
Hazards	There is debris from the plane, jet fuel, smoke but no evidence of fire. There are 2 x 1000l containers of unknown chemicals and the train is currently derailed and it is potentially unstable. The goods yard ground is uneven with many trip and slip hazards and sharp objects scattered around. Unknown chemicals involved including aviation fuel, the train is derailed.
Access	The scene can be accessed through the long stay car park at the Northern end of Runway 20; this is directly adjacent to the runway and goods yard.
Number of casualties	There are approx. 250 casualties, mostly in the remaining part of plane fuselage. There is currently no information on the types of injuries.
Emergency services	Emergency services required are ambulances, HART, police, fire service.

Background notes for terminology

The trainer should explain that providing timely and accurate information to inform and protect communities is key to a joint interoperability working approach.

One of the barriers to achieving shared situational awareness is the use of terminology that either means different things to different people, or is simply not understood across different services. Defining commonly understood terminology is desirable, and to a large degree attainable, but emergency responders must always be attentive to the risk that their own understanding of concepts and specific terms is either not understood or is misunderstood by others.

Issues to consider are:

- The language and terminology (including scientific concepts) should be commonly understood
- The use of probabilistic language (e.g. likely, possible, and probable) should be commonly understood
- Acronyms and abbreviations should be recorded and commonly understood
- What other sources of ambiguity, miscommunication and confusion exist?
- The Cabinet Office Lexicon should be used as reference for all joint interoperability terminology. A link to the Lexicon can be found in the **Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Training – Legislation Guide and Handbook**.

Maps are widely used in emergency management, but if different organisations use different map symbols to denote the same feature (e.g. a Rendezvous point (RVP) or inner cordon) then there is scope for dangerous confusion, and the potential of the map as a tool to coordinate multi-agency operations is severely curtailed. For this reason, Cabinet Office and Ordnance Survey have collaborated in developing and disseminating a core set of **common map symbols** for use in emergency management.

These can be found online and there is a link to the download page on the OS website at:

https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/emergency-responder-interoperability-common-map-symbols

Background notes for social media

The trainer should explain to the delegates that it's not **your** (the blue light services delegates') emergency anymore. Audiences want to play a role, but no longer want to be victims or witnesses……… they use social networks and mobile technology.

- Do not treat social media as something special or separate from normal work processes.
- Social media users try to do their part by forwarding information. Disaster information is one of the most highly forwarded or retweeted information in social media. Many users, who are often removed from the situation at hand, lend their support by forwarding information to ensure it reaches as wide an audience as possible.

- Social media can help monitor and address issues in disaster situations and recovery. The immediacy of social media makes it invaluable in the live monitoring of situations. Victims of natural disasters, frequently taken out of their comfort zones and regular modes of interaction with services, will often vent any frustrations through many outlets.
- Social Media is immediate and will allow organisations to proactively push out large volumes of information to large numbers of people, ensuring there is no vacuum of official information.
- Do not use social media solely to push out information. Use it to receive feedback and involve your online community.

Additional Background Notes for Trainers: An example of social media relevancy at a major incident:

Social Media was a major source for those seeking Boston Marathon bombing information. 56% of young adults kept up to date with Boston Marathon bombing news via social network sites such as Facebook. TV was the most widely used source of information, with 80% following the story there. Four in 10 kept up via radio reports and three in 10 read newspapers. A quarter of Americans got information about the devastating explosions and the hunt for the bombers on social networking sites such as Facebook and Twitter. There were 3.5 million tweets in the first 24hrs. After the explosion the Boston Police Department went from 40,000 followers to 300,000.

The Boston bombs exploded at 14.49hrs, at 14.50hrs the first tweet and picture was tweeted.

Cable News Network (CNN) and the Associated Press (AP) wrongly reported that the suspects were in custody, many others picked up on the news. WCVB-TV Boston, crediting the AP with the news, wrongly said that an arrest was ‘imminent’. **This inaccurate message was re-tweeted 87 times.**

Reddit (social media site) had to apologise to the family of missing Brown University student Sunil Tripathi, who was misidentified on social media as a bombing suspect.

Background notes for social media in response

The trainer should explain to the delegates that before they use social media as an option to deal with the response to a major incident, they should consider the positives and negatives of its use. These are as follows:

Positives:

- It can provide access to immediate feedback and information from the public at scenes, empowering the blue light services.
- It provides situational awareness for Category 1 responders in disaster-affected locations who otherwise have no means of communication.

- "Myth busting" of misinformation and rumours in the media and community. Social media can quickly kill rumour and misreporting before it becomes "fact" in the mainstream media, mainly through the #mythbuster hashtag.
    - The Guardian Interactive team who were responsible for the analysis in 'Reading the Riots'[2] suggest that, in order to curtail the spread of unreliable information, there are three key points for consideration (aimed at individual Twitter users):
        - If you're going to retweet, check what you're retweeting.
        - If you're going to send out information and you don't know the provenance of the information, please say so. Just say that you don't know, say it's unconfirmed.
        - If you're in the possession of valuable information to debunk rumours, add a link so that other people can cascade this information and debunk rumours. (Analysis of 2.6 million tweets).

Negatives:

- In cases of large-scale crises or in cases of investigations that receive special attention by the public, blue light systems for communication with the public come under stress. Increased attention for the information of a service may exceed the geographic boundaries and can go way beyond the local community that the service is usually responsible for, as local news can be virally distributed through social media.
  Usually, the IT infrastructures behind blue light service websites are not able to cope with the peaks in demand. One successful way of dealing with the high demands has been the use of various social media sites that can better balance high loads in their global infrastructures.
- Don't assume that just because something is online, that everybody has seen it or understood it – don't just rely on social media, your communications plan must try to reach people using a number of different tools and tactics.
- Remember that sometimes the best way to help someone is offline, not online. Human contact is one of the best ways of helping someone. Take things offline where possible.
- Commanders must ensure that their responders are not contaminating information of the major incident e.g. taking photos of it and posting them on social media sites. **Be aware what your responders are doing at the scene.**

[2] Guardian Interactive team (2011) Reading the Riots: Investigating England's Summer of Disorder

Background notes for social media tactical plan considerations

The trainer should explain the following points:

- Consider one designated social media lead person per agency, directing and coordinating all aspects of the organisation's response, including managing the messages and the communities. For a better result, there also should be one designated social media monitoring person who actually interacts with fans and followers, responding to comments, twitter mentions and other enquirers.
- Emergency and Disaster Communications Team – Key staff should convene to strategically review the situation and manage the communications surrounding the issue. Daily meetings with the social media lead people from all organisations/agencies are necessary, so you can coordinate the social media efforts. **This means a joint response with a joint multi-agency generic message.**
- It's very important that you designate a time and frequency of distribution of generic message to the general media and the general public.
- Consider creating a media centre in your website containing embedded banners, blog posts, press releases, photography and video of the major incident ready to be shared by the media or bloggers.
- Consider live Tweeting key points as they are made in your briefings.

Closure

Trainer to answer any questions and clarify any points the delegates may raise.

Trainer is to then revisit the aims and objectives of the session, reiterating the learning points.

Session 1.4: Assess risk and develop a working strategy for operational and tactical command

Duration

60 minutes

Aim

To test and develop the knowledge and understanding of the delegates in relation to jointly assessing risk and developing a working strategy when carrying out the role of Operational or Tactical Commander during a major incident.

Objectives

- Identify how to jointly assess risk and develop a working strategy in regard to the Joint Decision Model
- Explain the key steps to delivering an effective integrated emergency operational planned response
- Explain and demonstrate the application of the joint assessment of risk within a given major incident scenario.

Resources

- Risk PowerPoint
- Risk scenario task sheet

Delivery method

Introduction

Give a brief overview of the session's aims and objectives.

PowerPoint and plenary

The trainer should also bring into the plenaries the answers from the Delegate Research Portfolio activities. (For example, do the delegate answers from the Research Portfolios match up to the classroom discussion? What have the delegates learnt from the discussions to take forward to the workplace?)

The trainer should display the slides and deliver the input for each individual slide based on the notes provided in this trainers guide.

Background notes for ICL Factory Explosion Inquiry Report 2009

The trainer should explain that the above is part of an extract from Lord Gill's Inquiry report into the explosion, caused by a leak of liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) on 11 May 2004, when nine people died and many more were injured at the ICL Plastics factory in Maryhill, Glasgow.

The quote emphasises the need to share insight and knowledge into the changing circumstance of an incident with everyone involved. In this instance, the site owner didn't share and (wasn't asked for) information updates. As a result, this had an impact on the on-scene management overall situational awareness.

LPG, which had leaked from an on-site underground metal pipe into the basement of the factory ignited, causing an explosion, which led to the catastrophic collapse of the four storey Victorian factory.

The factory manufactured plastics products and coatings and employed a number of people at the time of the explosion. On 28 August 2007, two companies (ICL Tech Limited and ICL Plastics Ltd) were fined £200,000 each at the High Court in Glasgow, following guilty pleas; ICL Plastics Limited for breaches of Sections 2 and 3 of the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974 and ICL Technical Plastics Limited for breaches of Sections 2 and 3 of that Act.

Background notes for stage two

The trainer should explain that emphasis should be placed upon the importance of the first 60 minutes of response to a major incident, during which responder intervention is recognised to have the greatest impact on saving life.

Understanding risk is central to emergency response, and one of the major challenges in joint emergency response is for commanders to build and maintain a common understanding of the full range of risks, and the way that those risks may be increased, or controlled by decisions made and actions taken by the emergency responders.

In a major or complex emergency the different emergency services will have unique insights into those risks, and by **sharing** that knowledge a common understanding of the various risks can be established, considered in the context of the agreed priorities and can inform a jointly agreed working strategy to resolve the incident.

Background notes for developing a working strategy

The trainer should explain that it is rare for a complete or perfect picture to exist and therefore a working strategy, for a rapid onset emergency, should be based on the information available at the time. The points on the slide should be taken into account when developing a working strategy.

Background notes for key steps

The trainer should explain that a joint assessment of the prevailing risks limits the likelihood of any service following a course of action in which the other services are unable to participate. This, therefore, increases the operational effectiveness and efficiency of the response as well as increasing the probability of a successful resolution of the incident.

In order to deliver an effective integrated multi-agency operational response plan, the following key steps must be undertaken:

Identification of hazards – this will begin from the initial call received by a control room and will continue as first responders arrive on scene. Information and intelligence gathered by individual agencies must be disseminated to all first responders and control rooms effectively.

The trainer should emphasise the use of the mnemonic M/ETHANE which will assist in a common approach.

Identification of the tasks – each individual agency should identify and consider the specific tasks to be achieved within its own role and responsibilities.

Dynamic Risk Assessment – undertaken by individual agencies, reflecting the tasks/objectives to be achieved, the hazards that have been identified and the likelihood of harm from those hazards.

Apply control measures – each agency should consider and apply appropriate control measures to ensure any risk is as low as reasonably practicable.

Integrated multi-agency operational response plan – the development of this plan should consider the outcomes of the hazard assessment, and service risk assessments within the context of the agreed priorities for the incident.

Recording of Decision – the outcomes of the joint assessment of risk should be recorded, together with the identified priorities and the agreed multi-agency response plan, when resources permit. It is acknowledged that in the early stages of the incident this may not be possible, but it should be noted that post-incident scrutiny inevitably focuses on the earliest decision making.

Scenario group work

The trainer is to hand out the **Risk task sheet** to the delegates in their joint interoperability groups; each group has the same questions.

They should have 20 minutes to carry out this task and at the end of this time they will be required to present it to the rest of the group. They may present it in any way they wish, within the time frame.

After the 20 minutes the trainer should ask each team to present their findings to the rest of the group. The trainer should clear up any ambiguities which may arise throughout the presentations and answer any questions the delegates may have.

The trainer should ask each group in turn the answers to each question in the task sheet, which will assist in the shared learning of the whole group. A different team should present first for each question.

Closure

Trainer to answer any questions and clarify any points the delegates may raise.

Trainer is to then revisit the aims and objectives of the session, reiterating the learning points.

Session 1.5: Powers, policies and procedures for operational and tactical command

Duration

60 minutes

Aim

To test and develop the knowledge and understanding of the delegates in relation to generic powers, policies and procedures when carrying out the role of Operational or Tactical Commander during a major incident.

Objectives

- Identify what generic powers, policies and procedures need to be considered in regard to the Joint Decision Model
- Recognise the need for accountability and the necessity of keeping an accurate audit trail of decisions made
- Recognise the generic powers, policies and procedures within a given major incident scenario.

Resources

- Powers, policies and procedures PowerPoint
- Powers, policies and procedures scenario task sheet
- Police Service – Striking the balance between operational and health and safety duties in the police service: an explanatory note
- Fire and Rescue Service – Striking the balance between operational and health and safety duties in the Fire and Rescue Service

Delivery method

Introduction

Give a brief overview of the session's aims and objectives.

PowerPoint and plenary

The trainer should display the slides and deliver the input for each individual slide based on the notes provided in this trainers guide.

Note: The trainer should explain that not every agency specific power, policy or procedure can be mentioned given the time frame of the course. This lesson seeks to highlight the powers, procedures and policies which are common to all three blue light services. Further powers, policies and procedures can be found in the **Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Training – Legislation Guide and Handbook**.

Background notes for stage three

The trainer should explain that in the context of a joint response, a common understanding of any relevant powers, policies, capabilities and procedures is essential in order that the activities of one service complement, and do not compromise, the approach of the other services.

Background notes for Civil Contingencies Act 2004

Overview of the Act

The trainer should explain that the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (CCA) delivers a single framework for civil protection in the United Kingdom capable of meeting the challenges of the twenty-first century.

The Act is separated into two substantive parts:

- Part 1: focuses on local arrangements for civil protection, establishing a statutory framework of roles and responsibilities for local responders.
- Part 2: focuses on emergency powers, establishing a modern framework for the use of special legislative measures that might be necessary to deal with the effects of the most serious emergencies.

Source: Cabinet Office (2004) Civil Contingencies Act 2004: A Short Guide (Revised)

The following non-statutory guidance supports and underpins the CCA 2004:

- Emergency Preparedness and
- Emergency Response and Recovery.

Background notes for The Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (number 5 in Powers Policy and Procedures)

The trainer should explain that category two responders are less likely to be involved in detailed planning but are likely to be heavily involved in responding to incidents that impact on their own sector.

The trainer should facilitate a discussion around the sector nature of Cat 2 responders, for example rail operating companies' utility suppliers or pipeline operators. Trainers should include this to local category two responders.

Background notes for The Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (Part One)

The trainer should explain that the above definition of an emergency focuses on the risks responder agencies face in the 21st century. The definition of emergency in the **CCA 2004** (as shown on the slide) focuses on the consequences of emergencies.

The definition of a major incident has changed and is drawn from interoperability the joint doctrine edition two.

When incidents are of such a nature that they severely test the response arrangements of responder agencies and require a special mobilisation of their resources, most are likely to declare a major incident. A major incident may be declared by an agency or jointly. It is feasible that only one service may determine an emergency as a major incident, based on the type of incident and scale of their resources required. This may not necessarily mean it is a major incident for all other services.

Background notes for Human Rights Act 1998

This means that the responder agencies must interpret and apply their powers in a manner which is compatible with the rights contained within the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR).

- Responders should always be able to justify their decision-making process in regard to the use of powers.
- Always remember to document decisions or the advice given in the decision log. What was the rationale behind making that decision at the time? What was the advice/decision given?

Positive obligations in human rights law denote a State's obligation to engage in an activity to secure the effective enjoyment of a fundamental right, as opposed to the concept of the 'negative' obligation which requires the State to refrain from interference with a Convention right.

Background notes for ECHR Article 2

The trainer should explain that should a major incident go to an inquiry, it will also be necessary to investigate the **planning of the operation and its control**, including the question whether the commanders had acted adequately so as to **minimise the risk of loss of life**.

Article 2 of the ECHR imposes a positive duty on the State and public authorities (including the emergency services) to protect the right to life. Where there is a real and immediate risk to life, which the state authorities know or ought to know of, they must take appropriate measures within the scope of their powers which, judged reasonably, may be expected to avoid that risk. This is the principle established in the case of **Osman v UK (2000) 29 EHRR 245**, (paragraph 116)). **Osman Case law can be found in the Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Training – Legislation Guide and Handbook.**

If the authorities fail to do all that can reasonably be expected of them to do, then this may amount to an infringement of the positive obligation under Article 2.

In relation to major incidents, there will be a duty on those in charge to protect the lives of the responder agency personnel at the scene, and a duty to prevent further harm to those already injured in the incident.

Commanders will need to take into consideration a number of factors, including the risks of the incident type, the information about the incident available at the time, the number of casualties, and the capability of appropriately trained deployable personnel at their disposal.

All decisions taken by commanders must be fully accountable, must be logged appropriately and made with the appropriate authority. The acronym PLAN is useful when making any decisions which must be proportionate, have a legal basis, be accountable and be necessary to achieve a legitimate aim.

The trainer should point out that this aligns to the Central Pentagon of the JDM.

Source: Westlaw.co.uk

The quote which appears on the scene upon a click of the mouse, is taken from the Peer Review of Operation Bridge; Response to Derrick Bird Shootings (2010) explaining that there was a priority to stop Bird rather than render first aid to the casualties.

Background notes for ECHR Article 8

The trainer should explain that ECHR Article 8 protects an individual's right to respect for private and family life. It's a qualified right, which means any interference by a public authority must be in accordance with the law, necessary in a democratic society in pursuit of one or more 'legitimate aims' such as public safety or the prevention of disorder or crime.

- This places a responsibility on responder agencies, especially the police, to establish an operational purpose for collecting, recording and retaining personal information.
- Proportionality is also important to the management of information – the greater the interference with an individual's privacy the higher the threshold required – particularly relevant with collection of information by covert and intrusive means. **The action taken should be no more than is necessary to accomplish the objective.**
- Commanders should have regard to their duty to protect the public when managing information, particularly those members of society such as vulnerable adults and children who are less able than others to protect themselves. (Public Protection)

The trainer should explain that this means in reality:

Formal information-sharing agreements (ISA) may exist between some or all responding agencies, but such existence does not prohibit sharing of information outside of these ISAs.

- There should be a specific purpose for sharing information
- Information shared needs to be proportionate to the purpose and no more than necessary
- Inform the recipient if any of the information is potentially unreliable or inaccurate

Background notes for duty of care

The trainer should explain that a duty of care can arise in a number of situations. Consideration should be given to the following:

The Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974, which sets out a duty of care towards employees and other persons.

If a health and safety offence is committed with the consent or connivance of, or is attributable to any neglect on the part of, any director, manager, secretary or other similar officer of the organisation, then that person (as well as the organisation) can be prosecuted under section 37 of the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974.

Section 3(1) states that “it shall be the duty of every employer to conduct his undertaking in such a way as to ensure, so far as is reasonably practicable, that persons not in his employment who may be affected thereby are not thereby exposed to risks to their health or safety”.

The potential risks to people other than employees (i.e. members of the public) in major incidents should therefore be considered.

It is an offence, under section 33 HSWA 1974 to fail to discharge the section 2 duty, the section 3 duty or to contravene health and safety regulations.

Background notes for decision log/audit trail

The trainer should discuss the following points:

- Commencement of an incident log on notification of the incident. Ensuring that all decisions, rationale and options are logged
- Maintenance, where practicable, of a record log, (e.g. written or audio/video recorded) by each level of command to provide an audit trail of decisions and supporting rationale. **Record what information shared, when, with whom and why**
- The log as subject to disclosure, used for one operation only, and created and maintained in accordance with Government Protective Marking Scheme (GPMS) guidelines (replaced by the Classifications Policy in 2014)
- Integrity of the audit trail to be maintained and integrity of individual logs to be protected.
- Where practicable, having a dedicated loggist present at all times to record all decisions and rationale
  Joint debrief, sharing lessons learnt. Following every incident each service will carry out a debrief. Where services have responded to an emergency jointly, it is expected that the de-brief will also be carried out jointly

Background notes for local decision log procedure

The trainer should explain to the group how single service and joint decisions are recorded in their LRF area. Trainers should also explain how decision logs are stored in their LRF area.

Scenario group work

The trainer is to hand out the **Power, Policies and Procedures task sheet** to the delegates in their joint interoperability groups; each group has the same questions.

They should have 20 minutes to carry out this task and at the end of this time they will be required to present it to the rest of the group. They may present it in any way they wish, within the time frame.

After the 20 minutes the trainer should ask each team to present their findings to the rest of the group. The trainer should clear up any ambiguities which may arise throughout the presentations and answer any questions the delegates may have.

The trainer should ask each group in turn the answers to each question in the task sheet, which will assist in the shared learning of the whole group. A different team should present first for each question.

Closure

Trainer to answer any questions and clarify any points the delegates may raise.

Trainer is to then revisit the aims and objectives of the session, reiterating the learning points.

Session 1.6: Options and contingencies for operational and tactical command

Duration

40 minutes

Aim

To test and develop the knowledge and understanding of the delegates in relation to identifying options and contingencies when carrying out the role of Operational and Tactical Commander during a major incident.

Objectives

- Explain how to identify options and contingencies in regard to the Joint Decision Model
- Identify the Principles for joint working
- Describe the options for communications at a major incident

Resources

- Options and Contingencies PowerPoint

Delivery method

Introduction

Give a brief overview of the session's aims and objectives.

PowerPoint and plenary

The trainer should also bring into the plenaries the answers from the Delegate Research Portfolio activities. (For example, do the delegate answers from the Research Portfolios match up to the classroom discussion? What have the delegates learnt from the discussions to take forward to the workplace?)

The trainer should display the slides and deliver the input for each individual slide based on the notes provided in this trainers guide.

Background notes for stage four

The trainer should explain that there will almost always be more than one option to achieve the desired end state, and it is good practice that a range of options are identified and rigorously evaluated. All potential options or courses of action should be evaluated with respect to:

Suitability – does it fit with strategic direction?

Feasibility – in resource terms can it be done?

Acceptability – is it legal, morally defensible and justifiable?

An action may include deploying resources, briefing (national or social media) or developing a contingency or emergency plan. Whichever option(s) is/are chosen, it is essential that commanders are clear what they are required to carry out and, where the option is time-critical, there should be clearly agreed procedures for communicating any decision to defer, abort or initiate a specific tactic.

Contingencies are events that may occur and the arrangements that are put in place to respond to them should they occur. For example, strong evidence may suggest that an emergency is being successfully managed and the impacts safely controlled, but there remains a low likelihood that the situation could deteriorate with significant impacts. Simply hoping for the best is not a defensible option, and a contingency in this case would be to define measures to adjust the response, should the situation deteriorate.

Background notes for Principles for joint working

The trainer should explain that the above principles must be applied by responders when they are determining an appropriate course of action and should be reflected in **Joint** or **Standard Operating Procedures** for joint working in the response to, and coordination of an emergency:

Co-location

Co-location of commanders is essential, and allows those commanders to perform the functions of command, control and coordination, face to face, at a shared and easily identified location. At the scene this is known as a Forward Command Post, a location near to the scene where the response by the emergency services to the emergency is managed. **Identification of Commanders using Tabards is essential.**

Communication – trainer should explain that this has already been covered on the course, but is shown on the slide to give the delegates the full joint working picture.

Coordination

Coordination involves the integration of the priorities, resources, decision making and response activities of each emergency service in order to avoid potential conflicts, prevent duplication of effort, minimise risk and promote successful outcomes. Effective coordination requires one service to act in a "lead" capacity for coordination. The lead service will usually be the police service. However, in certain circumstances other services/agencies may be a more appropriate choice, depending upon the nature of the emergency, the phase of the response and the capabilities required.

Joint understanding of risk – trainer should explain that this has already been covered on the course, but is shown on the slide to give the delegates the full joint working picture.

Shared Situational Awareness – trainer should explain that this has already been covered on the course, but is shown on the slide to give the delegates the full joint working picture.

Background notes for tactical advisors

Trainers should ask students to provide examples of specialist advisors, e.g. search advisors, urban search and rescue, firearms tactical advisors, Communications, and CBRN tactical advisors.

Trainers should describe the role of Fire and Ambulance service National Interagency liaison Officers (NILOs).

The trainer should explain the benefits commanders can obtain from involving tactical advisors at the earliest possible stage.

Background notes for contingencies

The trainer should explain that contingencies are events that may occur and the arrangements that are put in place to respond to them should they occur.

The trainer should ask students to provide an example of a contingency they had planned for and how they responded to it.

The trainer should describe that commanders must consider contingencies and have measures in place to respond should the situation deteriorate.

Background notes for options for communications

The trainer should explain the following points:

- There are many forms of communications possible – the best form will normally be face to face but this will not always be possible – for instance all tactical commanders for all agencies may not be present at the same place. Therefore other forms of communications will be required.
- Video conferencing and teleconferencing are often not practical in the field and also will normally not be protected in terms of security.
- Email and electronic messaging can be effective – but it is often not quick enough and it is not clear which messages all have received and are aware of. It is also often not practical in an urgent situation in the field to send bulk messages.
- Mobile phones are often over-relied on by staff. The next slide in a moment will explore some of the issues with them.
- **Airwave** is the preferred tool (where face to face is not practical) as a means of interoperable communications – it is expected, following high profile cases and inquests, to be something that the emergency services are able to use together when required. The trainer should explain that Airwave is the subject of a discrete module.

Background notes to mobile phones

The trainer should explain the following points:

- Mobile phones are extensively used by people as we are all used to them – however they have many weaknesses and are a danger to the safe management of a serious incident.
- Mobile phones are nearly always used as a one-to-one system (not for speaking to a group of people at once) – this can easily result in different people being unaware of the same information – different key personnel can easily end up knowing different versions of the truth.
- They are insecure – mobile phones have been penetrated many times. Voicemail messages are particularly vulnerable. They are only suitable for emergency use and for brief messages when **nothing** else is available.... Airwave is normally available, so this would be no defence.
- Overload: in major incidents the normal networks can easily become overloaded completely and effectively shut down. In extreme cases a conscious decision may be made to do this for security reasons. Mobile Telecommunications Privileged Access Scheme (MTPAS) is a system designed to help emergency services keep a higher priority. MTPAS may not always provide the reliability/resilience required.
- It is easy to select the wrong number (particularly with text messaging) and send the information to the wrong recipient. Sometimes this will not be obvious. People also send texts and assume they have immediately got through. At times of crisis there can be many hours of delay in the delivery of a message. This dangerously gives the impression information has been passed, when in fact it has not been received.
- The trainer should explain that there is a short section of the course that looks at Airwave in more detail.

Background notes for points when communicating

The trainer should explain the following points:

- Clear speech – it is important when working with other agencies to understand that things which make sense immediately to you and your staff may mean something entirely different to others or mean nothing at all. You must go out of your way to make sure the other agencies understand your full meaning.
- Checking understanding is important – people will often naturally agree by nodding or looking knowledgeable – but do they **really** understand?
- Abbreviations are dangerous – HP would obviously mean High Priority – but does it? HP to some Fire Services is a Hydraulic Platform. An ASO is what? It sounds like an AFO (Authorised Firearms Officer) but it actually means Assistant Scientific Officer! It is very important to avoid abbreviations wherever possible so no horrible misunderstanding occurs – it may be obvious to you but is it to the other person?
- Brief succinct messages are really important – this aids quicker updates and communication and leaves less room for mistaken understanding to creep in (although sufficient understanding is important) and makes better use of the finite airspace available.

Closure

Trainer to answer any questions and clarify any points the delegates may raise. Trainer is to then revisit the aims and objectives of the session, reiterating the learning points.

Session 1.7: Action and review for operational and tactical command

Duration

40 minutes

Aim

To test and develop the knowledge and understanding of the delegates in relation to taking action and reviewing what happens when carrying out the role of Operational or Tactical Commander during a major incident.

Objectives

- Identify how to take action and review what happens in regard to the Joint Decision Model
- Recognise the importance of a post-event debrief
- Explain the need for joint learning in order to sustain interoperability

Resources

- Action and Review PowerPoint

Delivery method

Introduction

Give a brief overview of the session's aims and objectives.

PowerPoint and plenary

The trainer should display the slides and deliver the input for each individual slide based on the notes provided in this trainers guide.

Background notes for stage five

The trainer should explain that building situational awareness, setting direction and evaluating options all lead to taking the actions that are judged to be the most effective and efficient in resolving an emergency and returning to a new normality.

As the JDM is a continuous loop, it is essential that the results of those actions are fed back into the first box – Gather and share information and intelligence – which establishes shared situational awareness.

This will, in turn, shape any revision to the direction and risk assessment, and the cycle continues.

Background notes for briefing

The trainer should explain that the JDM can be used as a structure for briefings but, as the incident progresses or for planned incidents, a more detailed briefing may be required.

The trainer should explain that the IIMARCH model can be used to develop and deliver briefings. They should explain that it is not a core JESIP product but that it provides a structure commanders may wish to use. They should also explain that this is not a course on producing and delivering briefing, instead this slide seeks to give students an awareness of the IIMARCH model.

The trainer should encourage students to find out if their organisation or LRF has an agreed briefing model.

The trainer should briefly outline the IIMARCH model:

Information – An outline of the information and intelligence known

Intent – The Objective(s) of the operation

Method – The detail of how the objectives will be delivered, who will do what and when it will be done

Administration – Details such as duty times, briefing locations, and equipment required and financial issues

Risk assessment – The joint risk assessment for the operation

Communications – Issue such as the Airwave talkgroups to be used, numbers of dedicated radio operators and similar

Humanitarian – This should cover Human Rights Act 1998 considerations as well as how support could be given to those affected by the operation

Background notes for post event

The trainer should explain to the delegates that if the major incident is over, consideration should be given to the following:

- In order to facilitate operational debriefing and to provide evidence for inquiries (whether judicial, public, technical, inquest or some other form), it is essential to keep records. Single-agency and inter-agency debriefing processes should aim to capture information while memories are fresh. For this reason a joint hot debrief should be undertaken by commanders as soon as practicable following the event.
- Deal with key welfare issues and document them
- If things went wrong, feedback into own service and get them actioned immediately, without waiting for debrief

Background notes for joint learning

The trainer should explain that joint learning describes both the identification of lessons relevant to joint working, and the process of learning those lessons. Individual services have their own approaches for identifying and learning lessons, but building and sustaining interoperability requires that these lessons are shared in order that unintended consequences (e.g. change that enhances the efficiency of single service operations but to the detriment of the effectiveness of joint operations) are minimised, and opportunities for greater interoperability are realised. This requires a commitment to sharing and prioritising lessons with implications for joint working.

Lesson identification, dissemination and the development of subsequent action plans to make and embed change should be undertaken through a formal debrief process managed by the LRF. Further work is being undertaken by JESIP as part of the legacy arrangements to ensure that lessons identified from joint working are referred to a national Tri-Service Governance Board for consideration. This will ensure that any associated action, either single or joint service, as a result of this joint learning of lessons, is made, and the changes embedded into how organisations operate and individuals behave. Part of this work will be for organisations to consider how they will carry out joint debriefs.

Background notes for joint organisational learning (JOL)

The trainer should describe how the JOL online system provides a single system for all responders to share learning and notable practice that are identified from incidents, exercises or training.

The trainer should explain that JOL should be used to capture learning that involves two or more emergency responders.

The trainer should explain how JOL consists of a national IT platform, a formal assessment and review process to analyse and identify learning and a system of governance that ensures learning identified is used to improve practice.

The trainer should encourage students to find out who is the JOL lead in the students' organisations.

Background notes for concluding on a positive

The trainer should explain that the Shoreham air crash was an example of when responders used JESIP with positive results.

Closure

Trainer to answer any questions and clarify any points the delegates may raise.

Trainer is to then revisit the aims and objectives of the session, reiterating the learning points.

Session 1.8 Communication (Airwave)

The trainer should describe the importance of effective operational communications.

Objectives

- Explain why Airwave is the preferred means of Communications
- Explain the importance of engaging a Communication tactical advisor at the earliest possible stage
- Provide an opportunity for students to demonstrate how to change talk groups on an Airwave handset
- Explain how Airwave will be replaced by the Emergency Services Network

Materials

- Communications Power point
- Students' Airwave terminals

Back ground notes for emergency service's network (ESN)

The trainer should explain briefly that AIRWAVE will be replaced by the emergency services network that will provide secure voice and data communications.

This section is likely to change over the lifetime of the course and trainers should speak with their organisation's lead for ESN to provide students with a brief update of ESN progress.

Background notes for Airwave

Trainers should explain that Airwave is the preferred method of communication. Trainers should describe the advantages Airwave offers over mobile telephones:

Trainers should describe that group calls enable commanders to be all informed without the delays that can arise from multiple telephone calls.

Trainers should describe how emergency services can talk on joint talk groups across services to support the JESIP principals of interoperability.

Note – Airwave capacity and coverage issues are quite complex and beyond the scope of this course to cover in detail. For this reason the training material highlights the two main issues that can cause communications issues but advises students to contact tactical advisor.

Background notes for issues – coverage

Trainer should describe how in some rural areas or inside buildings there may be no Airwave Coverage and so terminals may not be able to connect to the network at all.

Background notes for options

The trainer should explain that there are a number of methods that can overcome problems with coverage but that they should contact a tactical advisor at the earliest possible stage in an operation.

Background notes for issues – capacity

The trainer should explain that the Airwave network is built to support the normal number of users in a given area with some overhead.

The trainer should explain that if there are many more users in a given area then there may be problems with capacity. The trainer should explain that this is likely to cause issues with users hearing a busy tone when they try to transmit or not hear some messages.

Background notes for options – tactical advisors

The trainer should explain that there are a number of solutions to problems with capacity. The trainer should explain that commanders who are experiencing queuing or who are managing or planning an event that will see many more Airwave users than normal in an area should contact a tactical advisor as soon as possible.

Background notes for talk groups

The trainer should describe how all talkgroups have names which are referred to as Alpha tags. The trainer should explain that to ensure effective communication students should always refer to talkgroup by its Alphatag and not by the number it occupies in the students Airwave terminal. The trainer should explain that this is because other agencies are likely to have the same talkgroups in different positions in their terminals.

Note: trainers are encouraged to use local photographs in this section of the course.

Trainers should describe how alpha tags are made up of a letter describing the sector: P for Police, F for Fire or A for Ambulance, a four letter code to describe which organisation e.g. AVON for Avon and Somerset and then a description of what the talkgroup is e.g. INTEROP1 for an interoperability talk group.

Background notes for 'What is available for the emergency services'

The trainer should describe that there are a number of talk groups available that will enable the emergency services and responder agencies to speak to each other. These include interagency talkgroups and local Emergency services talkgroups.

The trainer should explain that some talkgroups are available all the time whilst others need to be booked for events to ensure there is no confliction.

Trainers should describe that commanders should contact a tactical advisor at the earliest possible stage in an incident or if planning an operation to ensure the most effective talkgroups are used.

Background notes for points when communicating

Trainers should explain to students that they should follow the following rules when using Airwave during a multi-agency incident.

- Clear speech should be used
- Acronyms and other specialist language should not be used
- Messages should be brief
- Single service call signs should not be used, instead individuals' and teams should be identifies in plain language. E.g. No BD002A but Police Tactical commander.
- Understanding should be checked

Background notes for interoperability – practice

Trainers should demonstrate how to change talk group to a local interoperability talkgroup, for example ES1 on students' terminals and then allow the group to practise changing talk groups and speaking to one another using Airwave.

Session 1.9: Command consolidation exercise

Duration

80 minutes

Aim

To test and develop the knowledge and understanding of the delegates in relation to the roles, responsibilities and command structures when carrying out the role of Tactical Commander during a major incident.

Trainers should seek to identify a local scenario based upon their LRF risk register. They should use local material to develop a scenario that will enable students to work together and apply the JDM to achieve the objectives shown below.

For initial course trainers may choose to use the ‘Festival’ or ‘RTC’ consolidation exercise developed by the College in the first edition of the training, although it is preferable to use a local exercise.

Objectives

- Identify the need to declare a major incident in a given scenario
- Explain the role of an Operational or Tactical Commander in a given major incident scenario
- Discuss the underpinning rationale in an Tactical plan evidenced around the Joint Decision Model for a given scenario

Resources

- Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Principles - Joint Doctrine
  Hand out
- Joint l Commander Consolidation exercise title PowerPoint based upon the existing tactical commander course
- Tactical Commander Consolidation exercise task sheet based upon the existing tactical commander course
- Consolidation Exercise task answer sheet

Delivery method

Introduction

Give a brief overview of the session’s aims and objectives.

It is important that an individual taking on the role of Tactical Commander is fully conversant with the role and responsibilities involved. The outcomes of the session should be used at the end of the day to consolidate the learning which the delegates have gone through and check their understanding.

The trainer should bring into the plenaries the answers from the Delegate Research Portfolio activities. (For example, do the delegate answers from the Research Portfolios match up to the classroom discussion? What have the delegates learnt from the discussions to take forward to the workplace?)

Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Principles - Joint Doctrine

The trainer should give out to the delegates the **Joint Doctrine handout** and go through it relating it to the lesson content covered on the course, emphasising that following this doctrine will lead to more efficient and effective coordination of emergency response, more effective deployment of resources, and improved public confidence in the tri-service response; ultimately saving as many lives as possible.

This doctrine should now be applied to the consolidation exercise.

Group work

The trainer is to pose the question: **'In your groups, you are the Operational and Tactical Commanders for this incident from your own organisations. Please complete the task sheets and be prepared to share your findings with the rest of the classroom group.'**

The trainer should emphasise that the scenario is a vehicle to allow Commanders to work in a joint interoperability environment setting and draw upon and utilise the principles for joint working. This spontaneous event is above and beyond that which is prepared for by the Event Management Plan.

The trainer is to hand out the task sheets and the JDM task answer sheet to the delegates in their groups; each group has the same questions.

They have 30 minutes to carry out this task and at the end of this time they will be required to present it to the rest of the group. They may present it in any way they wish, within the time frame.

After the 30 minutes the trainer should ask each team to present their findings to the rest of the group. The trainer should clear up any ambiguities which may arise throughout the presentations and answer any questions the delegates may have.

The trainer should ask each group in turn the answers to each question in the task sheet, which will assist in the shared learning of the whole group. A different team should present first for each question.

Closure

Trainer to answer any questions and clarify any points the delegates may raise.

Trainer is to then revisit the aims and objectives of the session, reiterating the learning points.

Session 1.10: Course closure

Duration

10 minutes

Aim

To allow delegates to recap learning and clarify any outstanding areas.

Objectives

- Provide the delegates with the opportunity to ask questions, clarifying any ambiguities
- Identify new learning that the delegates can apply to working effectively as a Tactical Commander at a major incident.

Delivery method

This is the final session, so the following will need to be carried out:

- Offer delegates the opportunity to ask any remaining questions they may have.
- Complete and collect evaluation forms.

Notes:

CONTROL ROOM MANAGERS TRAINER GUIDE

CONTROL ROOM MANAGERS TRAINER GUIDE

JESIP
Working Together – Saving Lives

WWW.JESIP.ORG.UK

Contents

Purpose of the Course

This course has been developed to enable organisations to train control room managers and supervisors in JESIP ways of working. It can be used both for initial training and refresher training. The course will give students an understanding of the principles for joint working and how they can be used by control rooms to deliver the JESIP objective of working together to save lives and reduce harm.

The course is designed for people who work in the control rooms, or similar facilities, of:

- Emergency Services;
- Other Civil Contingencies Act Category One Responders;
- Civil Contingencies Act Category Two Responders;
- Volunteer Sector;
- Military.

Whilst the course has the title Control Room Managers' Course it is aimed at people who hold, of who aspire to hold a number of roles, these include, but are not limited to:

- Tactical Commanders based in control rooms;
- Tactical Commanders based in control rooms;
- Mangers based in control rooms;
- Supervisors based in control rooms;

This course has been designed to support the requirements under the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 for training of appropriate Category 1 staff.

This course aims to equip delegates with the knowledge they will need to work with other control room mangers in response to incidents, including major incidents.

Chief Officers/ chief executives should decide who from their organisation should attend this course.

Prior or co-requisite Learning

Students should complete either the national JESIP classroom or online awareness product:

http://www.jesip.org.uk/e-learning-2017

Trainer Requirements

To deliver this course trainers should either be trainers with knowledge or experience of their organisations control room OR experienced control room managers who can deliver this material and facilitate students learning. Trainers can be drawn from any organisation (although see student trainer mix section for the role of the emergency services)

- Prior knowledge or experience of command and/or management in their organisation's control room.
- Awareness of multi-agency working practices in relation to major incidents gained through attendance (or training) a JESIP commanders' course.
- Experience or ability in the facilitation of learning by:
  - creating an effective learning environment;
  - using effective communication techniques including giving and receiving feedback;
  - employing effective presentation skills using a variety of visual aids;
  - employing effective facilitation skills to manage scenario-based group work;
  - monitoring learners progress and respond to specific needs as appropriate;
  - employing a range of strategies for managing challenging situations in training, including resistance to change; and,
  - promoting equality and value the diversity of the learners.

A key element of JESIP is the avoidance of single service language. To support these trainers should avoid any single service acronyms, terminology or models.

This trainers' guide is intended as a light touch document, it contains the key points that should be delivered to students but leaves the means of delivery flexible for trainers to decide locally based on their own knowledge and experience.

Student and trainer mix

For the course to meet the national recommend standards there should be members of the Ambulance, Fire and Police services in the room.

The gold standard would be police fire and ambulance trainers and students, along with students, and possibly trainers, from other responder agencies.

The minimum standard is that there should be two emergency service trainers, from different services, present and that standards there should be members of the Ambulance, Fire and Police services in the room as either students or trainers. This is to facilitate the understanding of each service's capabilities.

Supporting Material

Trainers may refer to these documents to support their knowledge:

- Joint Doctrine: The Interoperability Framework Edition 2;
- Cabinet Office Lexicon 2013 v2.1.1;
- Cabinet Office (2012) Civil Protection Common Map Symbology;
- Cabinet Office (2005) Civil Contingencies Act 2004: A Short Guide (revised);
- Cabinet Office (2013) Emergency Response and Recovery V5.

Local course Development

There are elements of this course that require local input from trainers.

If organisations wish to modify this course to deliver additional local learning outcomes then they may do so on the condition that:

- The course still delivers the national learning outcomes;
- All references to JESIP remain;
- This course is not run for profit. Cost recovery is permitted.

Course Timetable

Time	Session	Title	Duration (Mins)
09:00-09:30	Session 1:	Introduction	30
09:30-10:15	Session 2:	Emergency services control rooms	45
10:15-10:30		Break	15
10:30-11:30	Session 3:	JESIP Products including the principles for Joint Working	60
11:30-12:30	Session 4:	Joint Decision making in Control rooms	60
12:30-13:00		Lunch	30
13:00-13:45	Session 5:	Information Sharing and management	45
13:45-14:30	Session 6:	Social Media and communications	45
14:30-14:45		Break	15
15:00-15:30	Session 7:	Organisational learning	30
15:00-15:30	Session 8:	Consolidation	30

Resources

- Projection methods;
- JESIP Control room managers course PowerPoint;
- JESIP Control room managers course group exercise material (two sets per syndicate);
- Classroom in cabaret seating arrangement;
- Pens;
- Flip chart or white board.

The symbol is used for student discussions.

Session 1: Introduction

Aim

The aim of session one is to explain the purpose of the course and to outline the format of the training.

Delivery

Students should be allocated to syndicates which should provide as wide a mix of agencies in each syndicate as possible.

The trainers should deliver the slides:

To

Trainers should use an ice breaker exercise either with the whole course or in syndicates, depending on course numbers. A recommended exercise is from the slide:

Date	Status	Document Name	Version	Page
2017 10 16	DRAFT	JESIP Control Room Managers Course	V0.3	Page 7 of 25

Session 2: Emergency services control rooms

This section describes how ambulance HM Coastguard, fire and police control rooms are configured and work.

There are three slides that trainers should populate locally to describe the local emergency service control rooms. These should be populated during the course planning stage.

The slides for this section are:



To



The content of the slides should be sufficient for trainers to deliver this material to their students. Trainers should explain:

- That ambulance and police control rooms tend to be larger than fire control rooms;
- That fire control room staff tend to be multi skilled whereas there are different roles in police and ambulance control rooms;
- That police control rooms have a significant command role.

The local slides should be populated to give students an understanding of the other control rooms they are likely to work with, their locations, staff numbers and typical call volumes.

Student Activity

Trainers may wish to ask students to discuss their own control room arrangements either within the syndicates or with the wider group.

This would be particularly useful if there are students from services other than the ambulance, fire and police services.

Session 3: JESIP and the principles for joint working

This section covers the principles for joint working and introduces students to the Joint doctrine, The Interoperability Framework. The Joint Decision Model (JDM), the M/ETHANE model and the definition of a major incident.

Trainers should familiarise themselves with these products by reviewing the Joint Doctrine.

TO



The trainer should explain that the joint doctrine and products provides a framework so control room managers and all commanders can work together. Applying these models and principles will improve the way responder agencies **work together to save lives and reduce harm.**

The trainer should explain to students that the key products are: the Principles for joint working , the joint doctrine, the Joint Decision Model (JDM) and the M/ETHANE model and that these models will be described in this section. The trainer should also explain that these products are reinforced by five control room supporting principles which will be addressed in the next session of the course.

Interoperability is defined as the extent to which organisations can work together coherently as a matter of routine.

JESIP began with a focus on the blue light emergency services. It developed to include all emergency responders. Today these principles apply to **all** agencies involved in some way in responding to incidents in the UK. There is always learning for responder agencies in managing incidents more effectively. JESIP continues to develop new systems and processes and encourage best practice amongst emergency responders.

The trainer should explain that JESIP is underpinned by the ‘Joint Doctrine: The Interoperability Framework, Edition Two2016. This doctrine differs from the first edition by:

- Increased scope, it covers all responders, not just police, fire and ambulance;
- A section on the military;
- A section on interoperability between control rooms.

The trainer should explain the principles for joint working underpin JESIP. These principles are not hierarchical and they do not need to be delivered in the order they are presented in in the joint doctrine.

The Principles for Joint Working



Trainers should explain that Co-location of commanders is essential. It allows those commanders to perform the functions of command, control and co-ordination, face to face, at a single, jointly agreed location. Control rooms can assist commanders in physical location, by identifying the location and sharing that information with commanders.

Control rooms can also achieve the objectives of co-location by virtual co-location between control rooms and other commanders. This can be achieved by using interoperable Airwave talkgroups, teleconferencing and video conferences.

Trainers may ask the students if they have had experience of using interoperable Airwave talkgroups, teleconferencing and video conferences.

Communication is the passage of clear, unambiguous and timely information relevant to an emergency situation. Meaningful and effective communication between emergency responder organisations and individuals underpins effective joint working. The sharing of information, free from acronyms and other potential sources of confusion, across service boundaries is essential to operational success.

Co-ordination involves commanders discussing and making decisions on the priorities, resources, future decision making and response activities of each agency, including their integration to avoid potential conflicts, prevent duplication of effort, minimise risk and promote successful outcomes. Effective co-ordination generally requires one service to act in a “lead” capacity, such as chairing co-ordination meetings and ensuring an effective response.

Risk arises from threats and/or hazards which will be seen, understood and treated differently by different emergency services. In the context of a joint response, sharing information and understanding about the likelihood and potential impact of risks and the availability and implications of potential control measures will ensure, as far as is reasonably practicable, that the agreed aim and objectives are not compromised. This will include ensuring the safety of responders and mitigating the impact of risks on members of the public, infrastructure and the environment.

This is a common understanding of the circumstances and immediate consequences of the emergency, together with an appreciation of the available capabilities and emergency services' priorities. Achieving shared situational awareness is essential for effective interoperability in the emergency response.

The Joint Decision Model introduction

The Joint Decision Model is introduced in this session. Trainers should briefly introduce students to it and to each of the elements. They should explain that each element of the JDM is explained in greater detail in the next session.

M/ETHANE and major incident introduction

The trainer should explain that the definition a major incident changed at the same time as the second edition of the joint doctrine was published. The definition of a major incident is:

An event or situation with a range of serious consequences which requires special arrangements to be implemented by one or more responder agencies

Trainers should explain that the M/ETHANE model should not be used just for major incidents but can be used for other incidents if an ETHANE message is sent.

Trainers may wish to add a local example of a METHANE message.

Session 4: Joint Decision making in Control rooms



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

Trainers should explain that this session will address the Joint Decision Model in more detail and from the context of control room managers. The session will also give students the opportunity to develop a M/ETHANE message.

The trainer should explain that decision models used to support decision making in difficult circumstances should be simple and easy to apply.

The trainer should describe how the JDM has been developed from a police service model called the National Decision Model (NDM; the difference being that the NDM central pentagram is the **National Police Service Code of Ethics** as opposed to the JDM's **Working Together Saving Lives Reducing Harm**.

Trainers may ask students to discuss the use of decision models in their own organisations. This could take place in syndicates or with the whole group depending on circumstances.

Trainers should describe how the JDM will be applied many times during the course of an incident. That it is scalable in its application. For example, an initial commander may apply it in a matter of seconds in assessing an incident for the first time, whilst at a later stage the Tactical Coordination Group (TCG) may use the JDM as the framework of a meeting that could last around an hour.

JDM Elements

Trainers should present the slides explaining the JDM. During the information and intelligence element trainers should explain that the difference between information and intelligence: *Intelligence is information that has been the subject of an assessment process.*

During the information element students will have the opportunity to construct a M/ETHANE message based on the Hotel scenario.

During the Assess Risks and Develop a working strategy trainers should explain where the different agency commanders are most likely to be located. Students may be asked to speak about their own agencies policies; this will be particularly useful if there are students from non- emergency services present.

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Overarching or primary aim: Working together saving lives reducing harm

Trainers should describe that joint decisions must be made with reference to the overarching or primary aim of any response to an emergency: to save lives and reduce harm. This is achieved through a co-ordinated, multiagency response. Decision makers should have this uppermost in their minds throughout the decision-making process.

Trainers should describe how control room managers should test their decisions and actions against this primary aim throughout the incident.

Gather information and intelligence

Trainers should describe that situational awareness is about having appropriate answers to the following questions: what is happening, what are the impacts, what are the risks, what might happen and what is being done about it? In the context of the JDM, shared situational awareness becomes critically important. Shared situational awareness is achieved by sharing information and understanding between the organisations involved, to build a stronger, multi-dimensional awareness of events, their implications, associated risks and potential outcomes.

During the information and intelligence element trainers should explain that the difference between information and intelligence: *Intelligence is information that has been the subject of an assessment process.*

The trainer should explain that information sharing is vital in the response to an incident, but also remind students that there are constraints to the sharing of personal data and sensitive personal data (including police intelligence) requires further consideration before sharing across agencies and the JDM can be used as a tool to guide decision making on what to release and to whom. When considering the legal and policy implications, the following are relevant:

- A legal framework to share information is required – in an 'emergency' situation this will generally come from Common Law (save life/property), the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 or the Civil Contingencies Act 2004
- Formal Information Sharing Agreements (ISAs) may exist between some or all responding agencies but such existence does not prohibit sharing of information outside of these ISAs
- There should be a specific purpose for sharing information
- Information shared needs to be proportionate to the purpose and no more than necessary
- The need to inform the recipient if any of the information is potentially unreliable or inaccurate
- The need to ensure that the information is shared safely and securely – it must comply with the Government Protective Marking Scheme (GPMS – replaced by the Classifications Policy in 2014) if appropriate
- What information is shared, when, with whom and why, should be recorded.

The trainers should ask students to describe what considerations their organisations have in relation to information sharing.

The trainers should use exercise two (hotel fire) to allow students to produce a M/ETHANE message in their syndicates.

Asses risk and develop a working strategy

Trainers explain that control room managers have a vital role in developing a joint assessment of risk, particularly in the early stages of an incident. At any incident, each responder agency will have a unique insight into these risks.

By sharing what they know control room managers can start to establish a common understanding. Informed decisions ions on deployments and risk control measures can be made an early stage.

Trainers should explain that the working strategy should not be confused with the strategy for the incident provided by the strategic commanders or strategic co-ordinating group, normally sometime into the incident.

Trainers should explain that in some organisations a control room manager may well set the initial working strategy, for example the police, but that this is less likely to happen in other agencies, for example fire.

Trainers may ask students to speak about their experience of strategy being set by control room managers in their organisation.

Trainers should explain that even if the control room in their agency does not have a role in developing the working strategy they will have a role in sharing it both within their agency and with other agencies.

Trainers should explain that a working strategy should address these questions:

- What are the aims and objectives?
- Who is setting these?
- When, time scales and milestones?
- Where, what locations are affected are the locations?
- Why, what is the rationale is it consistent with the strategic aims?
- How will these tasks be achieved?

Consider powers policy and procedure

Trainers should describe that decisions should be made in relation to legislation, doctrine and local policy and procedures. Trainers should explain that there is a hierarchy in relation to joint response to incidents.

Trainers should explain that, in a joint response, a common understanding of any relevant powers, policies, capabilities and procedures is essential so that the activities of one responder agency complement rather than compromise the approach of other responder agencies.



Emergency response documentation hierarchy

Trainers should also explain that different agencies will have different levels of knowledge and understanding about legislation.

Trainers should explain that the joint doctrine informs all responder agencies. Trainers should describe that there is national single service doctrine for agencies.

- National Ambulance Guidance
- Police APP Approved Professional Practice
- Fire NOG National Operational Guidance

Identify options and contingencies

Commanders should consider possible courses of action and review them against these criteria:

- Suitable - does it help to achieve the strategy?
- Feasible – can it be achieved with the resources available?
- Acceptable – is it justifiable, legal and ethical?

Trainers should explain that whichever options are chosen, it is essential that commanders are clear on what they need to carry out. Procedures for communicating any decisions to defer, abort or initiate a specific tactic should be clearly agreed.

Trainers should explain that contingencies relate to events that may occur and the arrangements that will be put in place if they do.

Take action and review what happened

Trainers should explain that the control room **may** have a role in informing staff on what actions has been decided, allocating staff to tasks and communicating when activity may start and stop. This will vary between agencies.

Trainers may ask students to describe what role their control room has in directing activity at an incident.

Session 5: Control Room Supporting Principles and Information Sharing and management



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

The trainer should describe how there are five supporting principles for control rooms. These support the principles for joint working. Like the principles, the supporting principles are not hieratical and can be applied in any order through all stages of an incident.

A dialogue between control room supervisors should be established as soon as possible.

Trainers should describe the different ways that this can be achieved; for example, using Airwave or a conference call. They should acknowledge that it may be difficult to achieve but it is vital during a fast-moving incident.

Plain English should be used between control rooms

Trainers should invite students to provide examples of how single service language, jargon or acronyms can cause confusion.

Talking to commanders, both before the first commander arrives at the scene and to commanders throughout the incident will contribute to shared situational awareness.

Trainers should describe how this can be useful in helping commanders build a shared situational awareness before they arrive. Trainers can explain how the airwave standard test can help commanders and control room staff become familiar with this process.

Trainers can find details of this test on the JESIP web site.

http://www.jesip.org.uk/airwave-test

Control room supervisors should engage in multi-agency communications and carry out the initial actions required to manage the incident.

Trainers should describe this will vary from service to service.

Trainers may ask students to describe what kind of actions they would take in response to a major incident. This could be done in syndicates or as a plenary session.

The lead responder will suggest a location for commanders to co-locate in the early stages of a multi-agency incident when operational commanders may be traveling to the scene

Trainers should briefly describe what elements contribute make a good rendezvous point or forward command post.

Trainers explain that some sites have pre-planned locations for rendezvous points. They discuss the benefits of this but also the risks, especially when responding to possible terrorist incidents.

The trainer should explain how control rooms have a key role to play in sharing information between organisations.



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

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Session 6: Social Media and communications

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

This section covers three areas:

- The use of social media to gather information and intelligence;
- The use of social media to provide information to the public;
- Communication systems available to responder agencies.

Trainers should highlight that information about major incidents is very likely to appear on Social Media within minutes, if not seconds, of the incident occurring and there is almost no way of preventing this. Instead responder agencies should consider using social media to provide information to the public.

Commanders may be able to obtain vital information from social media in the early stages of an incident. Although trainers should explain that there may be issues with the volume of information being received and being able to assess its accuracy.

Trainers should describe how social media can be a powerful tool to share information with the public and so help keep people safe and minimise the effects of an incident. For example, social media can be used to warn people to avoid a certain area or give details of actions they can take to keep themselves safe.

The trainer may ask students to describe what access to social media students have in their control rooms. This would refer to:

- Any ability to access social media as a source of information and intelligence; and,
- Capability to put information onto social media.

Operational Communications.

Trainers should speak about the different communication systems available to their organisations.

Trainers may ask student s to describe their organisations communication systems and how their control room makes use of them.

Unless trainers are confident about describing the issues caused by a lack of coverage or over capacity on the Airwave network they should inform students that large incidents or incidents in rural areas may be affected by issues with Airwave, they should mention that there may be issues without going into details. Trainers should advise students to make contact with an operational communications advisor at an early stage in large pre-planned or spontaneous incidents.

The operational communications advisor course replaces previous single service Airwave tactical advisors courses. It is run on behalf of all responder agencies by the College of Policing.

Trainers should update the Airwave shared talkgroup slide to reflect local alphatags.

Trainers may ask students to describe their experiences of using shared talkgroups.

Trainers should explain that the purpose of the Airwave standard test is to spread knowledge and experience of interoperable shared talkgroups among commanders. Students should be informed that details of the test can be found on the JESIP website. Trainers should describe what the local arrangements are for conducting the Airwave standard test.

In the communication section trainers should provide an update in relation to local progress with implementation of the Emergency services Network (ESN).

Session 7: Organisational learning

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

Trainers should explain that learning lessons is not simply about identifying where things went well and badly but it must also include using that information to make changes to practice.

Trainers may ask students to describe any experiences of taking part in de-briefs.

Trainers should explain the local arrangements for JOL ONLINE. This information can be obtained for their organisation's JOL ONLINE single point of contact (SPOC)

Session 8: Consolidation



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Following the consolidation exercise trainers should invite students to consider the questions on the final slide. Students should be encouraged to write their answers down and take them away with them

Trainers note. These exercises are based on a fire in a cliff top hotel. You may choose to replace this scenario with one drawn from your local risk register.

Map of location of exercise



Photographs of hotel



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Group Exercises Inject 1



It is 1030 hours. You are on duty in your control room when 999 calls start to be received about a fire at the Cliffs Hotel in Sandford. Calls are coming from people who are outside the hotel and people inside the hotel. Some of the callers' state that they think they can hear people in the sea shouting for help.

The Cliffs Hotel has 120 bedrooms and is located on the seafront. It stands between Claremont Road and sea cliffs that are about 20 meters high.

In your syndicate discuss:

- What information your organisation might hold on the location; and,
- What further information you would seek to gather from callers.

Group Exercises Inject 2



It is now 1015

Large parts of the hotel are on fire with some people trapped in bedrooms. Your control room is continuing to receive 999 calls.

Would you declare this as a major incident? If you did, what will your agency do in response?

Construct a M/ETHANE message that you would expect to receive from the scene.

Facilitate a discussion with students as to whether they would declare this a major incident, ask for their rationale as to their decision

Group Exercises Inject 3



It is 1030. Your agencies have staff at the scene responding to this fire. There are still people trapped in rooms in the hotel. Some people may have escaped into the garden and then fallen on to the cliffs in an attempt to escape. Some may have fallen into the sea.

There are many messages appearing on Facebook and similar social media sites referring to this fire and posting pictures of the hotel on fire.

As a group apply the Joint Decision Model.

Be ready to share your thoughts on these questions with the rest of the group.

As Control room managers:

- What would your joint course of action be know?
- What is your syndicate's joint understanding of risk?

Group Exercise Inject 4



It is now 1055. All agencies have commanders at the location and a Tactical Co-ordination Centre is being set up at Sandford Police Headquarters.

A large tank of heating oil has ruptured. The oil has not caught fire but is leaking down the cliff face and into the sea.

A large number of people are gathering on the Pier close to the hotel to watch.

Pictures are appearing on social media of what appear to be two badly burnt dead bodies outside the hotel.

Smoke is blowing inland and has reduced visibility on the main London Road; this is the main route into the town centre.

As a syndicate consider the following questions and prepare and report back to the rest of the group:

- How would you communicate between control rooms?
- How would you communicate between your control room and staff at the scene?
- Commanders at the scene are requesting an interoperability command talk group. How will you facilitate this?
- What are your considerations in relation to social media?

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LEARNING OUTCOMES

JESIP

Working Together – Saving Lives

WWW.JESIP.ORG.UK

All Responder Staff Interoperability Learning Outcomes

Interoperability & Major Incidents

- Define interoperability
- Explain why it is important organisations work together at incidents
- Demonstrate an awareness of the JESIP mobile application
- List the five principles for joint working
- Define a major incident
- Describe who can declare a major incident in the students' organisation

JESIP Principles for joint working

- Describe why it is important to establish communication with other responders arriving on-scene
- Describe how the commander at scene from each responder agency can be identified
- Describe why it is important that responder agencies commanders co-locate at an incident
- Describe why it is important to communicate using plain English avoiding the use of acronyms and single service jargon and how to access tools to help - JESIP Glossary
- Describe the basic role and capabilities of other responder agencies
- Describe what is meant by shared situational awareness why it is important to establish it
- Describe what models can support developing shared situational awareness (M/ETHANE and the Joint Decision Model)
- Describe the importance of understanding risk from perspectives of all responder agencies involved

M/ETHANE

- Describe why it is important to have a single format for sharing incident information
- Describe the difference between METHANE and ETHANE messages
- Demonstrate the construction and delivery of an effective M/ETHANE message
- Demonstrate how the JESIP App can be used to help generate a M/ETHANE report

Joint Decision Model

- Explain the benefits of having a single decision making model across agencies
- Name the model commanders should use for making joint decisions
- Describe the importance of a post-event debrief
- Explain the need to capture lessons impacting on interoperability as part of de-brief procedures

Control Room Staff Interoperability Learning Outcomes

Interoperability & Major Incidents

- Define interoperability
- Explain why it is important organisations work together at incidents
- Demonstrate an awareness of the JESIP mobile application
- List the five principles for joint working
- Define a major incident
- Describe who can declare a major incident in the students' organisation

Principles for joint working

- Describe why it is important to establish communication with responders deployed to the incident and other control rooms
- Describe why it is important that responder agencies commanders co-locate at an incident
- Describe how control rooms can support co-location of commanders
- Describe why it is important to communicate using plain English avoiding the use of acronyms and single service jargon and how to access tools to help - JESIP Glossary
- Describe why a multi-agency conversation between control room supervisors / commanders may be required during an emergency
- Describe how the use of Airwave multi-agency talk groups can assist with managing an incident
- Describe the basic role and capabilities of other responder agencies
- Describe what is meant by shared situational awareness why it is important to establish it
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Control Room Command / Manager / Supervisor Interoperability Learning Outcomes

Interoperability & Major Incidents

- Define interoperability
- Explain why it is important organisations work together at incidents
- Describe the JESIP Joint Doctrine guidance and how to access it
- Demonstrate an awareness of the JESIP mobile application
- Describe the five principles for joint working and why they are important
- Define a major incident
- Describe who can declare a major incident in the students' organisation
- Describe the implications of declaring a major incident for the students' organisation and for other organisations
- Explain where their own organisation single service and Local Resilience Forum major incident plans are held in their area
- Describe the role of a Control Room in a major incident
- Describe why it is important to provide timely and accurate information to warn and inform the public

M/ETHANE

- Describe why it is important to have a single format sharing incident information
- Describe the difference between METHANE and ETHANE messages
- Demonstrate the construction and delivery of an effective M/ETHANE message
- Describe how information from M/ETHANE messages can be used to populate an incident log

Principles for joint working

- Describe why it is important for commanders to co-locate and what can go wrong if this does not occur
- Describe how the commander at scene from each responder agency can be identified.
- Describe what considerations there are in relation to co-location (safety, easily identifiable, proximity to scene)
- Describe how control rooms can support co-location of commanders
- Describe why it is important to establish a Forward Command Post and who needs to be aware
- Describe why it is important to communicate using plain English avoiding the use of acronyms and single service jargon
- Describe how and why the use of Airwave multi-agency talk groups can assist with managing an incident
- Describe the basic role and capabilities of other responder agencies
- Explain the differences in how other responder agency control rooms operate
- Describe why it is important to agree a lead service
- Describe why it is important to agree priorities resources and capabilities
- Describe why it is important to agree the timings and structure of meetings (for example conference calls with other control rooms)
- Describe why it is important to use a consistent standard briefing tool such as IIMARCH
- Describe the elements of developing a joint understanding of risk (likelihood and impact of risks and hazards)

Control Room Command / Manager / Supervisor Interoperability Learning Outcomes
Principles for joint working continued
• Describe the importance of sharing single service risk assessments in a multi-agency environment • Describe what is meant by shared situational awareness why it is important to establish it • Describe what models can support developing shared situational awareness (METHANE and the Joint Decision Model) • Describe how control rooms can start to develop shared situational awareness • Describe the support a communications advisor can give during a major incident
Joint Decision Model
• Explain the benefits of having a single decision making model across agencies • Describe the structure of the Joint Decision Model and demonstrate its use • Describe how the Joint Decision Model is scalable and should be used for any multi-agency incident • Describe information, intelligence and the difference between them • Describe the importance of sharing information to aid an effective response • Describe the issues that should be considered when sharing information • Describe what information would be shared and how (face-to-face, electronically) • Describe how METHANE can assist in developing shared situational awareness • Describe the need for using common terminology and how to access tools to help - JESIP Glossary • Describe what is meant by developing a working strategy and why it is important • Describe the importance of understanding risk from perspectives of all responder agencies involved • Describe why contingency plans and control measures are important in managing risk • Describe the legislation and guidance that exists and how that impacts on multi-agency incidents • Explain the importance of Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA) right to life • Describe what policies and procedures exist locally and nationally to support joint working • Describe considerations required for the Powers, Policies and Procedures stage of the Joint Decision Model • Explain the importance of log keeping • Explain the importance of record keeping • Explain how to identify options and contingencies in regard to the Joint Decision Model • Describe the options for operational communications at incidents • Describe how to take action and review what happens in regard to the Joint Decision Model • Describe the importance of a post-event debrief • Explain the need to capture lessons impacting on interoperability identified at the de-brief for logging onto Joint Organisational Learning (JOL) in order to continually improve interoperability • Describe JOL and explain local procedures to record lessons identified and notable practice onto the JOL Application

Control Room Command / Manager / Supervisor Interoperability Learning Outcomes
Command
• Describe the purpose of both the Tactical and Strategic Co-Ordination Groups (TCG & SCG) and how control room supervisors should interact with them • Describe why a multi-agency conversation between control room supervisors / commanders may be required during an emergency • Describe the purpose and function of the Local Resilience Forum (LRF) & the importance of involving local partner agencies in communications about the incident
External Communications & Social Media
• Describe what is meant by social media and what types of social media may impact on an incident. • Explain how and why social media can impact commanders on-scene and remote from scene in terms of public perception, potential for mis-information but also positive uses such as gaining information to help develop a Common Operating Picture (COP) • Demonstrate awareness of local policies & procedures with regards to the role of the control room manager / supervisor in handling media & social media in relation to the incident

Operational Command Interoperability Learning Outcomes
Interoperability & Major Incidents
• Define interoperability • Explain why it is important organisations work together at incidents • Describe the JESIP Joint Doctrine guidance and how to access it • Demonstrate an awareness of the JESIP mobile application • Describe the five principles for joint working and why they are important • Define a major incident • Describe who can declare a major incident in the students' organisation • Describe the implications of declaring a major incident for the students' organisation and for other organisations • Describe the role of an Operational Commander in a major incident
M/ETHANE
• Describe why it is important to have a single format sharing incident information • Describe the difference between METHANE and ETHANE messages • Demonstrate the construction and delivery of an effective M/ETHANE message • Demonstrate how the JESIP App can be used to help generate a M/ETHANE report
Principles for joint working
• Describe how the commander at scene from each responder agency can be identified • Describe why it is important to co-locate and what can go wrong if this does not occur • Describe what considerations there are in relation to co-location (safety, easily identifiable, proximity to scene) • Describe why it is important to establish a Forward Command Post and who needs to be aware • Describe why it is important to communicate using plain English avoiding the use of acronyms and single service jargon • Describe why it is important to have regular communication between all responder agencies and up and down through the command chain throughout the incident response • Describe how and why the use of Airwave multi-agency talk groups can assist with managing an incident • Describe the basic role and capabilities of other responder agencies • Describe why it is important to agree a lead service • Describe why it is important to agree priorities resources and capabilities • Describe why it is important to agree the timings and structure of meetings (for example meetings at Forward Command Post) • Describe why it is important to use a consistent standard briefing tool such as IIMARCH • Describe the elements of the IIMARCH briefing model and generate a brief using it • Describe the elements of developing a joint understanding of risk (likelihood and impact of risks and hazards)

Operational Command Interoperability Learning Outcomes

Principles for joint working continued

- Describe the importance of sharing single service risk assessments in a multi-agency environment
- Describe what is meant by shared situational awareness why it is important to establish it
- Describe what models can support developing shared situational awareness (M/ETHANE and the Joint Decision Model)

Joint Decision Model

- Explain the benefits of having a single decision making model across agencies
- Describe the structure of the Joint Decision Model and demonstrate its use
- Describe how the Joint Decision Model is scalable and should be used for any multiagency incident
- Describe information, intelligence and the difference between them
- Describe the importance of sharing information to aid an effective response
- Describe the issues that should be considered when sharing information
- Describe what information would be shared and how (face-to-face, electronically)
- Describe how METHANE can assist in developing shared situational awareness
- Describe the need for using common terminology and how to access tools to help - JESIP Glossary, Joint Doctrine Key Definitions
- Describe what is meant by developing a working strategy and why it is important
- Describe the importance of understanding risk from perspectives of all responder agencies involved
- Describe why contingency plans and control measures are important in managing risk
- Describe the legislation and guidance that exists and how that impacts on multi-agency incidents
- Explain the importance of Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA) right to life
- Describe what policies and procedures exist locally and nationally to support joint working
- Describe considerations required for the Powers, Policies and Procedures stage of the Joint Decision Model
- Explain the importance of log keeping
- Explain the importance of record keeping
- Explain how to identify options and contingencies in regard to the Joint Decision Model
- Describe the options for operational communications at incidents
- Describe how to take action and review what happens in regard to the Joint Decision Model
- Describe the importance of a post-event debrief
- Explain the need to capture lessons impacting on interoperability identified at the de-brief for logging onto Joint Organisational Learning (JOL) in order to continually improve interoperability
- Describe JOL and explain local procedures to record lessons identified and notable practice onto the JOL Application

Operational Command Interoperability Learning Outcomes
Command
• Describe the purpose of the Tactical Coordinating Group (TCG) and who should attend
External Communications & Social Media
• Describe what is meant by social media and what types of social media may impact on an incident • Explain how and why social media can impact commanders on-scene and remote from scene in terms of public perception, potential for mis-information but also positive uses such as gaining information to help develop a Common Operating Picture (COP) • Demonstrate awareness of local policies & procedures with regards to handling media & social media in relation to an incident and the impact on those in the operational command role

Tactical Command Interoperability Learning Outcomes

Interoperability & Major Incidents

- Define interoperability
- Explain why it is important organisations work together at incidents
- Describe the JESIP Joint Doctrine guidance and how to access it
- Demonstrate an awareness of the JESIP mobile application
- Describe the five principles for joint working and why they are important
- Define a major incident
- Describe who can declare a major incident in the students' organisation
- Describe the implications of declaring a major incident for the students' organisation and for other organisations
- Explain where single service and Local Resilience Forum major incident plans are held in their area
- Describe the role of a Tactical Commander in a major incident
- Describe why it is important to provide timely and accurate information to warn and inform the public
- Describe why it is important to have a single format sharing incident information
- Describe the difference between METHANE and ETHANE messages
- Demonstrate the construction and delivery of an effective M/ETHANE message
- Demonstrate how the JESIP App can be used to help generate a M/ETHANE report

Principles for joint working

- Describe how the commander at scene from each responder agency can be identified
- Describe why it is important to co-locate and what can go wrong if this does not occur
- Describe what considerations there are in relation to co-location (safety, easily identifiable, proximity to scene)
- Describe why it is important to establish a Forward Command Post and who needs to be aware
- Describe why it is important to communicate using plain English avoiding the use of acronyms and single service jargon
- Describe why it is important to have regular communication between all responder agencies and up and down through the command chain throughout the incident response
- Describe how and why the use of Airwave multi-agency talk groups can assist with managing an incident
- Describe the basic role and capabilities of other responder agencies
- Describe why it is important to agree a lead service
- Describe why it is important to agree priorities, resources and capabilities
- Describe why it is important to agree the timings and structure of meetings (for example TCG meetings)
- Describe why it is important to use a consistent standard briefing tool such as IIMARCH
- Describe the elements of the IIMARCH briefing model and generate a brief using it
- Describe the elements of developing a joint understanding of risk (likelihood and impact of risks and hazards)

Tactical Command Interoperability Learning Outcomes
Principles for joint working continued
• Describe the importance of sharing single service risk assessments in a multi-agency environment • Describe what is meant by shared situational awareness why it is important to establish it • Describe what models can support developing shared situational awareness (M/ETHANE and the Joint Decision Model)
Joint Decision Model
• Explain the benefits of having a single decision making model across agencies • Describe the structure of the Joint Decision Model and demonstrate its use • Describe how the Joint Decision Model is scalable and should be used for any multiagency incident • Describe information, intelligence and the difference between them • Describe the importance of sharing information to aid an effective response • Describe the issues that should be considered when sharing information • Describe what information would be shared and how (face-to-face, electronically) • Describe how METHANE can assist can assist in developing shared situational awareness • Describe the need for using common terminology and how to access tools to help - JESIP Glossary, Joint Doctrine Key Definitions • Describe what is meant by developing a working strategy and why it is important • Describe the importance of understanding risk from perspectives of all responder agencies involved • Describe why contingency plans and control measures are important in managing risk • Describe the legislation and guidance that exists and how that impacts on multi-agency incidents • Explain the importance of Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA) right to life • Describe what policies and procedures exist locally and nationally to support joint working • Describe considerations required for the Powers, Policies and Procedures stage of the Joint Decision Model • Explain the importance of log keeping • Explain the importance of record keeping • Explain how to identify options and contingencies in regard to the Joint Decision Model • Describe the options for operational communications at incidents • Describe how to take action and review what happens in regard to the Joint Decision Model • Describe the importance of a post-event debrief • Explain the need to capture lessons impacting on interoperability identified at the de-brief for logging onto Joint Organisational Learning (JOL) in order to continually improve interoperability • Describe JOL and explain local procedures to record lessons identified and notable practice onto the JOL Application

Tactical Command Interoperability Learning Outcomes

Command

- Describe the purpose of the Tactical Coordinating Group (TCG) and who should attend
- Describe the purpose of the Strategic Coordinating Group (SCG) and who should be based there
- Describe the purpose and function of the Local Resilience Forum (LRF) & the importance of involving local partner agencies in communications about the incident
- Describe the role of Government Liaison Officers
- Describe the role of military Joint Regional Liaison Officers

External Communications & Social Media

- Describe what is meant by social media and what types of social media may impact on an incident
- Explain how and why social media can impact commanders on-scene and remote from scene in terms of public perception, potential for mis-information but also positive uses such as gaining information to help develop a Common Operating Picture (COP)
- Demonstrate awareness of local policies & procedures with regards to handling media & social media in relation to an incident and the impact on those in a tactical command role

Strategic Command Interoperability Learning Outcomes

Interoperability & Major Incidents

- Define interoperability
- Explain why it is important organisations work together at incidents
- Describe the JESIP Joint Doctrine guidance and how to access it
- Demonstrate an awareness of the JESIP mobile application
- Describe the five principles for joint working and why they are important
- Define a major incident
- Describe who can declare a major incident in the students' organisation
- Describe the implications of declaring a major incident for the students' organisation and for other organisations
- Explain where single service and Local Resilience Forum major incident plans are held in their area
- Describe the role of a Strategic Commander in a major incident
- Describe why it is important to provide timely and accurate information to warn and inform the public

M/ETHANE

- Describe why it is important to have a single format sharing incident information
- Describe the difference between METHANE and ETHANE messages

Principles for joint working

- Describe how the commander at scene from each responder agency can be identified
- Describe why it is important to co-locate and what can go wrong if this does not occur
- Describe why it is important to communicate using plain English avoiding the use of acronyms and single service jargon
- Describe why it is important to have regular communication between all responder agencies and up and down through the command chain throughout the incident response
- Describe the basic role and capabilities of other services
- Describe why it is important to agree a lead service
- Describe why it is important to agree priorities resources and capabilities
- Describe why it is important to agree the timings and structure of meetings (for example TCG meetings)
- Describe why it is important to use a consistent standard briefing tool such as IIMARCH
- Describe the elements of the IIMARCH briefing model and generate a brief using it
- Describe the elements of developing a joint understanding of risk (likelihood and impact of risks and hazards)
- Describe the importance of sharing single service risk assessments in a multi-agency environment
- Describe what is meant by shared situational awareness why it is important to establish it
- Describe what models can support developing shared situational awareness (M/ETHANE and the Joint Decision Model)

Strategic Command Interoperability Learning Outcomes
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Command
• Describe the purpose of the Strategic Coordinating Group (SCG) and who should be based there • Describe the purpose and function of the Local Resilience Forum (LRF) & the importance of involving local partner agencies in communications about the incident • Describe the role of Government Liaison Officers • Describe the role of military Joint Regional Liaison Officers • Describe the Role of COBR

Strategic Command Interoperability Learning Outcomes
External Communications & Social Media
• Describe what is meant by social media and what types of social media may impact on an incident • Explain how and why social media can impact commanders on-scene and remote from scene in terms of public perception, potential for mis-information but also positive uses such as gaining information to help develop a Common Operating Picture (COP) • Demonstrate awareness of local policies & procedures with regards to handling media & social media and the strategic role in developing a media handling strategy for the incident and cascading any instructions through the command chain

Annex A – Audience Definitions

Audience	Definition
All Responder Staff	All staff who may be first on scene, deployed to the scene as the incident develops or working remotely from the scene
Control Room Staff	All staff who work in a responder organisation control room, emergency rooms, operations room, or equivalent
Control Room Command/ Manager/Supervisor	All staff who carry out a command supervisory / management role in a responder organisational control room, emergency room or equivalent
Operational Command	All those who perform an operational command role in relation to incident response
Tactical Command	All those who perform a tactical command role in relation to incident response and may be required to attend a Tactical Co-ordinating Group if one is established
Strategic Command	All those who perform a strategic command role in relation to incident response and may be required to attend a Strategic Co-ordinating Group if one is established

Document Control

This page is used to track minor and major changes to the document.

Amendment History

Version	Date	Reason for change	Amended by
1.1	3/10/2016	Correction to Social Media learning outcome for Operational & Tactical Command	J Flanagan

Notes:

Notes:

JOINT ORGANISATIONAL LEARNING GUIDANCE

OCTOBER 2017

JESIP
Working Together – Saving Lives

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JOINT ORGANISATIONAL LEARNING GUIDANCE

Contents

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Joint Organisational Learning (JOL)

Introduction

This guidance document provides information for responder agencies about Joint Organisational Learning including the process and system for recording and sharing lessons via JOL Online.

JESIP have been successful in producing a clear set of principles for joint working which are explained in detail within the Joint Doctrine: The Interoperability Framework. JOL Online has been developed to ensure that lessons are identified and learnt by responder agencies[1] in accordance with those principles. Additionally, responder agencies have the facility to record lessons identified across a range of national resilience capabilities.

A significant challenge in the past for responder agencies, voluntary organisations and military responders in their provision of Military Aid to the Civil Authorities (MACA) has been the ability to identify issues when working with other agencies that, if addressed in a consistent and standardised format at a national level, would improve multi-agency response including interoperability and national resilience capabilities. JOL Online provides this consistent and standardised method for agencies to achieve this.

A review of 32 public inquiries and reviews was carried out by Dr Kevin Pollock on behalf of JESIP and the Cabinet Office in 2013. This review identified a number of common failures which impacted on multi-agency interoperability and these were documented in the Pollock report[2]. The report identified that the common causes of failure were:

- *Poor working practices and organisational planning*
- *Inadequate training*
- *Ineffective communication*
- ***No system to ensure that lessons were learned and taught***
- *Lack of leadership*
- *Absence of no blame culture*
- ***Failure to learn lessons***
- ***No monitoring /audit mechanism***
- ***Previous lessons/reports not acted upon***

The report recommended that:

> *In order to learn lessons from incidents, training, testing and exercising and other external sources, a common recording and reporting procedure should be adopted by all of the emergency services and other Category 1 and Category 2 responders[3].*

[1] 'Responder agency' describes all category one and two responders as defined in the Civil Contingencies Act (2004) and associated guidance. Responder agency also includes any voluntary agency, UK Armed Forces or organisation which may plan and respond to a civil emergency
[2] Review of Persistent Lessons Identified Relating to Interoperability from Emergencies and Major Incidents since 1986
[3] Category 1 and Category 2 responders as defined in the Civil Contingencies Act 2004

In addition, the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 places requirements, through statutory and non-statutory guidance that Local Resilience Forums and Category 1 responders must collectively:

- *Learn and implement lessons from exercises*
- *Share lessons learned from emergencies and exercises in other parts of the UK*
- *Make sure that those lessons are acted on to improve local arrangements*

Developing a national strategy for all levels of command, ensuring lessons identified progress to lessons learnt and ultimately to procedural change remains a key objective for JESIP. JOL Online has been developed between JESIP and the Civil Contingencies Secretariat in response to report findings and recommendations. It relates to two main areas for identifying lessons. Those lessons identified specifically to the learning of ***interoperability*** lessons and those specifically against ***national resilience capabilities***.

The Importance of Learning

The responsibilities for learning are in many ways cultural and where lessons are identified and notable practice is shared with partners across the responder community, we will continue to successfully develop and improve joint working. **The key message to responder agencies is that JOL is not about "who" but about "what" and "why".**

These responsibilities are further reflected in legislation and sector standards and are set out in the following:

- Health, Safety and Welfare etc. Act 1974
- Management of Health and Safety Regulations 1999
- Civil Contingencies Act 2004
- Human Rights articles including Articles 2, 6 & 8

Debriefing

It cannot be emphasised enough that debriefs are a critical source of capturing lessons identified. Responder agencies **must** embed within their local debrief processes, the facility to capture lessons relating to interoperability between any organisations, the application of JESIP Principles for joint working and models and national resilience capabilities. Only by adopting this locally can we ensure lessons are identified, captured, shared and effectively learnt across all UK responder agencies.

What will JOL Achieve?

The capture of JOL via JOL Online will provide a consistent and accountable mechanism to ensure lessons from incidents, training, exercising and other external sources are identified

Lessons identified will be captured from responder agencies, then monitored and analysed by the JOL secretariat, shared with responder agencies and where required, recommendations for action will be made to the Interoperability Board. The Interoperability Board may issue a JOL Action Note with a directive towards agencies affected to implement locally.

The use of JOL Online by responder agencies will convert "lessons identified" into "lessons learnt" throughout the planning, response and recovery phase of incidents.

Effective JOL will provide assurance to Government departments, Chief Officers, Chief Executives and ultimately the general public, that responder agencies can demonstrate true progress in Joint Organisational Learning and show our commitment to learn from incidents and continually improve our multi-agency response to future incidents and emergencies.

How will JOL work?

JOL has a number of components, these are described in detail later in this guide but in summary they are:

1. **JOL Online** – a database that is hosted on Resilience Direct and captures and records lessons identified and notable practice. It is the system responder agencies will use to report any JOL.
2. **JOL Process** – Inputs, Analysis, Implementation & Assurance
3. **JOL Structure** – The interrelationship between responder agencies, emergency services, Organisational Points of Contact, Interoperability Board and delivery agents.

Each organisation or LRF must have a named individual at strategic level who holds the responsibility for sharing information onto JOL Online and a JOL Single Point of Contact. Strategic leads are also accountable and responsible for the local implementation and assurance of all JOL Action Notes which have been approved by the Interoperability Board.

JOL Online will be underpinned by regular monitoring and evaluation procedures to ensure recommendations issued are implemented by responder agencies leading to lessons being learnt and practice being improved.

Scope

The current scope of JOL Online is limited to two categories and emergency responders should input their lessons identified into JOL Online when there are:

1. **Lessons Identified**:

    - The lesson identified may have an impact on responder agencies interoperability measured against JESIP Principles for joint working;
    - The lesson identified may have a national impact;
    - The lesson identified may impact on your organisations national standards;
    - The lesson identified may impact on effectiveness of your sectors current national operational guidance, approved professional practice or doctrine;
    - The lesson identified may impact on effectiveness of current national resilience capabilities;
    - You want to share your lessons identified with other emergency responder agencies to promote learning;
    - The lesson identified is low impact but high frequency (trend).

This is not a definitive list and if organisations feel that a lesson should be recorded on JOL, they should do so.

2. **Notable Practice**

    - Activities that you have identified that may positively improve responders interoperability, measured against JESIP Principles for joint working;
    - Activities that you have identified that may positively improve national resilience capabilities;

Activities that have a positive impact on the normal activities of responder agencies. Interoperability lessons identified or notable practice captured from multi-agency debriefs, by responder agencies should ideally be raised and discussed through their respective local multi-agency groups/forums who have responsibility for lessons. These local groups/forums should have a standing agenda for discussion and approval of any Joint Organisational Learning. Once approved there should be a standing agreement around which lead agency will submit respective lessons or notable practice onto JOL Online on behalf of the multi-agency group/forum. This does not preclude any organisation from submitting JOL on an individual basis if lessons are captured through a single agency debrief.

Governance

Ministerial Oversight remains in place for the JESIP team and Interoperability Board during 2015 – 2018. This includes Government Departments holding responsibility for the emergency services and civil contingencies.

Organisational Points of Contact (OPoCs) and the JOL Secretariat will oversee JOL Online, including the management and analysis of inputs and will provide updates to the Interoperability Board along with any requests for recommendations for action. The OPoCs will continue to provide regular updates on JOL to Interoperability.

A diagram showing the Governance structure is shown below:

Figure 1 - JESIP Governance Structure

JOL Online

JOL Online is the single repository for the **capture and collation** of multi-agency lessons arising from incidents, training, testing and exercising and other external sources[4].

It will allow the JOL secretariat and OPoCs to **monitor** lessons identified and notable practice and **analyse** them to identify any issues which may need to be addressed.

[4] Although this list is not exhaustive these may include public inquiries, health and safety reports or Prevention of Future Death reports (e.g. regulation 28)

This may then lead to **recommendations** for change to policies or procedures, or to training or testing and exercising to improve joint working and national resilience capabilities.

There is a requirement for responder agencies to implement any actions that have been submitted via a JOL Action note. The JOL Action note will be sent to each emergency service and LRF strategic lead and bespoke JOL mailbox from the JOL secretariat. It is the responsibility of each organisations JESIP strategic lead to report back to the JOL secretariat via JOL Online on how they have implemented any respective JOL Action notes. JOL Online will provide the facility to create **reports** on progress regarding implementation , ultimately providing the level of assurance required by the Interoperability Board.

JOL Online will support the embedding of the Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Principles. It will be the mechanism to facilitate and promote the sharing of i nteroperability lessons and learning across responder agencies to achieve the JESIP aim of continually improving interoperability.

JOL Online is hosted on Resilience Direct and provides the security classification of Offic ial-Sensitive.

JOL Process

The steps below make up the JOL process. Behind each step are a number of activities to be completed by responder agencies or JOL Secretariat. The process is supported by JOL Online

Figure 2 - JOL process: Steps 1 - 3



The processes that sit behind each step are detailed on the following pages.

Step 1 - Inputs

Inputs are the Lessons Identified or Notable Practice which may come from responder agencies through their existing debrief processes. Lessons Identified may also come from other external sources such as national exercise debriefs, public enquiries, Prevention of Future Death reports or HSE recommendations.
Inputs will be entered onto the JOL Online in a standardised and consistent format.

JESIP Multi Agency De-Brief Template

Attached to this guidance document is a **JESIP – Multi Agency Debrief template**. (*See APPENDIX B - JESIP - Multi Agency Debrief).*

JESIP encourages responder agencies to use the multi-agency debrief template to capture and record interoperability Lessons Identified and notable practice as part of their local debrief procedures. It should be used to support all single service and multi-agency debriefs where responder agencies have attended an incident, exercise or training event. It is designed to enhance and support existing local de-brief procedures / templates.

By using this template, responder agencies will find it much more efficient to transfer information relating to interoperability and national resilience capabilities, captured during debriefs, onto JOL Online.

Debriefs are the source for capturing lessons and all multi-agency debriefs should incorporate interoperability as a core theme.

JOL Single Point of Contact

Each emergency service and each LRF has nominated a JOL Single Point of Contact (SPoC) who will be responsible for entering inputs onto JOL Online on behalf of their service or LRF.
ALL lessons identified or notable practice from emergency responder agencies SHOULD be agreed and authorised within their service and/or LRF before being inputted onto JOL Online.
Emergency responder agencies should have a generic JOL mailbox to support effective communications between the JOL Secretariat and JOL SPoCs.

Person Specification
Those taking the role of the JOL SPoC should:

- Be in a role within their organisation or LRF that has responsibility for capturing lessons from single service or multi-agency debriefs from incidents, exercises and training
- Have responsibility for managing their organisations generic JOL mailbox.
- Have an awareness and understanding of the Joint Doctrine: The Interoperability Framework and be able to identify relevant lessons or notable practice from de-briefs that fall within the scope of JOL
- Have appropriate delegated authority and influence to ensure that where JOL Action notes and other JOL information is communicated to organisations or LRFs then it can be effectively implemented
- Have basic IT ability and confidence in using web based applications
- Input Lessons Identified and Notable Practice on behalf of their organisation
- Have access to Resilience Direct

Where any responder agency changes their JOL SPoC, they must inform the JOL Secretariat with their contact details. This will ensure the contact database remains current.

Sharing information via JOL Online

The concept of JOL is to learn lessons and improve practice. Through JOL Online we are providing the emergency response sector with the opportunity to publish information in a secure environment but that will facilitate the sharing of best practice and learning.

The inputs provided from services are automatically protected as all data on the application will be marked as Official-Sensitive in line with the Governments Security Classifications 2014.
JESIP are members of a number of organisational learning boards across the emergency services and government network and will share lessons identified/notable practice with these boards as part of stakeholder engagement and to ensure work is not duplicated.

Publish Responses

JOL Online provides the facility for organisations to share lessons and notable practice from a variety of incident types. However, there may be concerns from organisations about the sharing of sensitive or commercial information with others. Information that is inputted onto JOL Online is managed in accordance with Official-Sensitive guidelines and the secretariat will after consultation with key stakeholders[6] make an informed decision around how much information is shared with other organisations. Information which has gone through this process may then be shared with the JOL SPoC closed group or with wider ResilienceDirect users.

Before information is published through JOL Online the JOL Secretariat **will** redact any personal and **may** redact any sensitive data and will moderate any free text answers to ensure no comments are published inappropriately. This also applies to any files you upload, if they are likely to be published with your input.

Once completed the secretariat will publish the following:

> **Share lessons with all RD users** - The information you provide will be published and visible to other site users;
> **Share lessons with JOL SPoCs** - The information you provide will be published and visible to other JOL SPoCs **only**
> **Share lessons with other approved closed groups** –The information will be published and visible to approved closed groups only

Where lessons or notable practice have been inputted that are believed to be sensitive (for example CT) JOL Online will automatically prevent this lesson from being published until further authorisation is received from key syakeholders[5].

Step 2 – Monitoring, Analysis & Development

The JOL Secretariat monitor and analyse Lessons received to identify where issues raised fall within the scope of JOL Online.

Whilst lessons identified and notable practice will be continually monitored and analysed, it is important that consideration at a national level does not replace local analysis and plans to implement lessons learned.

Lessons Identified will be reviewed and an overall assessment rating applied. This rating determines the next steps. This methodology provides a clear rationale for determining which issues should be subject to consideration at the national level.

[6] NCTP Organisational Development Unit (ODU) Business Partners Forum, Prepare - MTFA JOP working group

Analysis of Lessons Identified

As part of the analysis, the JOL Secretariat team will adopt an impact based assessment process in considering next steps. The results of this analysis may lead to one of two activities:

1. Feeding back to the relevant organisation and confirming that the lessons identified will not at this stage be subject to further consideration at the national level;

2. Escalation of lessons which may require commissioning further detailed analysis whereby actions and/or recommendations may be submitted to the Interoperability Board for consideration and approval.

Assessment Stage 1 - Initial Assessment

The JOL Secretariat will use an impact based assessment process to each Lesson Identified. This will inform any further action.
(See APPENDIX A
Joint Organisational Learning – Impact Based Assessment Process *for more details*).
The impact assessment process has two areas:

Likelihood
The first assessment is the nature of the lesson identified and the likelihood of the issue occurring again.

This assessment may involve discussion with relevant subject matter advisors and other stakeholders.

As the amount of inputs onto JOL Online grows, lessons identified will be indexed and links will be established to help us easily identify reoccurrences of issues. This will inform the likelihood assessment process.

Impact Grading
The second part of the assessment is the relative impact that an event had on responder agencies taking into account the varying nature of impacts.

Overall Assessment
From both the Likelihood and Impact, an overall assessment rating will be applied to the lesson identified. As part of the analysis, national trends may be identified, in these cases we will automatically trigger stage 2 of the analysis process.

Assessment Stage 2 - Further Analysis

If the rating is medium or above, the lesson will be escalated where a more thorough analysis of the Lesson(s) Identified will be carried out. The JOL Secretariat will:

- Facilitate additional discussions and outcomes from the initial assessment with respective OPoC's and other stakeholders where necessary; and / or,
- Clarify if work already exists locally or nationally to address the issue.

Outcomes from this further analysis may result in the JOL Secretariat liaising with the originators of the lesson identified to find an appropriate resolution. This may include sharing of information with other services or a degree of further engagement with originators to support/assist/guide them in finding an appropriate resolution. If a successful course of action is agreed and implemented, information may then be shared with other responder agencies.

Alternatively, the outcome of further analysis may dictate the commissioning of a task and finish group to further analyse the lesson identified and develop recommendations for action.

It may be that wider scale change is identified which may lead to recommendations for action being proposed to the Interoperability Board for approval and then implementation. To help with this assessment the JOL secretariat will utilise the Single Loop learning process ***'what we do'*** and Double Loop learning process **'why we do what we do'**.

By utilising this methodology, we can ensure we consider both the most efficient and effective process for developing action plans even if this may mean larger scale cultural/behavioural changes necessary to achieve lessons learned.



*Single loop learning is to improve efficiency – **"doing things better"***

or

*Double loop learning to improve effectiveness – **"doing better things"***

Figure 3 - Single and Double Loop Learning (Bryant 2009)

Assessment Stage 3 - Development of Recommendations

Following Stage 2, if it is decided that a lesson identified requires action to be taken, the JOL Secretariat and OPoC's will formulate potential actions to address the issue raised.

The recommendations developed may have both national and local impacts and may involve a number of activities such as doctrine review, multi-agency training, testing and exercising or a combination of these.

Dependant on the nature of the lesson identified, work to develop actions will either by carried out by the JOL Secretariat and Organisational Points of Contact independently or with a Task and Finish group if one has been established.

Where recommendations are required the OPoC's will submit a JOL Action Note to the Interoperability Board for approval.

Step 3 - Implementation & Assurance

Implementation

It is envisaged that any lessons identified and subsequent recommendations for action are likely to fall into the following areas:

- Doctrine
- Training
- Testing & Exercising
- National Resilience Capabilities
- Safety of the public and emergency responder staff

There is also likely to be the need for communication and engagement with those affected by the recommended changes who then become recommendation owners.

National Implementation

Once a recommendation for action is approved by the Interoperability Board, the relevant representatives will be tasked with instigating the implementation process.

Sector Interoperability Leads (Fire and Rescue Service, Police Service and Ambulance Service)

For the emergency services the **Sector Interoperability Leads** are those holding the national portfolio for interoperability for their sector *(Sector Interoperability Leads are members of the Interoperability Board)*. Depending on the nature of the action to be taken, other organisations may be involved in implementing JOL recommendations. The other organisations which may be involved in implementation include, but are not limited to:

- Civil Contingencies Secretariat
- DCLG RED Resilience Advisors
- Her Majesty's Coastguard (HMCG)
- Ministry of Defence (MOD)
- British Transport Police (BTP)
- Civil Nuclear Constabulary (CNC)
- Lead Government Department

Sector Interoperability Leads may liaise with other bodies or organisations to carry out work to support implementation of the recommendation. For example, for Doctrine related actions, these may include:

- College of Policing (APP)
- Central Programme Office (Fire & Rescue)
- National Ambulance Resilience Unit (Ambulance)
- Civil Contingencies Secretariat

This list is not exhaustive and may depend on the nature of the actions required.

Local Implementation

Local implementation of JOL recommendations will be the responsibility of the emergency services or the LRFs.

Service JESIP Strategic Lead

Each emergency service has a Service JESIP Strategic Lead. They are responsible for interoperability within their service or organisation. They are accountable for both their service inputs onto the JOL application and the implementation of any recommendations coming from JOL within their local service, force or trust.

Each emergency service JESIP Strategic Lead will be responsible for reporting their agencies activity in response to any JOL action notes that have been issued to their respective Organisational Point of Contact. This feedback will be regularly monitored to assess how recommendations are being implemented. Progress reports on implementation will be provided to the Interoperability Board.

Service JOL Single Point of Contact (JOL SPoC)

It is the responsibility of each emergency service JESIP Strategic Lead to nominate one or more Single Point of Contact(s) for JOL within their organisation. These people will have access to JOL Online, the generic JOL mailbox and be trained in its use and be responsible for inputting lessons identified or notable practice.

Local Resilience Forum (LRF) – JOL Single Point of Contact (JOL SPoC)

Each of the 42 Local Resilience Forums in England and Wales should nominate a JOL SPoC(s) who will have access to JOL Online, be trained in its use and be responsible for inputting lessons identified or notable practice on behalf of their LRF.

Should any recommendations or JOL action notes affect LRFs, the JOL Secretariat will share information about what action is required with LRFs through this network of JOL SPoCs. LRFs should direct any feedback in respect of implementation and embedding of recommendations through their respective LRF JOL SPoC who will update the JOL Secretariat.
This feedback will be regularly monitored to assess how recommendations are being implemented. Progress reports on implementation will be provided to the Interoperability Board.

Tracking your inputs

JOL Online will provide the person submitting the lesson identified or notable practice with the ability to track their input. This will fall into a number of phases which tracks the complete lifecycle of the input:

- **Received** – The JOL Secretariat has received an input from an end user
- **Initial analysis complete**– The input has been analysed and impact assessed
  - An impact assessment may not be undertaken for notable practice but will be analysed
- **Escalated** – The impact assessment indicates that the input is escalated to stage 2 where:
  - A task and finish group may be established for further analysis
  - Further stakeholder engagement is being undertaken
- **Published** – The JOL Secretariat has published the end users input
  - This may be with JOL SPoCs or all RD users
- **Final Stage** – The end user will be provided with information about what the outcome of their input is, which may be:
  - A referral to a Lead Government Department (identify which one)
  - Production of a JOL Action Note
  - Referral to a professional Association – (NPCC, NFCC, AACE, HMCG)
  - No further action after escalation
- **Closed** – the respective input has been completed and closed by the JOL Secretariat on behalf of the Organisational Point of Contact

Fire and Rescue Service - National Operational Learning

Lessons identified or notable practice are captured through UKFRS National Operational Learning (NOL) and the National Operational Learning User Group (NOLUG) where lessons are reviewed on a bi-monthly basis. The NOLUG secretariat will regularly consult with the JOL secretariat to share lessons across respective forums. The Fire and Rescue Service Organisational Point of Contact is a member of the NOLUG.

Ambulance Service/NARU - Lessons Identified Database

Ambulance Service Trusts enter their lessons onto Lessons identified Debrief (LiD). Those entering lessons may share their lessons internally or externally (nationally). These external lessons are reviewed on a monthly basis by NARU’s Central Management Team but it is envisaged that in the near future these lessons will be automatically merged with JOL Online. The Ambulance Service Organisational Point of Contact is a member of NARU’s Central Management Team.

Police Service - National Police Coordination Centre (NPoCC)

NPoCC facilitate nationally the co-ordination of structured debriefs within policing, lessons will be identified from these and shared with the appropriate National Police Chief's Council (NPCC) lead. There will be an assumption that these lessons will be shared on POLKA and JOL Online unless the initiator/NPCC lead states otherwise. . The Police Service Organisational Point of Contact is a member of NPoCC.

Assurance

To continually support the implementation of recommendations from lessons identified, an evaluation of how effective recommendations have been is key.

The JOL Implementation Structure

The process flow diagram below illustrates how information will pass between the different organisations involved and how they will interact with each other in respect of JOL. It shows the key workstreams that lessons identified will impact on (Doctrine, Training and Testing & Exercising) and the organisations that may be involved in either developing recommendations for action or implementing recommendations.



Figure 4 - The JOL Delivery Structure

The Interoperability Board is at the heart of the JOL process as it is here that any recommendations for actions that have national effect will be proposed, considered and approved for implementation.

The Organisational Point of Contact and the JOL Secretariat will facilitate activity between the Interoperability Board and other organisations.

Progress Reporting on JOL

The JOL Secretariat will continually monitor inputs on JOL Online and will regularly review the status of recommendations and JOL Action Notes. It will work with organisations to ensure reporting information is current and activities are recorded.

At the Interoperability Board the progress of recommendations or JOL Action Notes will be indicated by three status statements:

- **Recommendation/Action Open** - recommendations/actions are considered to still require action/implementation to move to completed. (regular updates will be required from recommendation owners)

- **Recommendation/Action Closed** - recommendations/actions have been completed and responder agencies reported back to the JOL secretariat.

- **Awaiting Allocation** – recommendation/action has been identified and allocation of owner not yet identified

The JOL Secretariat will collate updates from responder agencies and submit a quarterly summary review of recommendations to the Interoperability Board. This summary will provide the Interoperability Board with information extracted from JOL Online with regards to the number of lessons identified, new recommendations proposed since the last quarter, current recommendations and their activity status and any recommendations proposed for closure.

This information will provide key data to the Interoperability Board members to allow the assessment of how JOL is impacting organisations and benefiting joint working ‘on the ground’.

A quarterly update of notable practice will be provided to Interoperability Board.

Communication with stakeholders

The JOL Secretariat will produce regular communication to the responder agencies about the progress with JOL, specifically where we have made recommendations for action.

As with all JOL communications, the JOL Secretariat will seek to ensure a two way flow of information from organisations, encouraging feedback so that we can continually improve JOL Online and highlight areas where we can continually improve joint working.

Notable Practice

As part of JOL Online, responder agencies can also input any Notable Practice with regards to interoperability they feel would be beneficial nationally.

This may include how they have adopted and embedded JESIP and the Principles for joint working of co-location, coordination, communication, joint assessment of risk and shared situational awareness and how this may improve national resilience.

Notable practice is where an organisation has observed an effective and useful way of doing something to improve interoperability resulting in a positive outcome.

In respect of JOL and interoperability, notable practice may also be described as a method or technique that has consistently shown results superior to those achieved with other means, and that is used as a benchmark. It may also be used to describe the process of developing and following a standard way of doing things that multiple organisations can use.

When inputting notable practice, an organisation can categorise the notable practice based on the following three categories:

1. Where a notable practice has been identified and **has been implemented** within an organisation.

    - This identifies an alternative way of doing something and provides evidence that joint ways of working have been enhanced which provide recognised and beneficial improvements to Joint Emergency Services Interoperability or national resilience capabilities

2. Where a notable practice has been identified but **has not** been implemented within an organisation.

    - This may be due to a number of barriers or factors that may have prevented implementation and improvements to Interoperability and national resilience capabilities. However, the benefits and implementation of such a notable practice would provide a beneficial option of joint working if they could be overcome.

3. Where a notable practice has been identified and is **in the process** of being implemented.

    - The end user can provide details of how the notable practice is being implemented, what stage it is at and any potential implementation date. This section will provide the end user with the opportunity to identify specific areas where implementation has been successful and where there have or are likely to be barriers

Notable practice information submitted by organisations or LRFS will be available to other SPoCs via JOL Online. It will be an easily accessible notable practice hub for services and be an excellent repository for those wishing to research diverse and effective ways of joint working they may not yet have considered

APPENDIX A

Joint Organisational Learning – Impact Based Assessment Process

Introduction

This process enables lessons from incidents, training, testing & exercising and other external sources to be accurately assessed against predetermined criteria and prioritised for action in a comprehensive and consistent way.

In determining the assessment methodology for JOL, research was undertaken and various assessment methodologies were considered. This included the methodology adopted by the HSE, NCTP Organisational Development Unit, Ministry of Defence, Emergency Services and other responder agencies.

The methodology has been chosen as it allows the impact to be graded over a range of categories that have been informed by the strategic principles set out in the Joint Doctrine: The Interoperability Framework.

Aims of the Impact Assessment Process

- To assess any lessons identified which relate to the Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Principles;
- To prioritise any issues that have a national impact and meet the criteria for action to be taken;
- To propose any recommendations for action (JOL Action note) to the Interoperability Board for approval.
- To identify lessons that may not be related to Principles for joint working, but impact on joint working across a range of responder agencies
- To identify lessons that will support the continuing development of National capabilities

Objective

To ensure an inclusive and consistent approach to assessment and prioritisation of lessons identified, which will lead to recommendations for action and the implementation of those actions.

How will we assess Lessons Identified?

Lessons Identified will be analysed and assessed (using the methods described in this document) and an overall assessment rating applied. This overall rating will determine the next steps to be taken. This methodology provides a clear rationale for determining which issues should be subject to consideration at the national level.

The process we will go through for each Lesson Identified is as follows:

Assessment Criteria

- Lessons Identified will be primarily categorised on the Joint Emergency Service Interoperability Principles set out in the Joint Doctrine: The Interoperability Framework. If the lesson is not related to Interoperability Principles for joint working, it will still be impact assessed and actions logged
- The issues raised in the Lesson Identified will be scored as follows:
  - Likelihood x Impact rating = Overall Assessment Rating
- The “Likelihood” will be ascertained through data collection
- The “Impact” will be ascertained through assessment against graded criteria
  - A clear rationale for overall assessment rating will be applied
  - Each lesson identified will be assessed against each of the four impact grading criteria identified

Protocols for Risk Based Assessment Process

In carrying out the impact based assessment process, the protocols below will be followed:

- Proportionate: we continue to regard the importance of joint organisational learning to our work and we will always seek to ensure that lessons identified become lessons learned and that these are embedded across all services so the impact on communities is minimised.
- Learning and performance focussed: we will adapt flexibly to lessons identified and learn from our own experience, and from others, to improve our performance.
- Value for money: we will ensure that joint organisational learning is demonstrably efficient and effective and we will ensure its sustainability in the longer term.
- Collaboration: we will work in collaboration with a range of strategic and delivery partners to maximise the benefit and effectiveness of our activity.
- Equality: we are committed to ensuring fairness and equality in all that we do.
- Diversity: we will continue to develop a workforce that reflects, and has the trust of, the diverse communities we serve
- Transparency: we will seek to make as much information as practicable available to colleagues and partners in determining key policy developments.

Likelihood

The first part of the assessment process is to identify the issue that has occurred and the likelihood of this issue occuring again.

Lessons which impact on interoperability are identified by JESIP as the Principles for joint working (Co-Location, Communication, Co-ordination, Joint Understanding of Risk and Shared Situational Awareness). Lessons not directly impacting on interoperability but related to national resilience capabilities will be impact assessed. This allows issues to be indexed and links to be identified to highlight how many times an issue has previously occurred and allow an informed judgement on the likelihood of an issue occurring again to be made.

However, it must be borne in mind that the difference with the methodology for assessing JOL is that unlike traditional risk assessment where you are **preparing** to mitigate the risk. With JOL the secretariat will be assessing the majority of issues retrospectively. The lessons identified may have already been realised whether in a live incident, when testing and exercising a capability, during training or may come from a number of other external sources. JOL will be about assessing the likelihood and the impact of the issue occuring **again**.

The assessment of the likelihood of the issue occuring will be done using the matrix below:

Level	Category	Description
5	Probable	Occurring consistently *Will continue to occur nationally and regularly unless action is taken*
4	Possible	Greater than 50% probability of occurring. *May continue to occur nationally and/or regularly unless action is taken*
3	Unlikely	Greater than 30% probability of occurring *Issue may be local with little evidence of occurring nationally*
2	Rare	Less than 30% probability of occurring, occurs infrequently *Issue may be local with no evidence of occurring nationally*
1	Tolerable	Mitigating factors apparent. Unlikely to occur again

Impact

The second part of the assessment is the relative impact that an event had on the responder agencies.

Impact Grading Criteria

We will assess the impact on based around four descriptors which aim to take account of the varying nature of impacts that an issue may have.

Ability to respond – this relates to the impact on the emergency services and wider responders' ability to respond to an incident. It shows whether capabilities were proportionate to an incident and whether the impact on our communities could have been minimised.

Financial/Legal – this relates to any financial or legal implications of the issue arising. By assessing the financial and legal implications the JOL Secretariat are able to evidence the financial and legal implications and suggest recommendations to improve our efficiency and effectiveness ensuring our sustainability and that we are achieving value for money.

Health & Safety (Public) – this relates to the impact of an issue occurring in terms of our ability to protect the public.

Health & Safety (Emergency responder) – this relates to the impact of an issue occurring in terms of our ability to protect emergency responder staff

Organisational Reputation – this relates to the impact an issue could have on the reputation of the emergency services and responder agencies with our communities and our key partners.

Community Impact – this relates to the impact an issue could have on communities as a direct consequence of an event

Impact Assessment Matrix

Descriptor	1 Tolerable	2 Minor	3 Moderate	4 Major	5 Critical
Ability to respond	No noticeable impact on response	Response and recovery arrangements that could be managed locally by single service or collaborative interventions	Response and recovery arrangements requiring alternative methods to be used to enable duties to be carried out to achieve incident objectives	Significant failure in capability to respond to incidents which will prevent joint working, hinder lifesaving activities and efficient recovery	Critical failure in capability to respond to incidents which will prevent joint working, prevent lifesaving activities and efficient recovery
Financial and/or legal implications	No financial or legal implications	Additional costs or low level mitigation claim that may be managed by services	Legal implication or additional costs incurred requiring support from professional bodies	Legislative breech/additional costs requiring intervention from government departments	Subject to litigation and requires a change of doctrine, policy, procedure, training and potential introduction of new legislation
Health and Safety (Public)	No health, safety or welfare issues apparent	Minor injury would be sustained or welfare concerns that do not require ongoing support	Incident requiring treatment by a medical professional but not life changing injury/disability. Welfare concerns that require specialist health care and medical support	Major injury/disability[7] is probable if no or limited action is taken	Fatality of public is probable if no action is taken
Health and Safety (Emergency responder)	No health, safety or welfare issues apparent	Minor injury would be sustained or welfare concerns that do not require ongoing support	Incident requiring treatment by a medical professional but not life changing injury/disability. Welfare concerns that require specialist health care and medical support	Major injury/disability[8] is probable if no or limited action is taken	Fatality of responder is probable if no action is taken
Organisational Reputation	No noticeable impact	Negative regional/local media coverage managed by single service or multi-agency communication departments	Negative national media coverage, strategic leads lack of confidence in current capability to work together effectively	Negative national media coverage. Political impact and lack of confidence in current capability to work together effectively	Negative international news coverage, international attack on ability for emergency services to work together to save lives
Community Impact	No noticeable impact	recovery arrangements having a short term[9] impact on local community reassurance	recovery arrangements having a medium[10] term impact on local community reassurance	recovery arrangements having a long term impact on UK community reassurance	Recovery arrangements having a medium/ong term[11] impact on UK community reassurance

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[7] As defined under the Health & safety at Work Act 1974

[8] As defined under the Health & safety at Work Act 1974

[9] Short term impact over weeks upto 1 month

[10] Medium term impact over 1 month upto 1 year

[11] Long term impact over 1 year upto 5 years or more

Overall Impact Rating

To calculate the overall impact rating a weighted scoring system is used that places greater emphasis on more extreme impacts. The sums of these scores across all four impact grading criteria are then averaged to give an overall impact rating.

However, where any ONE of the descriptors on the impact assessment matrix are assessed and identified as Critical this will automatically direct the lesson identified to stage 2 and further analysis will be undertaken.

The methodology has been chosen as an issue may have impact in a number of different ways, any or all of which have been determined to have an impact on the effectiveness of the Joint Emergency Service Interoperability Principles.

Determining the Overall Impact Rating

1. Identify the impact score for each of the four impact grading criteria
2. Add the four impact scores and divide by the number of impact grading criteria (6)
3. The figure identified will be the overall impact rating.

Overall Impact Rating - 1 >	Tolerable
Overall Impact Rating - 2 >	Minor
Overall Impact Rating - 3 >	Moderate
Overall Impact Rating - 4 >	Major
Overall Impact Rating - 5 >	Critical

Overall Assessment Rating

The overall assessment rating is the sum of the likelihood x the impact rating. Once these two figures have been determined they are plotted against a matrix to give an overall assessment rating.

The overall assessment rating will determine the action to be taken in relation to the identified lesson by the JESIP team. Those with a very high rating would receive immediate prioritisation, whereas those with a lower scoring may not be considered further at the national level. This would be confirmed to the originating organisations/LRF via JOL Online tracker progress.

Overall Assessment Rating Matrix



To determine the overall assessment rating

The score for “Likelihood” x the score for “Impact Rating” will determine the overall assessment rating which will be one of the five categories below:

Tolerable	Low	Medium	High	Very High

Additionally, where there are lessons that do not relate to the five JESIP Principles for joint working these will be logged and actioned accordingly and will be categorised in the format below:

Logged

Acting on Issues

The categories of overall assessment rating (Tolerable through to Very High) will help us identify how serious the issue is in terms of national impact and within the scope of JOL. The categories will help us decide whether work should be undertaken centrally to identify and implement control measures which will mitigate the issue and improve practice.
Within the JOL Secretariat team there is no explicit stated policy in relation to appetite and tolerance of issues. However, use of this methodology is to help prioritise issues against national impact. This process aligned with professional assessment of each lesson provides a thorough and robust impact assessment process.

Recommendations for Action

Following the completion of the overall assessment rating a response option will be considered. It is anticipated that any issue with a rating of tolerable or low will not be considered further action by the JOL Secretariat and Organisational Points of Contact.
The JOL Secretariat and OPoCs will act on any issue rated at medium or above as described in the section: *Analysis of lessons identified"*

Glossary

The definitions below are used throughout this document:

Joint Organisational Learning (JOL)	the framework instigated by JESIP which allow responder agencies to have a nationally consistent and coordinated way of identifying and learning interoperability and national resilience capability lessons from incidents, training, testing & exercising or other external sources.
End Users	responder agencies who will use JOL ONLINE to input Lessons Identified or Notable Practice
JOL Online	the database which is hosted on Resilience Direct which provides end users with a system for inputting and sharing all Joint Organisational Learning.
Interoperability Board	National strategic level board which provides oversight and strategic direction as part of an ongoing multi-agency governance structure for interoperability and national resilience capabilities. It provides assurance to central government that issues affecting effective interoperability and national resilience capabilities are being addressed by responder agencies effectively
Lesson Identified	A lesson identified is an issue captured by any emergency responder that negatively impacts on interoperability and/or national resilience capabilities

Issue	The circumstances and details of what happened which led to a lesson being identified
Lessons analysis	A formal impact assessment process of lessons identified carried out by the JOL secretariat and Organisational Points of Contact.
Observation	An observation is a statement that is based on something that one has seen, heard or noticed. It is something that can be analysed to help produce potential solutions
Lesson learned	A lesson learned is a lesson that has been resolved through the implementation of necessary change which has a positive impact on responder agencies interoperability and/or national resilience capabilities. A lesson learned means practice has been improved.
Notable Practice	Notable practice is where an emergency responder has identified an issue but found a proven, effective and useful way of doing something. Notable practice does not always necessitate essential change throughout a sector, but it is something which responder agencies may wish to adopt as it has had a positive impact on interoperability and/or national resilience capabilities in another area of the country.
JOL Single Point of Contact (SPoC)	Personnel who have a Resilience Direct account and will input lessons identified or notable practice on behalf of their organisations onto JOL online. Additionally, JOL SPoCs from any organisation can input lessons or notable practice onto JOL online on behalf of any forum or group. JOL SPoCs will be nominated by their respective service/trust/force or LRF and will be registered on JOL online with appropriate security permissions.
Organisational Point of Contact (OPoC)	Subject Matter Advisors representing each of the emergency services and Civil Contingencies Secretariat**.** OPoCs will: • Provide sector advice and guidance throughout the JOL process, • Approve all analysis of lessons identified, • Be responsible for all JOL communications to responder agencies, • Support membership of the interoperability board and • Submit any recommendations to the interoperability board for approval and subsequent JOL Action Notes as appropriate • Be the individuals who are embedded within their own sectors national structures for capturing and learning lessons, thus bridging any potential gaps between JOL and single sector systems and processes.
JOL Secretariat	Is responsible for initial analysis of lessons identified once inputted by end users and the day to day management of JOL online. The JOL secretariat will work with and support the Interoperability Board, Organisational Points of Contact and be the initial point of contact for JOL SPoCs and other end users for issues regarding JOL.

Delivery Agent	Those bodies who have national responsibility for related work areas on behalf of their sector. For example: • NPCC - The College of Policing (CoP) Authorised Professional Practice (APP) • NFCC – Central Programme Office • AACE - National Ambulance Resilience Unit (NARU) • Lead Government Department
Recommendation owners	Where recommendations have been identified recommendation owners will be responsible and accountable for implementation within their organisation. At a local level this is the current JESIP Strategic Lead. Recommendation owners will be required to report back to their respective Organisational Point of Contact via JOL Online regarding implementation and assurance of JOL recommendations
JOL Action Note	A JOL action note will be issued to all respective responder agencies/LRFs from the Interoperability Board where there is a specific recommendation to be implemented. JOL action notes may be for action or information. Where for action, then the relevant JESIP Strategic Lead has responsibility and accountability to ensure the action is **implemented** across their organisation/LRF. When for information, then the Strategic Lead has the responsibility and accountability to ensure respective staff are made aware of the relevant JOL action note. The JESIP strategic lead will also provide assurances to the Organisational Points of Contact that any recommendations or information shared has been completed.

APPENDIX B - JESIP - Multi Agency Debrief Template

DEBRIEF TEAM NAMES:	**LOCATION:**	**DATE:**
INCIDENT TYPE: **(Exercise, Live Incident, Other)**		
OBJECTIVES	**LEARNING/RECOMMENDATIONS**	

DEBRIEF TEAM NAMES:	LOCATION:	DATE:
INCIDENT TYPE: **(Exercise, Live Incident, Other)**		
OBJECTIVES	**LEARNING/RECOMMENDATIONS**	
<u>Co-location issues:</u> Were commanders easily identifiable? (Tabards) What command structures where in place? Did Commanders meet face to face? Was a FCP established? Did Commanders identify timely on-scene briefings?	Details:	
<u>Communication</u> Was common terminology used? Was an Airwave interoperability talk group used? Was relevant information shared across all services and control rooms throughout the incident? Was METHANE used to pass information to control? Was effective communications established between: Operational & tactical Commanders; Commanders and control rooms; **<u>Communication Continued</u>** Emergency service Commanders and other responding organisations;	Details:	

DEBRIEF TEAM NAMES:	LOCATION:	DATE:
INCIDENT TYPE: **(Exercise, Live Incident, Other)**		
OBJECTIVES	**LEARNING/RECOMMENDATIONS**	
Local emergency service control rooms; Emergency service control rooms and national co-ordinating centres.		
Co-ordination issues: Did Commanders use the JDM as single decision model Were Capabilities identified Responsibilities identified Were joint decisions on priorities made and if so, how were the priorities arrived at and agreed? Were actions joined up and therefore efficient and effective? Were ALL on scene resources used appropriately? Was there an understanding the capability, capacity and limitations of each other's assets? Did someone take the lead co-ordinators role during Multi-Agency meetings?	Details:	

DEBRIEF TEAM NAMES:	LOCATION:	DATE:
INCIDENT TYPE: **(Exercise, Live Incident, Other)**		
OBJECTIVES	**LEARNING/RECOMMENDATIONS**	
Jointly Understanding Risk: Were threats and hazards identified, understood and treated different by each emergency service? Were limitations and capabilities of people and equipment identified? Was a joint understanding of risk achieved by sharing information about the likelihood and potential impacts of threats and hazards? e.g. sharing of risk assessments	Details:	

DEBRIEF TEAM NAMES:	**LOCATION:**	**DATE:**
INCIDENT TYPE: **(Exercise, Live Incident, Other)**		
OBJECTIVES	**LEARNING/RECOMMENDATIONS**	
<u>Shared Situational Awareness</u> Did Commanders have a common understanding of what has happened, what is happening now and the consequences of events? Did each of the emergency services understand their roles in resolving the emergency? Was the Joint Decision Model utilised identifying: **Situation:** What is happening? What are the impacts and risks? What might happen and what is being done about it? **Direction:** What end state is desired? What is the aim and objective of the emergency response? What priorities will inform and guide direction? **Action:** Were actions decided? What needed to be done to achieve a positive end state? Was METHANE regularly used to provide a Common Operating Picture (CoP)	Details:	

<table>
<tr><td>DEBRIEF TEAM NAMES:</td><td>LOCATION:</td><td>DATE:</td></tr>
<tr><td>INCIDENT TYPE:
(Exercise, Live Incident, Other)</td><td colspan="2"></td></tr>
<tr><td>OBJECTIVES</td><td colspan="2">LEARNING/RECOMMENDATIONS</td></tr>
<tr><td><u>Other information/issues:</u></td><td colspan="2">Details:</td></tr>
</table>

APPENDIX C –Notable Practice Aide Memoire

This aide memoire may be helpful as an aide to gather information prior to submitting Notable Practice onto the JOL Application.

Summary of issue	*The main title or heading of the issue including a brief summary of the issue*
Background	*These may include issues related to interoperability or improvement of national resilience capabilities and encompass any or all of the JESIP Principles for joint working*
Key Issues	*Detail the key issues and any initial problems around ways of joint working prior to the identification of this notable practice*
What you did/what should be done	*Taking into consideration the issue, background and key issues – what did you actually do (or should be done) to successfully implement this notable practice?*
Outcomes/expected outcomes	*Detail the outcomes of the implementation of this notable practice. Identify the real benefits 'on the ground' for beneficial and improved interoperability between services involved.*
Resource requirements	*Provide details of resources require to identify and implement this notable practice. This includes time, people, cost, consultation etc.*
Other services where involved	*Provide details of how and what other services had on the design, development and implementation of this notable practice*
Where there any barriers and if so how were they overcome	*Where there any barriers to the implementation of this notable practice. This may include culture, current working practices, finance, capacity and/or capability to implement*
Critical success factors	*The main critical success factors may include getting organisational 'buy in', continuous engagement with partners, sharing of information/intelligence protocols, joint local doctrine, consistently training and exercising with partners and measuring effectiveness 'on the ground'*

Document Control

Active date	Review date	Author	Role	Publisher
30/03/15	1/12/2015	Brian Welsh	JESIP Senior User	JESIP

Amendment History

Version	Date	Reason for change	Amended by
V1.0	30/03/2015	Guidance Document approved and signed off at Interoperability Board 23/03/2015	B Welsh
V1.1	17/04/15	Applied JESIP branding and standard formatting	J Flanagan
V1.2	24/4/15	Minor amendments based on feedback from JOL workshops	J Flanagan
V1.3	10/06/15	Amendments based on feedback from JOL launch. Addition of process for sharing information of sensitive nature on request. Minor amendments to De-Brief Template.	B Welsh
V2.0	30/10/17	Version 2 produced due to new JOL Online database and alignment of JOL and lessons Direct	B Welsh

Notes:

EXERCISE OBJECTIVES TEMPLATE

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JESIP Exercise Objectives Template

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Objectives (What do we want staff to demonstrate?)	Controlling Documents (What are we testing against)
Objective – To test levels of awareness of JESIP amongst first responder staff	
All first responder staff should: • Be able to identify a major incident and be aware how to declare one • Be able to generate a M/ETHANE message on arrival at scene and know who to pass to (using whatever prompts available) • Describe Shared Situational Awareness and what role they have in helping achieve it • Identify those in charge on-scene from other agencies as they arrive • Share incident information with first responders from other agencies at the scene using M/ETHANE • Brief commanders from their own organisation as they arrive on-scene	Joint Doctrine: The Interoperability Framework JESIP Learning Outcomes Framework
Objective - To test the interoperability of the emergency services at Operational, Tactical and Strategic levels of command	
Co-location **Commanders will:** • Co-locate and regularly meet face to face at a pre-determined location; (FCP, TCG, SCG, other) • Agree timings for future meetings and ensure all relevant commanders attend • Ensure the command structure is communicated across all emergency services and other responder agencies • Be readily identifiable through the use of tabards at FCP and TCG where appropriate	Joint Doctrine: The Interoperability Framework Principles for Joint Working Role & responsibilities of commanders JESIP Learning Outcomes Framework
Communication **Commanders will:** • Make an initial assessment of the situation and ensure appropriate resources are requested, declare a major incident if relevant • Use and agree M/ETHANE messages throughout, to help develop shared situational awareness; establish and maintain effective communications between emergency service commanders and control rooms to support a common	Joint Doctrine: The Interoperability Framework Principles for Joint Working Role & responsibilities of commanders JESIP Learning Outcomes Framework

JESIP Exercise Objectives Template

<table>
<tr><th>Objectives
(What do we want staff to demonstrate?)</th><th>Controlling Documents
(What are we testing against)</th></tr>
<tr><td>operating picture
• Establish and maintain effective communications between commanders and their respective command locations to support shared situational awareness
• Use common terminology and plain English, check understanding between commanders and other responder agency representatives involved and be prepared to challenge uncertainties
• Consider the use of interoperability talk groups between commanders to support communications (where co-location is difficult to maintain regular communications)
• At agreed meetings, commander from lead agency should ensure all parties are represented even if joining via agreed interoperability talkgroup</td><td></td></tr>
<tr><td>Co-ordination
Commanders will:
• Agree a “lead” service to coordinate the joint response
• Use the JDM as the single decision making model to share information intelligence with each other and to aid joint decision making
• Agree an initial working strategy based on what is known at the time and through the joint understanding of risks and integration of priorities
• Have clear and unambiguous joint operational response plans agreed and understood by all Commanders
• Maintain appropriate logs both single service and multi-agency</td><td>Joint Doctrine: The Interoperability Framework
Principles for Joint Working
Role & responsibilities of commanders
JESIP Learning Outcomes Framework</td></tr>
</table>

JESIP Exercise Objectives Template

Objectives (What do we want staff to demonstrate?)	Controlling Documents (What are we testing against)
Joint Understanding of Risk **Commanders will:** • Achieve a joint understanding of risk by sharing information about the likelihood and potential impacts of threats, hazards and risks • Identify any challenges the agreed operational response plan may cause other responder agencies and seek to address them • Consider all options for operational response plans and agree on the most appropriate course of action within the working strategy • Ensure hazards, threats, risks and control measures are understood and acted upon by all services and communicated effectively to relevant staff • Continually share and review dynamic risk assessments, putting in place appropriate control measures agreed jointly	Joint Doctrine: The Interoperability Framework Principles for Joint Working Role & responsibilities of commanders JESIP Learning Outcomes Framework
Shared Situational Awareness **Commanders will:** • Use the JDM as the single decision making model • Use M/ETHANE to develop and establish shared situational awareness • Have a common understanding of what has happened, what is happening now and the consequences of events • Ensure that a common operating picture is established • Develop briefings using a structured framework (IIMARCH is suggested) to ensure that the common operating picture is communicated effectively • Understand the capability, capacity and limitations of each other's organisation/response	Joint Doctrine: The Interoperability Framework Principles for Joint Working Role & responsibilities of commanders JESIP Learning Outcomes Framework

JESIP Exercise Objectives Template

Objectives (What do want staff to demonstrate?)	Doctrine/Controlling Documents (What are we testing against)
Objective - To test how effectively emergency service control rooms support interoperability	
Emergency service control rooms will: • Make an initial assessment of the available information and ensure appropriate resources are mobilised • Determine if the situation requires escalation and take action accordingly • Where appropriate, declare a major incident and communicate to others if declaration made • Ensure the wider command structure of the organisation is made aware of the major incident at the appropriate time • Initiate a conference call and/or establish a joint talkgroup to enable communication between the emergency service control rooms (manager/supervisor level) and where appropriate, partner agencies • Ensure the JDM is applied by the control room managers/supervisor • Ensure M/ETHANE messages are used throughout the exercise in an unambiguous manner across all services to support shared situational awareness • Achieve a joint understanding of risk by sharing information • Ensure RVP and/or FCP locations are considered and, if appropriate to the exercise, identified and communicated to commanders, staff and other emergency service control rooms and, where appropriate, wider responders • Where appropriate, establish an emergency services interoperability talk group and confirm all commanders are notified of it • Where appropriate, ensure a clear and appropriate transfer of command from control room manager/supervisors to other commanders	Joint Doctrine: The Interoperability Framework Control Room Guidance & Roles & Responsibilities JESIP Learning Outcomes Framework

JESIP Exercise Objectives Template

Objectives (What do want staff to demonstrate?)	Doctrine/Controlling Documents (What are we testing against)
Objective - To test and assess the debrief process and how emergency services and responder agencies capture interoperability lessons, notable practice, and share findings locally.	
Emergency services and responder agencies will: • Utilise the JESIP Interoperability debrief template to support the capture of interoperability lessons and notable practice through hot, single service and multi-agency debriefs • Successfully capture all interoperability lessons in a consistent and structured format • Ensure interoperability lessons ,notable practice and any agreed actions to resolve are shared with local, regional and national partners	JESIP - Learning Interoperability Lessons, Guidance doc. 2015 JESIP interoperability de-brief template JESIP Learning Outcomes Framework
Objective - To test and assess how emergency services and responder agencies identify interoperability lessons and/or notable practice and have processes for recording them onto the Joint Organisational Learning (JOL).	
Responder agencies will: • Ensure robust policies and procedures are in place for capturing, recording and inputting lessons identified onto JOL • Have arrangements in place to ensure that any issues to be submitted onto JOL can be shared and agreed between local services • Have identified JOL Single Point of Contact who is responsible for submitting issues onto JOL (emergency services and each LRF) • Utilise the JOL application as the default tool for the recording and sharing of interoperability lessons and notable practice via ResilienceDirect	JESIP - Learning Interoperability Lessons, Guidance doc. 2015 JESIP interoperability de-brief template JESIP Learning Outcomes Framework

Notes:

UMPIRE EVALUATION TEMPLATE

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Umpire Evaluation Template

UMPIRE NAME:	**LOCATION:**	**DATE:**
OBJECTIVES	**Operational/Tactical** *Delete as appropriate*	
<u>Communication</u> Is common terminology used? Is Airwave interoperability talk group used? Is relevant information shared across all services and control rooms throughout the incident? Were commanders easily identifiable? Were tabards worn? What was each other's organisation/response? Was METHANE used to pass information to control?		

Umpire Evaluation Template

UMPIRE NAME:	LOCATION:	DATE:
OBJECTIVES	**Operational/Tactical** *Delete as appropriate*	
Co-ordination Have joint decisions on priorities been made and if so, how were the priorities arrived at and agreed? Are the actions joined up and therefore efficient and effective? Was duplication of effort negated? Were ALL on scene resources used appropriately? Was there an understanding the capability, capacity and limitations of each other's assets? Does someone take the lead co-ordinators role		

Umpire Evaluation Template

UMPIRE NAME:	LOCATION:	DATE:
OBJECTIVES	**Operational/Tactical** *Delete as appropriate*	
<u>**Co-location**</u> What command structure is in place? Do Commanders meet face to face? Has a FCP been established? Do Commanders identify timely on-scene briefings?		

Umpire Evaluation Template

UMPIRE NAME:	LOCATION:	DATE:
OBJECTIVES	**Operational/Tactical** *Delete as appropriate*	
<u>Situational Awareness</u> Do Commanders have a common understanding of what has happened, what is happening now, the consequences of events, what has to be done and each of the emergency service's roles in resolving the emergency? Was the Joint Decision Model utilised identifying: **Situation:** What is happening? What are the impacts and risks? What might happen and what is being done about it?		

Umpire Evaluation Template

UMPIRE NAME:	LOCATION:	DATE:
OBJECTIVES	**Operational/Tactical** *Delete as appropriate*	
<u>Situational Awareness continued</u> Was the Joint Decision Model utilised identifying: **Direction:** What end state is desired? What is the aim and objective of the emergency response? What priorities will inform and guide direction? **Action:** Were actions decided? What needed to be done to achieve a positive end state?		

Umpire Evaluation Template

UMPIRE NAME:	LOCATION:	DATE:
OBJECTIVES	**Operational/Tactical** *Delete as appropriate*	
Joint Understanding of Risk Were threats and hazards identified, understood and treated different by each emergency service Were limitations and capabilities of people and equipment identified Was a joint understanding of risk achieved by sharing information about the likelihood and potential impacts of threats and hazards		

Umpire Evaluation Template

UMPIRE NAME:	LOCATION:	DATE:
OBJECTIVES	**Operational/Tactical** *Delete as appropriate*	
<u>Control Room information</u> At the point of mobilisation of resources, did each control room have the same picture? Throughout the incident, was a common operating picture clearly identified? Did informative messages from each service have conflicting information? When Major incident was declared did Commanders utilise M/ETHANE mnemonic?		

Have you identified anything that negatively impacted on the joint response of the services involved?

If yes, please ensure the details of the issue are entered onto the JESIP Joint Organisational Learning (JOL) database, JOL Online, either via your local JOL Single Point of Contact or the JESIP team.

Notes:

MULTI-AGENCY DEBRIEF TEMPLATE

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Multi-Agency Debrief Template

DEBRIEF TEAM NAMES:	LOCATION:	DATE OF EVENT:
	EVENT TYPE: (Exercise, Live Incident, Other)	

JESIP Principle - Co-location	
OBJECTIVES	LEARNING/RECOMMENDATIONS – Record observations below
Were commanders easily identifiable? (Tabards)	
What command structures were in place?	
Did commanders meet face to face?	
Was a Forward Command Post (FCP) established?	
Did commanders have timely on-scene briefings?	

Multi-Agency Debrief Template

JESIP Principle – Communication	
OBJECTIVES	**LEARNING/RECOMMENDATIONS – Record observations below**
Was common terminology used?	
Was an Airwave interoperability talk group used?	
Was relevant information shared across all services and control rooms throughout the incident?	
Was METHANE used to pass information to control?	
Were effective communications established between: • Operational & tactical commanders • Commanders and control rooms • Emergency service commanders and other responding organisations • Local emergency service control rooms • Emergency service control rooms and national co-ordinating centres	

Multi-Agency Debrief Template

JESIP Principle - Co-ordination	
OBJECTIVES	**LEARNING/RECOMMENDATIONS – Record observations below**
Did Commanders use the JDM as single decision model?	
Were Capabilities & Responsibilities identified?	
Were joint decisions on priorities made and if so, how were the priorities arrived at and agreed?	
Were actions joined up and therefore efficient and effective?	
Were ALL on scene resources used appropriately?	
Was there an understanding of the capability, capacity and limitations of each other's assets?	
Did someone take the lead co-ordinators role during Multi-Agency meetings?	

Multi-Agency Debrief Template

JESIP Principle - Understanding of Risk	
OBJECTIVES	**LEARNING/RECOMMENDATIONS – Record observations below**
Were threats and hazards identified, understood and treated different by each emergency service?	
Were limitations and capabilities of people and equipment identified?	
Was a joint understanding of risk achieved by sharing information about the likelihood and potential impacts of threats and hazards? e.g. sharing of risk assessments	

Multi-Agency Debrief Template

JESIP Principle - Shared Situational Awareness	
OBJECTIVES	**LEARNING/RECOMMENDATIONS – Record observations below**
Did Commanders have a common understanding of what has happened, what is happening now and the consequences of events?	
Did each of the emergency services understand their roles in resolving the emergency?	
Was M/ETHANE regularly used to provide a Common Operating Picture (CoP)	
Was the Joint Decision Model utilised identifying: **Situation:** What is happening? What are the impacts and risks? What might happen and what is being done about it? **Direction:** What end state is desired? What is the aim and objective of the emergency response? What priorities will inform and guide direction? **Action:** Were actions decided? What needed to be done to achieve a positive end state?	

Multi-Agency Debrief Template

Any other information/issues:	
Other Issues	**LEARNING/RECOMMENDATIONS – Record observations below**
[Describe the issue here]	*[Provide details and observations about the issue, what went wrong and who it affected. New rows can be added for multiple issues]*
[Describe the issue here]	*[Provide details and observations about the issue, what went wrong and who it affected. New rows can be added for multiple issues]*
[Describe the issue here]	*[Provide details and observations about the issue, what went wrong and who it affected. New rows can be added for multiple issues]*

Multi-Agency Debrief Template

Submission to Joint Organisational Learning

Do any of the issues raised during this de-brief meet the criteria for submitting to JOL Online?	**Yes/ No** (delete as appropriate)
Who will submit onto JOL Online? (agree with all parties)	
Name	**Organisation**

Triggers for submission to JOL Online:

Any issues raised as part of this debrief which meet any or all of the following criteria should be submitted onto JOL:

- relate to emergency response interoperability, primarily the use of M/ETHANE, the five JESIP principles for joint working and use of the Joint Decision Model;
- had an impact on the effectiveness of at least two of the response organisations;
- impeded successful interoperability;
- are known recurring issues; and/or
- if resolved could benefit other organisations therefore may have national impact.

Joint Doctrine Supporting Document
IIMARCH template

JESIP

The IIMARCH template below may help commanders in preparing a brief. When using IIMARCH, it is helpful to consider the following:

- Brevity is important - if it is not relevant, leave it out
- Communicate using unambiguous language free from jargon and in terms people will understand
- Check that others understand and explain if necessary
- Consider whether an agreed information assessment tool or framework has been used

Element	Key questions and considerations	Action
I	**Information** **What, where, when, how, how many, so what, what might?** Timeline and history (if applicable), key facts reported using M/ETHANE	
I	**Intent** **Why are we here, what are we trying to achieve?** Strategic aim and objectives, joint working strategy	

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AIRWAVE TEST

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Emergency Services Airwave Interoperability Test Regime

Introduction

1. The benefits of multi-agency Airwave use are a feature of JESIP training courses for commanders and control rooms. These courses highlight the various multi-agency talkgroups available and the arrangements in place to activate them. To help embed this learning and maintain familiarity with procedures, JESIP developed a simple test procedure. This is attached at Annex A.

2. This document sets out JESIP's expectations with regards to local implementation of the Airwave test procedure.

Background

3. The Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Programme (JESIP) published "Joint Doctrine: The interoperability framework" in 2013. This guidance focuses on police, fire and ambulance interoperability in the early stages of the response to a major or complex incident. Its purpose is to provide emergency service commanders with a framework to enable them to respond together as effectively as possible. It has since been used as the basis to train over 12,000 emergency services commanders and control room supervisory staff in a tri-service environment.

4. The core principles outlined in the doctrine are co-location, communication, co-ordination, joint understanding of risk, and shared situational awareness. Other key components are the METHANE pneumonic as a means to achieve shared situational awareness and a Joint Decision Model.

5. JESIP is people, rather than technology focussed, but does provide guidance on the effective use of existing technological solutions.

6. The JESIP Aide memoire provides the following *(right)* guidance on multi-agency communications.

7. Airwave, as the emergency services' digital radio platform, plays a crucial role in day-to-day operations for the emergency services. Given the different response arrangements and alternative uses of the radio network for each agency, a guide on developing procedures for the multiagency use of Airwave was



produced in 2010[1]. This followed with an expectation that Local Resilience Forums would jointly develop their own agreed protocols for use in their area. This would support communication efforts between incident commanders when it was not possible for them to co-locate.

Accountability

8. As with other JESIP products, accountability for implementation and operation of this test procedure resides with the organisation's designated JESIP Strategic Lead. The occurrence of tests will be monitored periodically through analysis of multiagency talkgroups usage reports by the JESIP Board. The JESIP team will also seek assurance that individual services have a regular Airwave test regime in place as part of the JESIP Self-Assessment Toolkit and it may also form part of any single or tri-service reviews by inspecting bodies. .

Expectations

9. The table below specifies the expectations that each agency is expected to meet:

Element	Expectation
Organisations involved	• To include at least the ambulance trust, fire and rescue service and territorial police force. • These core organisations may be augmented as agreed locally with other users of the Airwave system. In particular, areas may wish to consider the involvement of other local users most likely to be included when invoking multi-agency talkgroups . E.g. British Transport Police, Maritime & Coastguard Agency, Airport Fire Services. • There is <u>no requirement</u> that emergency services' control rooms should be conducting tests of <u>all</u> local Airwave user organisations every month. This is based on practicalities of conducting the test, and in recognition that many users already conduct regular tests within their sector.
Personnel involved	• Tests will be held for both Tactical Commanders and Operational Commanders on duty at that time (not necessarily on the same call).
Frequency	• Control rooms should participate in a test at least monthly. Due to the different number and jurisdiction boundaries of control rooms between services, some control rooms will need to participate more frequently. • Consideration should be given to scheduling these so as to maximise exposure of commanders and control room staff to the tests over the course of a year.
Test Duration	• It is anticipated that each test will last no more than 10 minutes.

[1] Standard Operating Procedures Guide on Multiagency Airwave Interoperability, 2010; http://www.acpo.police.uk/documents/uniformed/2010/20110831%20UOBA%20SOP-Guide-Multi-Agency-Airwave-Interoperability-20101%20(2).pdf

Implementing the Test Arrangements

10. It is recommended that the Ambulance Trusts coordinate the scheduling of tests. As a result of their larger geographical footprint they will be expected to undertake a greater number of Airwave tests. It would be prudent that tests are scheduled at a mutually convenient time when demand is forecast to be at a minimum, e.g. 0800 hours on Sunday mornings.

11. Agencies will be expected to implement this test regime and hold their first Airwave tests in May 2015. Local services' JESIP Delivery Leads and all participants in control room training courses conducted since the autumn 2014 have been made aware of the intended implementation.

12. Copies of this briefing note have been sent to JESIP Strategic Leads, JESIP Delivery Leads and control room managers.

Annex A: Airwave Interoperability Test Flowchart



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